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PREFACE
The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is unseen decides what
happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and
ungrasped.
John Dewey1
This dissertation began as an attempt to theorize “conversation,” based on my
experiences of learning, intuitively understanding conversation as a necessary element of my
learning. I planned to build upon a chapter written for my Masters thesis entitled,
“Conversation as a Mode of Research” (Trueit, 1996), elucidating what conversation is and
how it works. I was further encouraged in this project when I found William F. Pinar’s (et al.,
1995) reference to the field of curriculum as a “complicated conversation.” Seeking to narrow
the topic, I was surprised and inspired by neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty’s (1979,
360) inference that conversation is poetic. This was, I thought, an odd claim when I first read
it. I associated “poetic” with poetry, being imaginative, speaking metaphorically. I was aware
that Walter Ong (1982), a medievalist, explicates the poetic aspects of speech in primarily
oral communities: those Euro-Western communities prior to the printing press, where
presence, situation and the oral/aural—rhythm, rhyme, flow of words—were important for
understanding. From Ong’s perspective, conversation as oral discourse has a strong element
of the poetic in it. This view seems to me true, but too simple. Rorty (1989) has more in mind
about the poetic when he claims that the poet is “the maker of new words, the shaper of new
languages, [and] the vanguard of the species” (20). Rorty describes poets as those who “rebel
more strongly against the fear of death than other men and women do” (24). Rorty considers
Proust, Nabokov, Newton, Darwin, Hegel, and Heidegger all to be poets because “such
                                                 
1 Experience and Nature, 1958.
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people are…thought of as rebelling against death—that is, against the failure to have created”
(24). Poets are not just wordsmiths, they are creators. The intent of this dissertation is to
complexify2 the poetic that Rorty talks about, to understand this concept in a broader and
deeper sense.
In reading Rorty’s later works, especially Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), I found
he did indeed mean more. Rorty sees conversation as the discourse by which we envision the
future, the discourse which gives us the new metaphors we need to think beyond modernity
and its confines; the discourse upon which rests “intellectual and moral progress,” the
discourse which gives us “an increase in imaginative power” whereby we can “make the
human future richer than the human past” (87). These are vast claims, perhaps too vast, but in
aligning conversation with imagination—thought itself—intellectual and moral progress,
Rorty is putting forth his notion of progressivism and the social hope he finds there. I find this
notion of conversation aligned with social hope inspiring, if overwhelming, as I think about
education and the development of a new perspective on it.
The phrase, thinking “beyond modernity,” is one I borrow from Cornel West (1993).
William Doll (1993, 2002, 2005)3 explains “modern” and “modernity” as both a time period
and a form of thought. Doll (1993) quotes David Griffin who refers to the straightjacket of
modern thinking, that which began in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century
and/or the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Doll characterizes modern
                                                 
2 The use of the word “complexify” here, and in my title, alludes to the connections I make to complexity
theory. “To complexify” is to recognize differentiation, acknowledging “an increase in the intricacy of inter-
relations,” with an implication of mysticism, “greatly assisted by the hand of life” (Oxford English Dictionary,
online version). Complexity theory recognizes reductionism as an error characteristic of modern rationalism and
plays with the generative possibilities of difference. For more on complexity theory, see Doll (et al., 2005).
3 Much of the theoretical work in this dissertation is influenced by, and has developed through, my
relationship with William E. Doll, Jr., who is my teacher, husband, colleague, and best friend.
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thought, in part, as a cosmology reduced to mathematical and mechanistic principles,
indicating the supremacy of (Cartesian, Euclidean) “right reason,” a subject/object split that
has led to the hierarchical ordering of “reality”; universal and eternal laws pointing to
certainty; inquiry directed at ascertaining causality, predictability, and control—in a linear
fashion; a universe that can be broken down into atomistic units, that can be known, named,
categorized, and ordered. As I explain further in Chapter 1, modern thought, is also called
rationalism (Timothy Reiss, 1982) or rationality (William James). As Michel Foucault points
out, to be irrational in modern society, is to be undisciplined, that is, not fitting the norm of
thought. Reiss claims that rationalism is a form of thought, the dominant form of thought in
modernity. My inquiry concerns the possibility of thinking beyond rationalism. I suggest that
rationalism is a mimetic form of thought. While not discarding the necessity of reason, or the
role of mimesis, I suggest that poietic thought—a complex process of creating,
imagining—may be the discursive tool to help us move beyond the confines of modernity.
The topic of “conversation” provides a backdrop against which Complexifying the Poetic:
Toward a Poiesis of Curriculum is foregrounded. This inquiry is an exploration of the poetic
(particularly in its poietic form) and the implications which can come forward in relation to
curriculum: a poietic curriculum.
Until the LSU doctoral program in curriculum studies offered me this unequalled
opportunity for free inquiry, I took for granted much of the world around me, not in an
uninterested way; I was curious to learn, I was a feminist, I was a critical theory student and I
was learning well. Between quantitative and qualitative research methods, I would choose
“qualitative.” Life was tidy.
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The course work that led up to my General Examination initiated a shift in my
thinking, however, and the clear boundaries that marked not only how I conceived the world,
but myself, as well, began to blur. Reading and researching for this dissertation has taken me
to another level in the disordering of that certainty with which I was so comfortable. I have
taken the opportunity to learn more about the way logic is embedded in language and its
grammar; how thought and interpretations of experience are shaped by language; how values
and projects of modernity related to humanism, politics, and ethics might be re-conceived;
how one might develop modes of inquiry that might sit outside a modern tradition. As a
result, conceptually, the writing of this dissertation, was, and is, its own challenge.
The methodology that justifies this inquiry is lengthy; in it, I critique rationalism and
show how a pragmatist approach to inquiry shifts the discourse, addressing the problematic
“logic of domination” that Rorty claims constrains inquiry. In this shift, pragmatism enhances
rather than abandons reason. My attempt is to imagine how to be “not modern”; to speculate
on how imagination aids creativity and enhances emergence of the new; to articulate the
relationship of imagination to conceptions of self; and finally, to suggest ways for developing
curriculum that takes seriously the lofty goal of education in preference to schooling. I mark
this shift as the difference between poiesis (to create, to make, to do) and mimesis (copy,
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ABSTRACT
Inspired by philosopher Richard Rorty’s assertion that we need poetic imagination to
move beyond modernity, this pragmatist inquiry seeks to understand the poetic, not as it is
rationally defined, but rather as a historically situated discursive practice. In western cultures
modernist discursive practices are characterized by rationalist reasoning. Traced to
Aristotelian re- interpretations of mimesis (this is that), which structure modernist forms of
representation, mimesis operates on a principle of equivalency between the specific and the
universal, based on Euclidean, geometric reasoning. Likewise, mimesis underlies poetic
representation as an imaginative expression of an objective reality, ideally, a form that moves
one to think in universal terms.
Obscured from a modernist view of the poetic is a prior pre-Socratic mimesis, in which
are embedded the concepts of poiesis (to create, to make, to do) and paideia (cultural
education). Mimesis here is linked to poetic “re-presentations” as performances of epic
poems. Poiesis, etymological root of the word poetic, is related to making meaning through
interactions with others, with the environment/ cosmos, and reflexively to develop a sense of
being-in-relation. Knowledge, in this schema, is fluid, evolving, situated, communal, and is
based on patterns.
As a form of reason, pragmatist logic addresses the failure of modern rationalism to
theorize the implications of evolution, creativity and entropy; it also questions logical
relationships that exist between representation and mathematics, and the metaphysical
assumptions underlying them. Pragmatist logic, based on triadic reasoning, draws on poiesis
as an organizing principle of reason and its representation, and is a bridge to complexity
theory. Findings of this inquiry suggest (1) re-reading progressive educationist John Dewey in
xiii
light of poiesis, rather than modernist or Aristotelian views of the poetic; and (2)
consideration of a poiesis of curriculum, one that emerges as a complex living process, out of
guided inquiry, and from the reflections of students on their interactions with their
environment, with others, and with the greater world outside the classroom.
1
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION:
RATIONAL BEGINNING POINTS
Hidden in the whole process are personal and social values which only emerge
from a tacit state over a lengthy period of time. It is, in other words, easier to
come to know what one values through one’s writing than to write from our
values as rational beginning points.
James B. Macdonald
The above statement by James B. Macdonald (1975b), one of those who inspired the
“Reconceptualist” movement of the late twentieth century, is taken out of context, but serves a
purpose here, to begin the introduction to this dissertation. The statement is intriguing; I needed
to read it several times. I had to work to understand, and even now, I wonder. The fact of my
working to understand, having inspired me to make connections, and to go beyond—to imagine,
to engage in further study—is the point I am after. Macdonald was known as one who valued
poetic writing.
The Macdonald statement is significant, too, because it marks a threshold, one that
recognizes “rational” beginning points in curriculum, and another not yet fully articulated point,
“tacit.” While the statement marks a “personal/social” or public/private distinction, more
significantly, it tells me that for Macdonald beginning at “rational” points is not the same as
beginning at “values” points. The rational view is not necessarily his personal view. Implied,
here, is the impossibility of articulating personal values from “rational beginning points” (3).
Reading further in this short paper, in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists
(Pinar, 1975), Macdonald reveals that,
2
The struggle for personal integration, educational integrity, and social justice go
on, necessitating the constant reevaluation of oneself, one’s work and one’s
world—with the hope that whatever creative talent one may possess will lead
toward something better that we may all share, each in his own way. (4)
This statement signals Macdonald’s passionate interest in negotiating complicated
passages between what he calls the “human condition” and the “larger condition”; but also his
desire to create, to lead education toward “something better”— something more. Macdonald
agrees with John Dewey’s comment that “educational philosophy was the essence of all
philosophy because it was ‘the study of how to have a world’” (12). This kind of study needs
imagination, a form of thought that is creative, sometimes called poetic thought.
Macdonald was writing at the beginning of a new era in American curriculum theorizing,
the Reconceptualist Movement, a humanizing of at least part of the field of curriculum studies.
His optimism at this point is inspiring because, unfortunately, recent trends in educational reform
seem to be focused not on creating something “more,” but rather on getting “back to basics,” as
in the No Child Left Behind reforms. For me this language signals another return to a
“representational epistemology” where “knowledge ‘stands for’ or represents a world that is
separate” (Osberg and Biesta, 2003).1 I call this a mimetic curriculum, arising from, and
reinforced by rationalist discursive practices (Chapter 2). The “back and forth” of reforms in
education seem to indicate that we never get it right; as I survey the literature and study
                                                 
1 W. J. T. Mitchell (1994), in Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation, reconceptualizes
representation, and invites the reader to consider: “Suppose we thought of representation, not as a homogenous field
or grid of relationships, governed by a single [mimetic] principle but as a multi-dimensional and heterogeneous
terrain, a collage or patchwork quilt assembled over time out of fragments. Suppose further that this quilt was torn,
folded, wrinkled, covered with accidental stains, traces of the bodies it has enfolded. This model might help us
understand a number of things about representation” (419). I refer again to Mitchell in regard to Tetsuo Aoki’s use
of metonymy to disrupt modernist representation in Chapter 5.
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curriculum, I find that many of the issues of reform in the past 120 years, involve what is broadly
termed progressive2 reform and a more conservative “basics” approach to which we always seem
to “return.” These two approaches involve very different ways of thinking about curriculum. As
Dennis Carlson (2002) points out, “progressivism is about learning to think and act in new ways,
to leave the safe harbors of the mythologies we have grown comfortable and secure with, and to
re-script and re-work mythologies and narratives in ways that open up democratic possibilities
for the development of self and culture” (3). He asks how it is that we may move from the
security of the safe harbor to the “postmodern,” with its “uncertainty and unpredictability,”
“chaos and loss of meaning.”3
In narrowing the focus of this work, but also in providing some context for situating it in
the field of curriculum studies and making connections to “the poetic,” I begin by drawing from
Lawrence Cremin’s (1975) history of early curriculum organization in America.4 Cremin begins
with William Torrey Harris, acknowledging that he was one among many post-Civil War
schoolmen who developed curricula (in the 1870s) for the “intractable problem of universal
schooling in an increasingly urban society, namely the rationalizing of the school system along
bureaucratic and industrial lines” (20; emphasis added). Harris (quoted in Cremin) states that
the only defensible course of studies is one that “takes up in order the conventionalities of
                                                 
2 The term “progressive” is convenient here, but problematic as Herbert Kliebard (1995) points out. Here I use
the term to refer to progressive reform in the pragmatist style of John Dewey and Jane Addams.
3 Carlson argues throughout his book that a “new progressivism is emerging out of the dialectic between
modern and postmodern discourse and narratives, in the borderlands where the hybrid subject is continuously
engaged in critical reflection, and in the creative play of diverse cultural forms and identity categories” (6). It is the
dynamic of “creative play” that interests me and for which I find chaos and complexity theory useful tools of
imagination.
4 Other excellent histories of the mechanistic metaphors that orient education are found in Doll (1993, 2002,
2005), and Doug McKnight (2003).
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intelligence”; Cremin explains that the two great provinces of thought, for Harris, were nature
and spirit, which were to be developed through the curriculum—that is, courses of study laid out
by Harris. The “instrument of the process would be the textbook” (Cremin, 22; emphasis added).
As Cremin notes, the analytical paradigm for Harris’ curriculum went unchallenged for the next
50 years:
There is the learner, self-active and self-willed by virtue of his humanity and thus
self-propelled into the educative process; there is the course of study, organized
by responsible adults with appropriate concern for priority, sequence, and scope;
there are materials of instruction which particularize the course of study; there is
the teacher who encourages and mediates the process of instruction; there are the
examinations which appraise it; and there is the organizational structure within
which it proceeds and within which large numbers of individuals are enabled
simultaneously to enjoy its benefits. (22)
This was, indeed, the rationalizing of curriculum. An efficient, universal delivery system
to universalized learners: textbook facts, scheduling and supervision administered, secured with
belief in the joy that accompanies such rationalizing, harkening back to Peter Ramus and John
Amos Comenius (Doll, 2005). It was Harris’s model for education from primary school through
college. Later (Chapter 2), I will elaborate on rationalism as a modern episteme, but here, the
point is there is no place in this rational frame for questioning, reflection, or creative process,
unheard of until the Progressive Era, and later in the reform efforts of 1950s and 1960s (Cremin,
26). Early Progressive Era pragmatists of influence, John Dewey, Jane Addams, and Ella Flagg
Young set the tone for humanizing curriculum by aspiring to make curriculum engage the lives
of students. Humanizing curriculum started with the lives of students, attending to the skills and
competencies they needed to participate in their communities, and advancing their abilities. Later
curricularists, “conceptual empiricists” including “behaviorists” (Pinar, 1975, x), missed the
5
existential/participatory point that Dewey made. Their efforts were directed at designing “syllabi
and instructional materials designed to introduce students as engagingly and efficiently as
possible to the leading concepts and methods of the field” (Cremin, 1975, 26–27). This was not
progressive education as Dewey envisioned it. 5
This dissertation reiterates James Macdonald’s voiced concern regarding “rational
beginning points,” rather than lived ones; it stands as a critique of modernist rationality as it
explores how the “new” in “reconceptualization” might be created. Pinar (1975) describes the
project of the post-critical reconceptualists as being concerned with the “creation of the new”
(Preface, xi). In this dissertation, I am arguing that such creation is inherent in a poietic
curriculum.6
When Richard Rorty comments that we need poetic discourse (1979, 1999), he, too, is
suggesting that we move beyond the present rational discourse. Rorty, in fact, does not usually
refer to “rationalism”; he prefers to critique an “onto-theological metaphysical” vocabulary (a
                                                 
5 As Kliebard (1992) and Cremin (1961) both explain, progressive reforms have taken place many times in the
past century, each seemingly an improvement on the past. “Progressive” change in education is often associated
with Dewey; however many of the reforms, while they are designed to make progress in some way, have little to do
with Dewey or his ideas about education. Pragmatist approaches to education are a faint voice of opposition to the
dominating traditional discourse in education.
6 “Creativity” in curriculum is not a new concept. John Dewey and Jane Addams encouraged teaching through
art. In the 1950s Benjamin Bloom (1956), as part of the behavioral scientists’ “humanizing” of curriculum, brought
“creativity” into his taxonomy of educational objectives. Creativity is there linked with critical thinking and
problem-solving. Creativity in this sense is related to finding solutions to problems by using “thinking skills.”
Bloom’s use of the word “creative” here serves as an example of how words or concepts are pulled into a rational
frame to create a new—a-historical, a-contextual —standard of meaning for a word; a “new” concept that fits a
behaviorally testable construction. In this sense, “creativity” is technologized, consisting of a skill set, which fits
within a mimetic curriculum frame. Skills are practiced, in imitation, over and over again, until a level of
achievement is reached. E. Paul Torrance, in educational psychology, designed a test (1966) to evaluate creativity in
two dimensions (verbal and figural), creating the now commonly recognized category of “gifted and talented.”
Continuing that work, and expanding upon it, Jane Piirto (1998, 2004) looks at Understanding Creativity.
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phrase he borrows from Martin Heidegger), which he also refers to as “Platonism and
Cartesianism”:
“Platonism” in the sense in which I use the term does not denote the (very
complex, shifting, dubiously consistent) thoughts of the genius who wrote the
Dialogues. Instead, it refers to a set of philosophical distinctions (appearance/
reality, matter/mind, made/found, sensible/intellectual, etc.): what Dewey called
“a brood and nest of dualisms.” These dualisms dominate the history of Western
philosophy, and can be traced back to one or another of Plato’s writings. (1999,
xii)
For Rorty, modern discourse, that which has evolved since the seventeenth century, is
embedded with Greek metaphysical and Christian theological values; these values permeate
Western culture, perpetuate particular ways of thinking, and determine the truth-value or
certainty of thought. These values are the foundations of modern philosophy. Drawing on
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s descriptive and demystifying terminology in regard to language, Rorty
refers to such Platonist (Greek metaphysical) and Cartesian (Christian theological) values as a
vocabulary. Wittgenstein uses the terms “vocabulary,” “tools,” and “language games” to convey
that language should be thought of as a useful device rather than a transparent, benign, medium
through which meaning is conveyed. Rorty comments that the vocabulary of the past may have
been adequate for its purposes, but is no longer sufficient. He suggests that we need new
metaphors; we need to imagine new ways of speaking to move us toward a better future.
Rorty’s anti-metaphysical views, particularly those regarding language, progress and
method, situate him as a neo-pragmatist. 7 This dissertation will neither analyze nor critique
                                                 
7 As Rorty explains the difference, neo-pragmatists have taken the linguistic turn, picking up the topic of
“language” and dropping the topics of “experience” and “moral and social philosophy” (1999, 24–25).
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Rorty’s philosophical position, per se, but will draw on a pragmatist/neo-pragmatist perspective
to elucidate the poetic.
SITUATING AND CONTEXTUALIZING THE QUESTIONS
In situating my inquiry, I take my lead from Rorty,8 who suggests that the way questions
are asked may situate them as “modern” questions, intended to get at a-historical, a-contextual
answers. “What is…” questions lead to definitive answers, even from a historical perspective,
isolating the phenomenon from the context of the situation in which it evolved, indicating that
both the form and the intent of the question are shaped by cultural hegemony. Further, as M.
Jayne Fleener (1999) explains, even the interpretations of research findings are subject to a
“logic of domination,”9 so rooted in our modern world that we have come to accept [dominating]
“hierarchies of relationships as necessary and even fundamental to being and knowing” (8). This
hierarchical logic defines how we make sense of our world and is embedded in the very language
we speak.
Fleener recommends we focus on “why” questions (rather than “what is…” questions),
an approach that does not seek foundational or definitive answers, but explores meanings in the
past and present “within a matrix of social meaning systems” (8–9; emphasis added). The
heuristic of a matrix is helpful in eluding the trap of a-contextual, a-historical thinking. A matrix
                                                 
8 Rorty does not identify himself as a post-modernist, although much of his scholarship supports post-modern
theory. Rorty does call for moving beyond modernity, for using a new vocabulary, for creating new tools to envision
a better future.
9 “Logic of domination” is the term eco-feminist Karen Warren (1997) uses to describe the “oppressive
conceptual framework” of modernism. The phrase is not used in the sense of the Frankfurt School of critical theory,
but refers rather to “a structure of argumentation which leads to a justification of subordination” (Fleener, 1999), and
as Fleener (2005) later remarks, “The logic of domination is intrinsic to the scientific paradigm and the
mathematization of reality” (8).
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is a “situation or set of circumstances that allows or encourages the origin, development, or
growth of something” (OED). 10 Archaically, it is “the womb,” appropriate to this dissertation for
the way that systems (like the fetus, placenta/uterus, mother) are nested, connected, and growing
in relation. Tracing and describing such intertwined meaning, over time, presents a complicated
enough challenge, but that challenge is doubled in consideration that the meaning we ascribe to
events and circumstances is historically and culturally determined. The poetic is a form of
thought, inseparable from a human “being,” as well as a form of representation. This complex
bundle of self, thought, and representation is intertwined with the poetic. This same self-thought-
representation bundle circulates, in many different forms, around philosophical questions in the
present as it did around metaphysical questions of the past. Seen poietically, this triad yields
insights into new ways of organization not found in contemporary discourses. As Reiss (1982)
notes, it is a "nonconceptualized order," one that does not seek to separate concept and object
(46).
RESEARCH FOCI
This research investigates: (1) the “poetic,” and its relation to modern rationalism; (2) the
poietic with its relation to the poetic; and (3) implications of the poietic for curriculum,
particularly from a pragmatist and complexity theory perspective.
Why “poetic”? The poetic is a form of representation, often contrasted with “rational”
forms of discourse. Poetic(al) means “(1) relating to, typical of, or in the form of poetry; (2)
having qualities usually associated with poetry, especially in being gracefully expressive,
                                                 
10 OED: Oxford English Dictionary; all references are to the online version, LSU Libraries, Indexes and
Databases.
9
romantically beautiful, or elevated and uplifting; (3) characteristic of a poet, especially in
possessing unusual sensitivity or insight or in being able to express things in a beautiful or
romantic way” (OED). Inspired by Rorty’s claims about the “poetic,”11 this inquiry traces
historically and explores contextually, the meaning of the word at various bifurcation points
related to education, more specifically, to curriculum. From the time of the late Humanist (and
Protestant) Reform Movement to the current day, education as the representation of knowledge
has tended to a linearly structured curriculum. Here education as “imitation” (mimesis), based on
“Platonist” views is a copying act (Doll, 2005). Examples of the “logical” and mimetic approach
to curriculum and instruction continue to exist in today’s approach to lectures, exercises,
discipline, drills, sequencing. I believe it is fair to say that even today concepts of curriculum,
and the way it is delivered, can be called mimetic, due to a reliance on representational
epistemology (Osberg 2003, 2004). The curriculum in this case is the subject content that
students need to learn, and they are evaluated on how well they respond on examinations.
Renaissance and Humanist ideas about “representation” were based on a simple
translation of mimesis (representation), from the Latin, as “imitation” or “copy,” not on the
earlier Greek meaning of the word. An etymological and historical exploration of “poetic,”
reveals differing meanings-in-use, pre- and post-Socrates. It is a slippery concept. Mimesis is
always about representation. In its pre-Socratic, poetic form it is related to one form of thought,
                                                 
11 Richard Rorty, in making this claim, draws on Michael Oakeshott’s (1962) essay, “The Voice of Poetry in the
Conversation of Mankind,” in which Oakeshott suggests the poetic voice is one of three needed to inform thought
(poetic, scientific and practical), rather than the overly dominant voice of argumentative discourse, “the voice of
science” (197). Therefore, says Oakeshott, we need conversation rather than argumentation so that all voices may be
heard.
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expressed as a verb: “to create, to make, to do”—poiesis. After Plato, however, mimesis is
transformed: it is a noun, meaning “imitation,” “copy.” This dichotomous split has repressed the
value of the concept of the poetic in a rationalist culture. Today the “poetic” remains an
intellectually, academically devalued discourse—not “scientific”; therefore, not a source of true
knowledge. What kind of magic, then, is Rorty’s idea of the poetic that it might enable us to
move beyond modernity? In my search for meanings of the word “poetic,” beyond our
contemporary and most modernist frame, I come to my second question.
What is poiesis? The etymological root of “poetic” is poiesis (to create, to make, to do),
an action word, denoting a process—also related to education (paideia) through the concept of
mimesis.12 Traced to its pre-Socratic roots, “poetic” leads to poiesis. Here (re-) presentation
(mimesis) meant re-enactment related to the performance of Homeric epic poetry. Following this
pre-Socratic lead, my dissertation will develop the notion of poiesis, and poietic episteme. From
our current perspective, i.e., modes of thought, or vocabularies, such a creating is nearly
incomprehensible. Poiesis, understood from a process perspective, is perhaps best described in
                                                 
12 In recent years the word “paideia” related to education was used by Mortimer Adler, at the University of
Chicago, who founded the Paideia Program, a school curriculum centered around guided reading and discussion of
difficult works (as judged for each grade). “Paideia is a dynamic approach to restructuring schools to foster more
active learning and a better use of teacher and student time.” Adler’s curriculum stresses identification of key ideas,
development of basic skills, and recall of significant facts. He fought progressive education's child-centered
curriculum and vocation-centered training. He championed general education in the classics, where universal moral
truths could be found in the works of Plato and Aristotle: “the great ideas from great books.” Retrieved from the
internet: http://radicalacademy.com/homepage.htm; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Mortimer_Adler (Oct, 2005).
Adler’s ideas are criticized because such an education pays too much attention to the works of great (white) men,
and too little to women, people of color, and other minorities. A classical education has the tendency to reproduce
existing (hierarchical) structures in society.
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terms of complexity: the language of self-organizing, non-linear dynamical systems, which
offers a way to critique current curriculum thought and to re-think curricular relationships. As
my inquiry will reveal, poiesis is a powerful concept, associated with creating, with difference,
and with the emergence of the new—obviously, the inverse of ideas associated with a later
(Roman) interpretation of mimesis, that of simple copying, of simple, visual representation, of
what Peter Ramus laid out in the latter sixteenth century (Doll, 2005; Triche, 2002; Triche and
McKnight, 2004).
My intent is not to disregard mimesis—far from it—but to understand more about the role
of education and the process of curriculum by investigating representation (mimesis) in
curriculum, and how the interpretation currently used fits within the modern episteme. My third
question is, therefore, “How is a poietic curriculum different than a mimetic curriculum?” What
practical difference can it make to reconceive curriculum, thought, representation, and even, the
“self” in poietic terms? In describing the poietic, to speculate on the process of creating, to
theorize the difference, to think other than in modernist, representational terms, I draw upon
themes from complexity theory, the semeiotic logic of C. S. Peirce, and Gregory Bateson’s idea
of “difference that makes a difference.”13 Specifically, I would like this work to lend support to
recognizing the generativity of differences, to address the inadequacies, paradoxes and ironies of
modernist thought, and recognize the possibilities inherent in the vocabulary of complexity
theory, i.e., self-organizing (or emergent), dynamical systems. Ideally, one will appreciate, in this
proffered hypothesis, conceptions of self, representation, and thought (reason, logic) that have
                                                 
13 Neither Peirce or Bateson is considered a “complexity theorist”; however, each is considered to have laid the
groundwork for those who are, and so might be thought of as grandfathers to this newly emerging field.
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rendered the enactment of democratic education such a challenge, and the hope-filled reasons for
reconceiving a post-humanist self, a play-filled logic, and a poietic representation.
METHODOLOGY
A lengthy discussion of method and methodological concerns is presented in Chapter 2,
providing the rationale for a pragmatist approach to inquiry. In the first and second part of this
chapter, I identify “methods” as a technology of rationalism, historicize rationalism as the
dominant discourse (drawing on Timothy Reiss, 1982), and demonstrate the inadequacies of this
discursive practice. Such a discussion demonstrates how a modern episteme functions, in part
through its methods, to (re)define concepts in a rationalist mode, thereby maintaining itself as a
“dominant discourse.” In this mode, the poetic is defined by, and in relation to, rational
discourse. Consequently, I find research practices based on such a conceptual framework
inadequate for the task of understanding the poetic. In this section, drawing on Reiss, I find a
vocabulary for discussing the poetic as its own particular class of discursive practice, that is, a
particular form of reasoning: a “visible and describable” “organization of signs” called thinking
(Reiss, 9).
In the third part of the chapter, I outline how pragmatist thought originated as an effort to
address the perceived inadequacies of rationalism, without sacrificing reason. Pragmatism
eschews “method,” utilizing instead, inquiry that acknowledges how the cultural production of
knowledge is historically situated, and arises from and directly affects individual experience and
interpretation. A pragmatist approach to inquiry attends to the role of experience in discursive
13
practices, sees discourse not as a benign medium of expression but as a tool that can be—and
is—used for a purpose.
This approach to methodology is in keeping with William Pinar’s (2004) suggestion that
subjectively existing individuals14 in today’s society can benefit from an interdisciplinary
academic knowledge derived from a “new form of contemporary… research” (7). He proposes a
form of research that produces an inter-disciplinary, historical panorama, seeing the present
historical moment in light of the past, for the purpose of reconfigur[ing] the intellectual content
of the curriculum. Toward this end, in this chapter, I situate and describe the “present” rationalist
discourse, the conceptual framework of the dominant, Western, North American form of
representation that has contributed to conceptions of a standardized and representationalist
curriculum. In subsequent chapters, I explore the poetic historically as a discursive practice,
focusing on the “organism/word/environment” nexus—particularly how that relationship
functions discursively to shape individuals.
The methodological concerns of this dissertation are fundamental, not only to the way
this inquiry is conceived and presented, but also to understanding the limitations of modern
rationality and possibly, moving beyond it— which Richard Rorty claims, requires poetic
imagination. In other historical times, and even today in some cultures, poetic discourse performs
this function. Investigation into the poetic, to gain insights into discourse and its relationship to
                                                 
14 Michel Foucault (1982) is often credited with calling attention to subjectivities, historically tracing the
organization of modern societies and increasing levels of bureaucracies which create and reinforce normativity
through individuality. About subjectivities, Foucault says, a human being is made a “subject” through
objectification, “divided either within himself or from others, categorized, given both a social and a personal
identity” (208). One aspect of Foucault’s scholarly work is to historicize such conceptual categorizations; for
example, we talk of the poor, the sick, the insane, the criminal.
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conceptions of self and culture (organism/word/environment), demands an approach that will
reveal the poetic in poietic terms.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This review of selected literature addresses the primary topic of the dissertation, namely
the limitations of modern rationalist discourse and its mimetic curriculum, the possibilities of
there being something “more” (a poietic frame) and the implications for reconceiving curriculum
from complexly creative perspective. In this section I include a survey of the literature upon
which I have drawn related to modern rationality, the poetic, poiesis and pragmatism. I then
situate my topic of inquiry in the field of curriculum studies, identifying an ancestry of others
who have considered the poetic, in some way, an important aspect of curriculum.
Since pragmatist thought was developed to counter modern rationality and its discourse, I
begin in Chapter 1 (Methodology: A Pragmatist Approach to Inquiry) by drawing on Timothy
Reiss (1982) to characterize aspects of rationality, modernity and its discourse, and the modern
episteme (23).15
Pragmatist thought is, then, characterized first by the way that it finds rational thought
inadequate, and secondly, by the ways that pragmatism distinguishes itself. My characterization,
for the specific purpose of outlining a pragmatist mode of inquiry, draws heavily on readings of
                                                 
15 Reiss (1982) is careful to explain that the word episteme is a “useful shorthand” (though not an over-
simplification) to refer to a “process of development and of meaningful articulation; a way of knowing a particular
order of reality—not simply the ‘object’ of such knowledge.” He further explains, “the obvious diversity and
complexity of the thousand-year-long “Middle Ages” need not prevent us from understanding them as an epistemic
totality” (23, fn).
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Charles Sanders Peirce and Cornel West, but refers to William James, John Dewey, Jane
Addams, and of course, to Rorty himself.
One aspect of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, an essential point in this project, is his emphasis
of the inseparability of elements that form an “organism/ word/environment” nexus (1996,
1999). This triadic cluster is often conceived of as elements of “self, representation, society,” but
as separate elements or components that interact with each other.16 When Rorty refers to this
nexus “organism/word/environment,” he sees them as dynamically construed— more than
“integrated”—not as separate elements that sit in relation to one another, or even interacting with
one another.
Rorty, by calling attention to the inextricable inter-formation of the elements of organism,
word, and environment makes it possible to see the relationship among subjectivity, objectivity
and representation as a logically and discursively created problem, part of a pattern that
permeates Euro-Western cultures, at all levels, in various ways, as the relation between the one
and the many. As William James (1907/1995) comments, the rationality of modern thought
creates this relationship between individuals, community, and culture (49–62). Understanding
the relationship between individuals, community and culture differently; re-configuring that
relationship, is part of the pragmatist’s task discussed in Chapter 2. In the following chapters I
use the “organism/word/environment” construal to understand the complicated interrelationships
over time.
                                                 
16 Many critiques of modern rationalism, including feminist, post-colonial, poststructural and critical theorist,
struggle with these three elements in relation to each other. Just how these words are conceived and relate to each
other becomes one of the fundamental questions of philosophy, as the issues involved are the discursive
constructions “self,” mind, self–other relations.
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A poietic episteme is developed in Chapter 4. The difficulty of understanding a mytho-
poetic culture, as Reiss points out, is that we in the present are so steeped in rationalist thought,
that we can hardly imagine otherwise; when we think about “poetic” we do so from a modernist
perspective. I suggest, however, an adequate understanding of the differences between a mytho-
poetic culture and a modern one can be developed and note that Reiss, himself, presents an
excellent impression of these differences. In addition, I draw on Margaret Drewal’s (1992)
development of poiesis in performance from a multi-disciplinary perspective involving a
paradigmatic shift from structure to process; from the normative to the particular and historically
situated, from the eternal to the time-centered, and from the collective to the agency of
individuals.17 In her work, Drewal refers to Henry Louis Gates’ (1988) The Signifying Monkey,
regarding the play of signification in oral cultures. In curriculum studies, Walter Gershon (2004)
develops Drewal’s ideas in regard to teacher education.
To develop the differences between the Homeric poetic—which I refer to as poiesis—and
the simplistic Renaissance interpretation of the poetic, I borrow from Timothy Reiss’s
development of a modern episteme, and work to elaborate a poietic episteme. In doing so, I will
draw on literature from several disciplines: to understand the nuances of Greek language as it
functioned in Homeric times, particularly in the performance of poems, I use Gregory Nagy
(1990, 1996a, 1996b) along Richard P. Martin (1989) in cultural anthropology, linguistics and
Hellenic studies; to understand the concept of poiesis in Greek philosophy, H. D. F. Kitto (1966)
                                                 
17 This approach is used by Margaret Drewal (1992) in her study, Yoruba rituals: Performers, play and agency,
to uncover and to understand from the perspective of oral cultures, the role and purpose of the ritual enactment of
myths.
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and Jeffrey Walker (2000) in classical studies; for an understanding of representation as mimesis
I refer to Leon Golden (1992) and Martin Heidegger (1968) for the views on Aristotle and Plato,
respectively. Regarding the history of the use of the word poiesis, I draw on Nathan Greenberg
(1961) in philology; for a sense of “imagination” and the social function of Greek literature,
Paulo Vivante (1983) and George Walshe (1984) in literary theory; to understand the art of oral
performance, Richard Bauman (1986) in performance theory. An excellent explanation of the
mimesis of Aristotle and Plato is developed by Leon Golden (1992). To conceive of forms of
thought beyond a modern episteme, either pre- or post-modern, I refer to Clifford Geertz (1980),
N. Katherine Hayles (1994, 1999), Zygmunt Bauman (1993), Gregory Bateson (1958), David
Bogen (1999) and Donna Haraway (2000). In consideration of the orality of Homeric times and
the significance of primary orality for thought, I draw on Margaret Drewal (1992), Henry Louis
Gates (1988), and Walter Ong (1982).
Looking at the Renaissance as a bifurcation point and a turn away from the poetic, in the
field of curriculum studies I refer to David Hamilton (2002), William Doll (et al., 2005), and
Stephen Triche and Doug McKnight (2004). Beyond curriculum studies, related to historical,
literary and cultural studies, and the history of ideas particularly related to language, I refer to
Mikhail Bakhtin (1984a, 1984b, 1986), Martin Heidegger (2000), David Halliburton (1981), and
Timothy Reiss (1982). To understand a difference between an individual and the concept of self,
as it emerged in the French Renaissance of 1050–1200, I refer to Colin Morris (1972); for a
sense of self (character) in ancient Greek poetic tradition, Seth Schein (1984, 1996) and Graham
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Zanker (1994, 2004). For the history of scientific thought in Greece, I refer to G. E. R. Lloyd
(1999).
In American education, two influential figures served in the later nineteenth century to
establish a mimetic, representationalist approach to curriculum, reinforcing rationalist ideas of
modernity, Charles Eliot, President of Harvard College (1869–1909), and William Torrey Harris,
Superintendent of the St. Louis School Board and later US Commissioner of Education. Despite
opposition, despite reforms, a modernist approach to curriculum continues to dominate. In the
history of American curriculum and education, I read Lawrence Cremin (1961, 1975), William
Doll (2002, 2005), Herbert Kliebard (1992), Petra Munro (1998, 1999), William Pinar (1975,
2004) and Pinar (et al., 1995).
What seems common to those who write about the poetic in curriculum now is a desire
for something that is both more and different, that provides not only imaginative vision, but an
existential “being” and “doing,” for whom “the de-spiritualized is brought to life” (Quinn, 2001,
191). For example, David Hansen (2004) states, at the beginning of his article entitled “A Poetics
of Teaching,” that the idea of a poetics “contributes to a holistic view of the work… by regarding
teaching as more than merely a sum of its occupational parts” (119).
James Garrison (1997) describes John Dewey’s sense of imagination as “poetry, in the
classical Greek sense of poiesis, or calling into existence” (8). Garrison maintains that Dewey’s
aesthetics of “imaginative vision” is “the center of Dewey’s thinking” (1). A crucial difference
between mimetic and poietic educational thought is marked by these phrases, ones that call us to
ask: What is education for? Contemplating this question, one realizes that “poetic happenings”
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(Huebner, 1999) and “calling truth into existence” (Garrison, 1997) are not phrases that teachers
caught in a mimetic mode might use to describe their work.
I trace the ancestral heritage of my inquiry into curriculum studies to James B.
Macdonald (1971a, 1971b, 1975a, 1975b) and Dwayne Huebner (1999). Both were students of
Virgil Herrick at the University of Chicago. Herrick was a well-known curricularist, who worked
in the field of curriculum development, with his colleague at the University of Chicago, Ralph
Tyler. In 1947, the university sponsored The University of Chicago Curriculum Theory
Conference, a “benchmark” in the history of the field in a transitional period, one that the social
efficiency movement sought to reclaim. School dropout rates were high and opponents of
progressivism were hoping to shift the field in their direction. Tyler presented a paper at the
conference entitled, “The Organization of Learning Experiences.” It was subsequently a chapter
in Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction (1949), the single most influential curriculum
text—and still being used. In a brilliant transfer of a modernist interpretation of Dewey’s
scientific method, Tyler eased the transition to an efficient and scientific approach to teaching
subjects. He provided a model for the efficient organization of learning experiences, simple
linear steps— a four-step method that began with learning objectives to be achieved, and ended
with the evaluation of achievements; it was universally applicable (Pinar et al., 148–49) and
political climates favored its lasting success.
In sharp contrast, at the same conference, Herrick was calling for “analysis of curriculum
decisions and curriculum approaches and orientations via examination of their underlying
assumptions” (Pinar et al., 148). Herrick’s approach, one of observation and questioning, signals
20
a different approach to inquiry and a sounder basis for theorizing curriculum. In addition, he
wrote, “Our exclusive preoccupation with subject matter gives rise to the danger that we will fall
behind in creative, imaginative thinking about different ways in which an educational program
can be planned” (Macdonald et al., 1965, 70; Pinar et al., 1995, 172). Herrick’s concern is more
for the classroom situation and what occurs there. He used
analysis of classroom episodes, to discover what certain frameworks show about
this episode and further, what this exercise will say about the nature and function
of frameworks or structures in the whole process of curriculum thinking and
theorizing. (in Macdonald et al., 1975,178)
In concluding the “exercise” concerning the problems of curriculum development and the
application of models and frameworks, Herrick summarizes students’ presentations by pointing
out that: “Our experience seemed to indicate the following generalizations as being important: all
of the present structures were incomplete at some point” (183).18 For Herrick, the
incompleteness, might have been the place to start questioning, either the model or what was
actually happening in the classroom interactions. His inquiry was not limited to subject matter,
but focused on a teaching situation (Pinar et al., 172).
For two of his students, Dwayne Huebner and James B. Macdonald, the
“incompleteness” of the frameworks and structures may have signaled the “more-ness” inherent
in a classroom situation. Both were bothered by the existing state of education and of curriculum
theorizing, influenced by politics and scientism, resulting in stagnant thought, and in apathy—a
sign of oppression—in teachers and curricularists alike. Huebner (1999/1975) began one talk to a
                                                 
18 The other points Herrick (1975) brings forward in his conclusions are: (1) the importance of the concept of
transactions, (2) the need for value referents, the utility of some kind of structure, and (3) that “a complicated
classroom situation will yield impossible mountains of data” (181–83).
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group, “Fellow educators: Are we not lost?” in an effort to call attention to their tendency to
follow rather than lead—to imitate rather than create (231).
For James Macdonald (1975), the more-ness was related to language and the over-looked
context of a situation, blindness to the specific in relation to the general, or the micro- and
macro- of situations. Pointing to inter-connectedness of social and intellectual systems was part
of Macdonald’s effort to destabilize the techno-rational and scientific hold on curriculum
theorizing which deals with universals.
Influenced by Heidegger, Huebner (1999) refers to “poetic” as poiesis, in the pre-Socratic
sense, finding connections between language, thought, and being-in-the-world as discourse.
Integrating thought, language, experience, being and doing, Huebner states: “Conversation [is] a
creative act”: creativity is a poetic “happening of truth” (153). The poetic in this sense involves
the power of agency. For Huebner, the failure of education is due to “a breakdown in our talk,
our poetry, about the world we make” (232). Educators need to have clarity and vision about
their public world, which arises through their conversations. He asks, “Why do we not act with
courage?” (231).19
How will an alternative concept of the poetic influence a “representational
epistemology”? For me, a poietic vocabulary, perhaps influenced by chaos and complexity
theories, allows a radical re-conception of curriculum, one that can have a positive influence in
education. There are those who do not share my vision. For example, among the many
                                                 
19 Huebner’s (1999) fiery exhortation to educators in this essay, initially a speech, urges them to take action for
educational change. “As educators we must be political activists who seek a more just public world. The alternative
of course is to be school people—satisfied with the existing social order—the silent majority who embrace
conservativism” (238–39).
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mythologies of progressivism that Dennis Carlson (2004) brings forward in Leaving Safe
Harbors, he pays attention to Margaret Wheatley’s application of chaos theory to organizations.
Wheatley is an organizational theorist, public speaker, and chaos theory popularizer. Carlson
worries about chaos theory as it is applied to organizations, including educational institutions.
He states, “According to Wheatley, chaos theory in the new physics demonstrates an underlying
and unifying orderliness, a force that brings order out of chaos” (162). According to Carlson, in
representing “an underlying and unifying orderliness,” Wheatley suggests that chaos theory
represents “how things really happen/occur,” because that really is the way of nature,
organizations will “naturally” come to their own creative orderliness—self-organization. Carlson
notes correctly that chaos theory is too often another effort to appeal to the mythology that “this
is the way nature works” to justify a “scientific” approach (162). He says,
When chaos theory is applied to the organization of educational institutions, it
involves a two-tiered borrowing. It borrows a corporate managerial language and
methodology that in turn borrows its metaphors and mythic themes from a new
postmodern science. This means that in questioning the usefulness of chaos theory
in forging a new progressivism, we must question the validity of both of these
borrowings. (162)
 Carlson’s doubts and concerns are appropriate for the references he has chosen.
Unfortunately, these references are limited and outdated. Since the early 1990s, study of complex
and chaotic systems has burgeoned, not only in the sciences (Kauffman, 1993, 1995, 2000; Bak,
1996) and social sciences (Bird, 2003; Bogen, 1999), but in literature (Hayles, 1999) and literary
theory as well (Iser, 2000). Much of this literature is described in works by Davis (et al.,
forthcoming); Doll (et al., 2005); Doll and Gough (2002); and Fleener (2002).
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In the field of curriculum, chaos and complexity theories hold promise for those who
seek to understand representation beyond modernism. Representation from a complex and
chaotic systems perspective is “temporal,” ongoing, and increasingly complex (non-reductive).
As Osberg and Beista (2003) point out, complex systems (including chaotic systems) are about
recognizing change, creation of the new, and utilizing chance.
Models and theories that try to reduce the world to a system of rules or laws,
cannot be understood as representation of a universe that exists independently of
us, but rather, are valuable but temporary tools by means of which we constantly
(re)negotiate our world…because the process of finding our way through
obstacles does not have an end, rather it results in the exposure of more and
different obstacles, and different views of the same obstacle—a creative
process…rather than a compromise. (2003, Paper presentation)
On this basis, when Carlson talks about “a new progressivism emerging out of a
dialectic…in the borderlands…in the creative play of diverse cultural forms and identity
categories” (6) he uses a discourse that harmonizes with complexity theory.
From Carlson’s perspective, the harbor is predictably “safe”; from mine, safety is a
relative term that obfuscates chance. He is right, leaving the harbor presents a risk; but the
journey beyond, fraught with both danger and possibilities, opens one up to a whole new world.
This new form of thought holds promise, I believe, for “leaving safe harbors” and may represent
a new progressivism, one that shifts discursive practices beyond a modernist episteme.
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CHAPTER 2  METHODOLOGY:
A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO INQUIRY
PART ONE:  METHOD AND METHODOLOGY
Method: (1) a way of doing something according to a plan; (2) orderly thought,
action, or technique; (3) the body of systematic techniques used by a particular
discipline, especially a scientific one.
Methodology: the methods or organizing principles underlying a particular art,
science or other area of study; (2) the study of methods of research.
These two definitions from my computer dictionary are common ones.20 The word
“method,” is formed from the Greek roots, meta- and –ode; meta- is a combining form of
preposition and –ode is “way, path, travel” (OED).21 Although the definition of method (above)
suggests a definite plan, it was not always so. Method begins with the connotation of traveling
with, after, or between; journeying the same way, walking the same path, journeying together.
For the early Greeks, method, as a “way” was often associated with doing with a particular
person, someone who knew how to do, demonstrated a skill, and was recognized because that
person was successful. Lengthy apprenticeships were based on learning method, which was to
learn the art of doing. The art required time, time to be with the master, to learn his thoughts as
well as his skills. Method, even since those early times, has been associated with technique; and
underlying the technique are various forms of reasoning. 22
                                                 
20 Computer dictionary is Encarta World English Dictionary, Microsoft Word X, 1999, s.v. “Method”,
“Methodology.”
21 OED, s.v. “Method.”
22 Martin Heidegger (1971), in his book entitled On the Way to Language, notes that the word “way” “speaks to
the reflective mind of man.” He equates “way” in Western languages to “Tao, [in Laotse’s poetic thinking] ‘which
properly speaking’ means way.” These words are translated as “reason, mind, raison, meaning, logos” (92).
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The relationship of method to methodology, as implied in the quotations above, is that
methodology is the study of methods, particularly their organizing principles or underlying
procedures, the forms of thought that organize or shape the method. The form of thought or
conceptual framework that underlay Greek method, especially in medicine, was rational (or
metaphysical) reasoning. With the development of metaphysical thought, medicine moved
beyond the various and sundry attempts to deal with disease: magic, drug peddling, quackery,
divination and prayer. G. E. R. Lloyd (1999) maintains that rampant disease presented ample
opportunities for many different groups and individuals who professed the ability to heal. It was
a lucrative opportunity and competition spurred development in the medical field (19–54).
Amongst the arguing and competing groups of healers, there were those who called
themselves “Methodists.” The Methodists were the first self-defined sect of medical healers, with
a founder and distinct medical theory. Unlike most other healers of their day, Methodists rejected
dreams and other forms of divination as the cause of illness. They developed a practice—a way,
based on the Hippocratic doctrines. The epistemological foundations of this philosophy
categorized illnesses based on careful symptomatic observation. The physician Galen (131
A.D.–201 A.D.), not a Methodist, advanced their methods, advocating rational reasoning about
causation and experimentation (Lloyd, 138, fn. 65). Galen’s method, with the inclusion of
experimentation, became a way of testing theories, one of the characteristics of modern science
and its method. 23
                                                 
23 Doll, (2005), in his “The Culture of Method” chronicles the history of scientific method and notes that
experimentation as the intentional manipulation of variables is a late development in the history of science. Galen’s
experimentation is related to practical and applicable knowledge of disease and pharmaceuticals. In contrast,
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According to the Oxford English Dictionary, method does not have a “systematic
approach” until the Renaissance, when the Schoolmen translate methodus from the Latin (OED);
but Galen, practicing in the third century, dominated by the Romans and their sense of order,
does have an organized method. Between the first century B.C.E. and the third century C.E.,
method becomes organized in the practice of medicine and way, especially the way, becomes
strongly associated with Christianity. The word way is common in the Bible. In the Acts of the
Apostles, those of the Way were Christians; the way of God was the course of God’s providence.
Method became “a prescribed course of life,” prescribed by the commandments; “a course of
action; a moral way of living,” and by the time of the Renaissance, “one’s best or most advisable
course” (OED). At the time of the Protestant Reformation, the Way was the path to God, a single
way with a definite destination, a prescribed course.
William Doll (2005) explores, in depth, the relationship of method to education
beginning in the 1500s. He notes that “method,” now reified as a thing in itself, of immense
significance, became formalized in this time period:
Method became a movement, permeating virtually all intellectual thinking, and in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries laid down a legacy––that of “the…
arrogance of reason”––which remains with us today. (47)
The right method was sought after as the key to knowing—even, the key to heaven. With
the right method, it was thought, one could know everything, which was as close as one could
come to the Divine. Strongly associated with the Protestant movement, reading and interpreting
                                                                                                                                                              
Aristotle used the word “science” in reference to that of which one could be certain, knowledge ascertained through
metaphysical reasoning, not experimentation. This idea is still much present in Gallileo’s science. Further steps in
the development of a systematic scientific method came through Francis Bacon’s emphasis on the recording of
observations and techniques.
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the Bible in the right way, method became “the Way,” less of an unfolding journey and more of a
prescribed course (curriculum). Drawing on Walter Ong (1971), Doll emphasizes that with the
advent of modern “methods,” art was transformed to a practice, an exercise. Lengthy
apprenticeships, one-on-one relationships, student with master, were no longer necessary; the art
of learning itself took on a different aspect: skills or techniques were learned—at a distance.
Relationship and dialogue were replaced by technologies. In schooling, teachers first addressed
lessons to students in large classes; then, textbooks provided information for students to
memorize and repeat exercises for practice —again, at a distance. The distance achieved by the
technologies of modern methods (Ong, 1971, 1983) signifies a difference from earlier Greek
methods meaning “together with.” It heralded, as Ong (1983) claims, “the decay of dialogue.”
This difference is pertinent to a critical discussion of method, as I will explain later.
The method of curriculum made it possible to school many to act in the same way at the
same time. Such a procedure was a short cut, of sorts, allowing a teacher to address a whole class
instead of the more specialized attention of apprenticeships. Classes were time-efficient—but
this form of schooling was more than that, as Michel Foucault (1982) points out. Over time,
beginning in the sixteenth century, the “most innocent institutions of discipline,” for example,
schools, hospitals, mental institutions, churches and poor houses, the institutions Foucault calls
the “carceral archipelago,”24 developed into disciplinary institutions. What begins innocently as a
procedure, a method, is soon observed, assessed, evaluated; “placing the threat of delinquency
                                                 
24 “Carceral” means, literally, of or belonging to a prison; it came to common usage in the mid 1500s.
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over the slightest illegality, the smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly,”—violations of the
method (297). Foucault goes on:
A continuous gradation of the established, specialized and competent authorities
(in the order of knowledge and in the order of power) which, without resort to
arbitrariness, but strictly according to the regulations, by means of observation
and assessment hierarchized, differentiated, judged, punished and moved
gradually from the correction of irregularities to the punishment of crime. (299;
emphasis added)
The right method becomes a disciplinary device. Deviation from the “way” (of doing), the “one
and only way” (in Peter Ramus’s phrase), necessitates attention and punishment as “the way”
becomes the “norm.”25 “Without resort to arbitrariness” implies that negotiation is irrelevant. No
conversation is needed, rules replace dialogue. The carceral net in education is organized around
“method(s),” the standardization of teaching, of curricula, and of research. In recent years, as
Peter Taubman (2004, AAACS; 2004, Bergamo) points out, the National Council for the
Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) presumes to regulate academic institutions by
demanding that institutions and their faculty conform to pre-set standards, a derivative of
methods.26
This brief reconstruction illuminates a particular relationship between method and
methodology and situates method historically in the field of education. In this reconstruction I
paint a picture using broad sweeping strokes to create an impression. This narrative is not
intended to convey a systematic history of method or thought; it is not inclusive, but rather
selects a theme and seeks nuances and variations through time. It is one person’s making sense
                                                 
25 Stephen Triche (2002) points out that schools at that time were referred to as “beating schools.”
26 On the increasingly powerful influence of NCATE, see also McKnight, Educational Studies, 35(2), 212–30;
Pinar, 2005.
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from an inquiry. (I will present this point more fully in the section on a Pragmatist Approach to
Inquiry, below).
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the organizing principles of modern27
methodology, the episteme of rationality put forward by Timothy Reiss (1982).28 This
exploration is a prelude to discussion of a pragmatist approach to inquiry, to demonstrate that
pragmatist thought was developed as a constructive response to the perceived inadequacies of
rationalism and not as a rejection of reasoning per se. This distinction needs to be emphasized, I
believe, since reason and rationality are often conflated. 29 In addressing these inadequacies of
rationality, I suggest pragmatist thought supports inquiry that looks beyond modernity; i.e.,
inquiry that is not constrained by a rationalist methodology.
Pragmatist thought provides alternative organizing principles for inquiry, allowing for a
new, more comprehensive understanding of the poetic to emerge. My point in shifting to a
pragmatist approach to inquiry is to achieve an understanding of the poetic in another episteme, a
different way of knowing, a poietic ordering of reality (Chapter 4). In this way, one might
understand the dynamically construed, inextricably intertwined relationship of “organism/ word/
                                                 
27 In this dissertation, by “modern” I mean both a period of time (1600s–mid–late1900s) and a form of thought
that evolved and eventually became dominant during this time period.
28 Reiss explains the word episteme as a way of knowing a particular order of reality. In this dissertation I have
use the word to also mean a way of thinking, or a form of thought, that characterizes a culture. Episteme refers to all
human mental life including the production, interpretation, and interrelating of signs. The episteme is specific to
time, place, and society.
29 The comparison of rationalism and pragmatist thought may be perceived as an “either/or” dichotomy. The
intent in this chapter, however, is to point out the differences between them as an indication of the ways that
pragmatist thought was developed to improve upon rational thought—that is, as a form of “reason.” One of the
distinctions that comes forward from the OED quotations providing uses over time is that “reason” (1300–1400) is
“a way, a manner, a method; a cause dependent upon human action or feeling.” Rational thought, from its
metaphysical origins, distances itself from the human experience, and is governed by the authority of laws and
principles of Nature—laws and principles it created.
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environment” that Rorty claims cannot be reduced to its atomistic parts. Finally, a pragmatist (or
pragmaticist) approach to inquiry, through Charles S. Peirce, makes possible later connections to
complexity theory and a new understanding of the dynamism inherent in the poetic—poiesis.
PART TWO:  RATIONALISM AND A MODERN EPISTEME
The modern Western episteme, a way of thinking that characterizes a culture, evolved
from previous co-existing discourses;30 one of those, neo-Platonism, was already heavily
influenced by metaphysical reasoning from “self-evident truths.” Scholastic education,
1100–1300, revived neo-Platonist, metaphysical—rational—reasoning, based upon the
innateness of ideas, and a view of the cosmos as a Great Chain of Being.31 Walter Ong (1971)
suggests that technologies such as writing and the printing press (see also Marshall McLuhan,
The Gutenberg Galaxy, 1962) enabled a divided and chaotic world that was “dissolving and
resolving at the same time” (McLuhan, 1962, 1) to have a transition. The previous discourses of
the pre-modern no longer provided the right tools for the job which was to represent the newly
discovered knowledge of the Renaissance natural world.
                                                 
30 Discourse is a form of representation; a representation of reasoning or thought.
31 Neoplatonists disagree on many issues, but share the following distinctive doctrines: (1) the first principle and
source of reality is utterly transcendent and unknowable; (2) every created entity has its source in The One and
emanates from it, creating a Great Chain of Being linking the highest spirituality to the lowest corporeal objects; (3)
whatever is created is naturally inferior to its creator; and (4) the ultimate goal of each created soul is to return to




Transitions of discourse are evolutionary as well as revolutionary.32 Such change is noted
in the literature of a culture—if it is a literate culture. In his analysis of Rabelais and his World,
Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) explores the co-existence and significance of two distinct discourses in
the late medieval and early Renaissance, specifically, bawdy “marketplace” discourse is
contrasted with formal institutionalized discourse as the transition plays out in power relations in
the public square. Similarly, Reiss (1982) marks a transition to rational discourse from a previous
discourse of “patterning.” He explains the major difference between the two discourses this way:
There [was] a gradual disappearance of a class of discursive activity, a passage
from what one might call a discursive exchange within the world [patterning] to
the expression of knowledge as a reasoning practice upon the world [analytico-
referential]. (30)
Discourse of Patterning
The “discursive exchange within the world” is the discourse of patterning, also called
mythic, or mytho-poetic discourse. A pattern is a model, but by definition, and in practice,
pattern also involves variation or difference.33 One might think again of the way of the
apprentice and the master craftsman. Even as the apprentice strives to imitate the technique and
                                                 
32 On the point of evolutionary and revolutionary change, Timothy Reiss’s (1982) notion of epistemic change is
in line with Thomas Kuhn (1970) and C. D. Axelrod (1979). Kuhn and Axelrod both explore the essential tension
between the individual and the community of scholars in which they are situated; this tension is transformed to
creativity as the individual negotiates between discursive practices (standards, rules and traditions) and attending to
the novel. As it is demonstrated in complexity theory, a small change, over time, can lead to major change—perhaps
“epistemic” change. The tension between the individual (the one) and the community (the many) must produce “just
the right amount of perturbation” (Doll, 1993), experienced by the individual, to lead to creativity. Axelrod uses the
term “intellectual breakthrough” as I use the term creativity.
33 Gregory Nagy (1996) presents the complex notion of mimesis in a mytho-poetic culture, which is very
different, I suggest, from mimesis as it was translated by the scholastics (schoolmen) and developed in modernity.
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skills of his teacher, his product is a variation; it will not be exact.34 I suggest (Chapter 1) that
patterning is the organizing structure of a poietic episteme, involving a reading and interpretation
of signs organized by similarities and difference, resemblances that form patterns. The discourse
of patterning is understood to organize comprehension of the natural landscape, humans, society,
and the supernatural as a system of transformations. Discourse in this episteme is a tool for
finding relations between, without necessarily resolving, differences and contradictions. A
discourse of patterning, going back to the times of Homer in early Greek civilization, is
associated with “mythic sensibilities,” whose central feature is the notion of participation:
“participation enacted the relation between man and the immanent and/ or the transcendent”
(Tambiah, 1990, 106). Reiss (1982) states that a “discourse of patterning” with its emphasis on
the mythic, is not an ordering of the world by the mind, but rather “an ordering of the mind by
the world (bricolage)” (30).
An “exchange within the world” involves relations of continuity, existential immediacy
and contact, and shared affinities between persons, groups, animals, places, and natural
phenomena. This kind of immediacy and sense of relations is apparent in the early drafts of
Johannes Kepler’s Somnium (1634). In over twenty years of writing this work, however, Kepler
shapes and shifts his focus and learns to set aside all personal thoughts not directly pertinent to
his observations, and so begins to remove himself from that which he observes. As his focus
narrows, Kepler’s personality is distanced. Reiss notes that,
                                                 
34 As Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) and Henri Louis Gates (1988) both point out, discourses of patterning (part of
primarily oral cultures) involve both repetition and difference; parody (pattern and difference) is a key component of
the discourse of patterning, as are play and laughter.
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[Kepler’s] text fairly clearly divides, therefore, a discourse of patterning from one
of analysis and reference. I will propose that the notes [Kepler’s marginalia]
represent the appearance from within a discourse of patterning of the order [the
analytico-referential] of what will shortly become the dominant discourse. (144)
Reiss’s analysis of Kepler’s writings demonstrates the transition from one discourse to
another within Kepler’s lifespan—within one book. In the Somnium, the recording of lunar
speculations influenced by dreams, one sees the imposition of rational discourse in the form of
notes upon an unfiltered mytho-poetic discursive process. The scientific-rational, Reiss’s
analytico-referential, first over-laps, then smothers the mytho-poetic. Over time, epistemically,
imaginative qualities of the mytho-poetic are lost as creativity itself becomes defined in terms of
the dominating analytic-referential discourse.35
The transition in discourse did not go unnoticed. Viewing astrological bodies, making
observations, Galileo recorded his concerns about the intermediate role of discourse between
both per-ceptions, con-ceptions and the objects he was describing. Reiss calls this unity “the
Galilean trinity,” and he configures it this way: “mind/ discourse/ phenomena.” He notes that the
“trinity” is reduced a short time later by Cartesianism to a dichotomy, as awareness of the
transition disappears and the word becomes understood to stand for both thought in the mind and
object-in-view, which he configures this way: “mind/phenomenon” or “mind/matter.” “Word and
thing are brought to coincide in the sense that the former [word] is a completely adequate and
                                                 
35 In educational psychology, E. Paul Torrance, the “Father of Creativity” is “credited with inventing the
benchmark method for quantifying creativity and arguably created the platform for all research on the same subject.”
(University of Georgia, Faculty of Education http://www.coe.uga.edu/coenews/2003/ EPTorranceObit.html). In this
appropriation, the concept of creativity is reified, objectified, defined, and made into a quantifiable criterion for
further categorizing some students as “gifted and talented,” a label that privileges some over others, reinforcing a
hierarchical “ordering” of society.
34
transparent representation of the latter” (36; emphasis added). Three separate changes occur here
which distinguish this new episteme from the older one of patterning. First, symbolic
representation, the word or symbol, is assumed to be equivalent to the object, an exact
representation (a copy). Second, the individual who is perceiving/conceiving is reduced to
“mind.” In this regard, another even more subtle change occurs; “experience” is reduced to
“experiment,” which in effect focuses the viewer on the object, minimizing the effect the subject
him- or herself might have on what is observed (subjective influence). Notation, symbolic
representation, becomes a reality; experience is mathematized (Dear, 1995), and the scientific
self comes into being, one devoid of physicality, emotional attachment, historical past, desires,
etc. Dear notes the way that the words “experience” and “experiment” change in meaning in the
early seventeenth century to indicate the objectivity of experiment, which was previously a
variant of personal experience.
Reiss explains that it is the act of making observations through a telescope that calls
Galileo’s attention to language, and he (Galileo) questions how individual observations
—representations of a “thing”—can be scientific:
For the assumption as a consequence is that “the scientific knowledge of objects
is nought but the result of sign-manipulation, and that their ‘truth’ is merely their
utility…” (in Reiss, 1982, 34)
This is, in fact, a criticism that later pragmatist thinkers would make. Dear (1995) frames the
questions this way:
How can a universal knowledge-claim about the natural world be justified on the
basis of singular items of individual experience? (13)
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William Doll (2005) notes Gerald Holton’s (1973) research in this area concerning the
difference between what scientists do and their reasoning processes (Holton’s S1) and how it is
(re-)presented (Holton’s S2). The distinction is between dialectical reasoning (S1) and
demonstrative reasoning, a distinction originally made by Aristotle. The demonstrative proceeds
from “‘first truths known by intuition’ and proceeds carefully step-by-step to ‘conclusions
necessarily true’” (Max Fisch, 1969, 402; Doll, 2005, 48). Doll claims, supported by Holton, a
family of resemblances between demonstrative reasoning and scientific method; I suggest further
that the (re-) presentation of scientific method conforms to something external— an ideal form.
Dialectical reasoning, dealing with the probable (not the certain), is “problem-centered
and social; experiential, practical knowledge crafted over time via a community of inquirers
(neophytes and experts) in the field, relating to the doing of science. The telescope, as a
metaphor, helps to move discursive practice from the untidy, inefficient, back-and-forth of
dialectical reasoning—for which the schoolmen were severely criticized— to the individual
observations that worried Galileo. His concerns about the validity of such a solitary enunciation
(rather than a dialectically reasoned one) and it being scientific seem to vanish. This evaporation
can be attributed, as Reiss explains, to the rise to dominance of the new discourse with previous
discourses becoming occulted. He comments, “To enumerate [list, name] provokes a kind of
hypnosis whereby the distance between the real and the fictional evaporates” (Jean Paris, quoted
in Reiss, 1982, 35).
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The Rise to Dominance of Rationalism
Relatively quickly, the new discourse organized “an intellectual structure… upon the
perceived world” (35). Reiss refers to this modern form of discourse as “analytico-referential,”
meaning that it is characterized by both analysis and reference. By “analytico-” he refers to serial
(cause and effect) logic. By “referential” he means correspondence of word to object. These two
words (analytico- and referential) represent two major characteristics of rational thought. I use
the more familiar terms rationalism or rationality as synonymous with Reiss’s “analytico-
referential” (as he does also). Rational discourse is the dominant discourse of a modern
(Western) episteme (23; Dissertation Introduction, fn. 14).
The discourse of analytico-referentiality explains the world, even imposes meaning on
the world, a world conceived as set and ordered. The transition from a mytho-poetic discourse of
patterning and the rise to dominance of rational discourse represents a change in reasoning.
Reasoning is a discursive practice; modernist discursive practices are characterized as the
“visible and describable… organization of signs”—“called [rationalist] thinking” (Reiss, 9).
Rational reasoning proceeds from a conceptual framework and is evident and analyzable in
discourse practices, such as the production of texts.
REISS’S CHARACTERIZATION OF RATIONALISM
Reiss identifies five characteristics of rationalism. He calls these five “exemplary
elements” and maintains that these five exemplary elements affect how we in the modern
(western) world function discursively. In Galileo’s and Kepler’s texts Reiss locates the
beginnings of a conceptualizing practice, signifying a “conceptualizing mind and world of
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objects” (33). The first two of the five exemplary elements are (1) objectivity and (2) the use of
metaphor as an ordering device. These two elements derive from viewing objects through a
telescope (objectivity). The telescope as a mechanical device narrows the visual field and isolates
the object. The procedure is methodized, end-focused. The object, through the telescope, is seen
at a distance, from a perspective, and out of context. The telescope, as an intermediary, is a
metaphor for discourse. It also represents the (desired) distance between viewer and object.
The third element, related to the first two, is (3) a “perspective” on the object, the “god’s
eye view,” sometimes called the “view from nowhere,” one that is fixed and whose certainty is
ensured by defining. This view is assumed to be absolute, that things can be known as they are
viewed—though they may be broken down into component parts and those parts further
analyzed atomistically. As Galileo remarks, however:
While human intellect cannot understand the infinity of propositions in geometry
and arithmetic—which knowledge is divine—yet as concerns ‘those few’ which
our intellect ‘does understand…its knowledge equals the Divine in objective
certainty, for here it succeeds in understanding necessity.’ (in Reiss, 1978, 42)
Galileo’s statement acknowledges the authority of the Divine, the infinitude of
mathematics and Divine knowledge—yet the human’s humble striving for certainty and for
objectivity. From a perspective, humanity can know, with certainty, some “few” things. This is a
paradox: human knowledge is limited and incomplete, but at the same time “certain.”
Next, closely associated with “objective certainty” is (4) “probability theory” (and later,
statistical theory); for the aim of epistemology is to uncover the laws of nature, i.e., the laws of
an orderly universe, itself already complete, a reality. Finally, in Reiss’s characterization of the
elements of rationality, is (5) the linear narration of causality. Causation, like “reality” is a
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holdover from the rational reasoning of Greek metaphysical philosophy: for every effect—in an
orderly world—there is a cause.
As these five elements order and shape the conceptualizing practice of rationalism,
knowledge is both fixed and finite; that is, through the process of objectifying, boundaries of
certainty are clearly defined, as the object of that knowledge is defined. The defining of an object
constitutes it; it creates a boundary, the difference between the liminal, being that of which one is
conscious, and the ineffable, being that for which there is no articulation. For the “inexpressible,”
during the early seventeenth century, the French developed the phrase je ne sais quoi, indicating
a certain something ineffable. It is, perhaps, the point about rationalism that curricularists
Dwayne Huebner and James B. MacDonald recognized, that there is something more. The je ne
sais quoi developed as a topic into the sublime (sub-liminal), then into a discussion of taste, and
finally, into a concept in itself—aesthetics (Reiss, 1982, 39).
Organism, Word, Environment in the Modern Episteme
The “reasoning practice upon the world”—the rationalism of the Western modern
episteme— signifies a new phase of man’s (sic) sense of himself: the one who enunciates,
enumerates and analyzes the world. This shift in discursive practice (reasoning) marks the
emergence of the modern rational self. With the emergence of rationalist discourse in the
sixteenth century, the meaning of “self” changes; it becomes equivalent to “mind” and
“consciousness” (OED). During this century the autonomous, humanist self emerges. With the
rationalist habit to reify concepts, self becomes an individual object, and like other objects
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becomes defined, categorized, and “normatized” (Foucault, 1982, 295)—one that ultimately can
be measured or at least hierarchically ordered in a rational manner.36
With the emergence of powerful new conceptualizing practices and the autonomous,
humanist self, other discursive practices related to self are devalued. For example, prior to the
epistemic shift, man was thought to possess innate understanding due to nature, including his
relationship to God.37 The quest was to understand what it means to be human and to understand
one’s relationship to God and others. Self was conceived as “soul,” and was constituted through
practices of meditation, self-mastery and asceticism, an acknowledgement of the unity of body
and soul. Truth was associated with practices of purification, conversion, prayer and
contemplation. Significantly, the individual was connected with both God (supernatural) and the
community, each of whom was related via their own relationships, creating a pattern of natural
and supernatural connections.
Discursive practices of a modern Western episteme (1) determine what knowledge is,
how we are constituted as “self’s,” and as knowers; (2) alters the way we perceive relationships
between ourselves and others; and therefore, (3) determines how morality is constituted.38
Importantly, as Foucault makes obvious, the effect of these discursive practices that constitute
                                                 
36 Rorty summarizes this transition as a shift in practices of “worship”: “Once upon a time we felt a need to
worship something which lay beyond the visible world. Beginning in the seventeenth century we tried to substitute a
love of truth for a love of God, treating the world described by science as a quasi divinity. Beginning at the end of
the eighteenth century we tried to substitute a love of ourselves for a love of scientific truth, a worship of our own
deep…nature” (1989, 22).
37 This concept underlies Descartes belief that he and God could be on the same wavelength, provided Descartes
concentrated on his innate ideas and followed rational chains of reasoning.
38 Foucault claims that the modern episteme is dissociated via (1) the truth through which we constitute
ourselves as subjects of knowledge; (2) in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as
subjects acting on others; and (3) in relations of ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents (1982,
237).
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knowledge, self, and relations alter moral and political relations of rational subjects.39 Foucault
illuminates the distinction between knowledge as the process of “enunciation” and knowledge as
the object of that enunciation (Reiss, 1982, 37). The distinction refers also to the difference
between humans as active subjects, and therefore the “enunciators,” or the recipient objects
toward whom knowledge is directed. The difference that Foucault brings forward in these two
positions, one of active subjects, the other of objects, is significant in education. William Pinar
and Madeline Grumet’s (1976) development of the notion of currere is aimed at creating an
awareness of—and indeed, a curriculum founded on—promoting the active engagement
(experience) of learners in the study of the disciplines. Students need to see the connections
between themselves and the subjects they study, to understand the forces that shape the
understanding of their lives—to be able to enunciate, in the sense of naming their experience.40
This active approach to learning is the antithesis of schooling as it was envisioned by the early
scholastics, and recently criticized by Paulo Freire as the “banking model” of education.
In the modern episteme, the role of discourse itself was occulted; the metaphor of the
telescope, that structures language, similarly disappeared.41 The relationship between the subject
and the object, was breached, as experience, particularity, context, historicity, were excluded in
pursuit of rational reasoning. Within this conceptual frame, relations, patterns and differences
became obfuscated. With this mind, it is impossible to consider the “organism/ word/
                                                 
39 Zygmunt Bauman further develops the effect of the discourse of rationalism on ethics and morality in his
book Postmodern Ethics (1993).
40 William Pinar (1994) wrote, “The curriculum is not comprised of subjects, but of Subjects, of subjectivity.
The running of the course [currere] is the building of the self, the lived experience of subjectivity” (p. 220).
41 Reiss’s choice of the word “occult” is quite deliberate; in 1625, according to the OED, in the scientific sense
of the word, now obsolete, occult meant “not manifest to direct observation; discoverable only by experiment.”
41
environment,” that Rorty claims is a wholeness. As Reiss points out, in a rationalist episteme,
“word” disappears, and what is left is the subject/object bifurcation. Discursively, Rorty’s
“organism” which is, of course, “self,” is distanced from the phenomenal world at large, the
environment, which is the “object.” Discursively, self acts upon the world, at arm’s length,
authoritative and enunciating, representing reality as objects. The rationalist episteme creates the
self/other “problem.” “Self” in the rational world is separate, autonomous, and pronounces upon
the world. The subject position becomes problematic when the rational self is understood as an
object, objectivized, as Foucault says, the “knowable man” (1995, 305). This self becomes the
recipient, the depository into which learning is dropped. This self too becomes one that
rationalist discursive practices expect to be able to know without consideration of experience,
context or culture: the universal man. In rationalist discursive practices, concepts are reified and
become both the norm and the reality.
Methods are discursive practices, technologies of rationalism, and a form of regulation,
which sits at the heart of discipline (Foucault, 1995, 297). A rationalist episteme organizes the
discourse of methods. Consequently, methods may also be regarded as reductive, simplistic—
and, in the tendency to regard results as certainties—methods are deterministic, contributing to
the perception of truths as static representations of reality. Pragmatist thought offers its own
critique of rationalism, pertinent in the way it resists rationalist methods.
PART THREE  THE PRAGMATIST EVASION OF MODERN METHODS
Pragmatist thought was formulated amongst the members of the Metaphysical Club, an
exclusive men’s club for intellectual, philosophical discussion in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in
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the early 1870s. Louis Menand (2001) lists the original members of the club as Oliver Wendell
Holmes, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, Chauncey Wright, Nicholas St. John Green,
John Fiske, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, and Joseph Bangs Warner. Pragmatism was named by
Charles Sanders Peirce, popularized by William James, and brought to education and politics by
John Dewey. The name “pragmatism,” which stems from the Greek word related to “practice”
and “practical”—apropos of the truth of a statement residing in its practical consequences
(Peirce, 1998, 332). Peirce summarized the club discussions in a paper he presented to the group,
later published as “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.”42 Peirce reports that the group was impressed
with the paper (Ketner, 1998, 279). The ideas that coalesced among them to become
“pragmatism” were in response to the circumstances of the time and the general dissatisfaction of
the members in regard to logical intellectual thought (reasoning), progress, responsibility, and
social ethics. Expressing their intent, Peirce states,
It is easy to show that the doctrine that familiar use and abstract distinctness make
the perfection of apprehension has its only true place in philosophies which have
long been extinct; and it is now time to formulate the method of attaining to a
more perfect clearness of thought, such as we see and admire in the thinkers of
our own time.
Various members went on to develop their ideas more fully, especially C. S. Peirce,
William James, and Holmes, notably, in the field of legal interpretation.
Socio-Historical Context
Christopher Hookway (2004) notes that Peirce did not approve of the way those
following his lead, perhaps especially James, were too casual in their interpretation of his
                                                 
42 “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Popular Science Monthly 12, Jan. 1878: 286–302.
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pragmatic maxim.43 Hookway reports that Peirce disparagingly refers to these followers as
having a pragmatist attitude: “[Peirce’s] version of pragmatism, which took the form of a precise
‘logical principle,’ was transformed into a ‘philosophical attitude’ by these later thinkers and
that, in the process, much that was of value in the doctrine was lost” (119). James, on the other
hand, when he introduced the intellectual world to pragmatism in a series of public lectures
(1907), used the notion of a pragmatic attitude as that which unites various pragmatists. Drawing
on Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini, James (1907/1995) explains that:
[Pragmatism] lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel.
Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an
atheistic volume; in the next someone on his knees praying for faith and strength;
in a third a chemist investigating a body’s properties. In a fourth a system of
idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility of
metaphysics is being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass
through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective
rooms. No particular results…but only an attitude of orientation is what the
pragmatic method means. (21–22; emphasis added).
 I suggest the phrase, attitude of orientation, is useful in acknowledging differences between
those who take a pragmatist approach to inquiry—one guided, but loosely structured—and those
who take a set, fixed, universalized approach. An attitude is a “disposition” (OED); the
differences in the approach to pragmatic thought between someone like C. S. Peirce and Jane
Addams are many, but their dispositions to community, democratic values, science, interaction,
                                                 
43 Peirce (1903/1998) explains: “Pragmatism, the maxim that the entire meaning and significance of any
conception lies in its conceivably practical bearings…which would go to determine how we should deliberately act,
and how we should act in a practical way and not merely how we should act as affirming or denying the conception
to be cleared up” (145). He has stated it otherwise in several papers; for example: “Pragmatism is the theory that a
conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing
upon the conduct of life” (xxxvi). Because of his dissatisfaction with the way others used the word
“pragmatism,”—“abused in a merciless way,”—he reports that he decided to “kiss the child good-bye,” and change
the name of his approach to “pragmaticism”—a name ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers” (335).
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growth, and education would characterize them both as pragmatists. In addition, orientation
being a “process of becoming accustomed to a new situation” or “movement or direction of
growth toward light” (OED) is aptly descriptive of two key elements of pragmatism: (1)
“fluidity,” referring to a refusal to be caught in static modes, and (2) “growth toward the light”
which infers enlightenment, and movement toward the “good,” toward greater community and
relations. Scott Pratt (2004) summarizes four “commitments” of pragmatism: to interaction,
associated with an instrumental understanding of meaning; to pervasive pluralism which is
ontological, epistemological, and cultural; to community; and to growth. (94–95) 44
These four commitments would seem to resist the idea of “method,” if only because these
are an open-ended indication of a way. Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, though —both
pragmatists—are strongly associated with theorizing a method of thought, a scientific method not
associated with openness. William Doll (2005) notes this paradox; he suggests that the “new
methods” Peirce and Dewey developed were quite different than the popular appropriations of
them. While educationists have locked in five linear steps to the scientific method, this is quite
unlike the method Dewey (drawing on Peirce) envisioned in his Logic of Inquiry (1938). Doll
explains that Dewey is committed to four aspects of inquiry: (1) to “problem framing,” that the
problem is framed as arising from the perception and context of a situation; (2) to practical
action; (3) to reason which apprehends ideas evaluated in terms of their consequences and utility;
and (4) to interaction: “bringing forth ideas into the light of cultural criticism and development”
(Doll, 2005, 52–53). On examination, Dewey’s (and Peirce’s) ideas about method, as elucidated
                                                 
44 Maurice Hamington (2004), draws on Pratt’s pragmatist “commitments” to discuss “embodied care” and
ethics in relation to Jane Addams.
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by Doll, are not far removed from the “commitments” of pragmatists that Pratt uses to
characterize pragmatism, nor to the approach to inquiry laid out by Cornel West (1993).
I suggest that pragmatist thought, like the discursive practices of Galileo and Kepler in
the late 1500s and early 1600s, reflects more than local accomplishments. Jane Addams, a
progressive social reform activist in Chicago, was not party to the discussions of the
Metaphysical Club, but she had profound influence on both George Herbert Mead and John
Dewey, considered “classical pragmatists” (Morton White, 1972). Addams’s preparation in the
development a pragmatist attitude derived instead from her personal and practical experiences of
working with impoverished immigrants. She recognized first “the faces of the poor” (Victoria B.
Brown, 2004), but she recognized, as well, the discrepancies between the rhetoric of the
“freedom” and “inalienable rights” of democracy and the oppression of workers. She recognized
that even such benign words as “immigrant,” and “worker,” concealed the particular nature and
condition of the individuals so categorized. Take for example, the word “worker”: Addams
recognized that children’s mental, spiritual and physical health was jeopardized by harsh
environmental and working conditions (Munro, 1999). The term “workers” conceals the fact that
children were being exploited. Addams lobbied for change to labor laws and organization of
labor unions. The benefits, she felt, would be that child health would not be compromised, that
they might be educated, that they might become better citizens. This work was opposed strongly
by those who profited by cheap labor, and by those who opposed the legislation of such “rights.”
(also in Liva Baker, 493–510).
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This example, from a turbulent social situation in America between the Civil War and
World War I, points to the intermingling of political,45 economic, social, spiritual, scientific, and
moral factors that enter into a situation, which may not be apparent to an objective observer.
Pragmatist thought—because of its attention to specificity of a situation and its representation—
might then be considered on the cusp of a change in episteme, a modern episteme which began,
as Stephen Toulmin points out in his Cosmopolis (1990), in the scientific revolution of the
seventeenth century.
The twentieth century, like the seventeenth century, was a time of epistemic upheaval. In
Boston, as in other major cities, such as New York and Chicago, America was in significant flux
due to post Civil War challenges: fast-growing labor unions, democratic social and political
forces unleashed by heavy immigration (Baker, 237). Authority, truths, ideologies, assumptions
of the past were all being called to question in light of new discoveries, new ideas, and a sense of
millennial spirit as the twentieth century approached. The biography of Oliver Wendell Holmes
(Baker, 1991) provides rich detail of the cultural climate in Boston and Cambridge in the last 30
years of the nineteenth century where pragmatist thought incubated. Baker describes the milieu
of Holmes’ youth:
The new democracy was challenging the platitudes of the old politics at the same
time the new science was challenging the platitudes of the old faiths. The slavery
                                                 
45 I use the word “political” in the sense of referring to “politicalism, political activity; politicalize v. (a) trans.
to make or render political; (b) intr. to practise or discourse on politics; politicalization, the action of making
political (OED). As Baker (1991, 493–510) explains in exploring Justice Holmes’ position, this time in American
history marks a transition from the contract between business owners and their individual employees with the social
understanding of the owner, as signeur, taking care of his employees. In the profit-driven capitalist society, these
responsibilities lapsed. Addams and Dewey politicalized social issues, and in this way were political activists. In
Holmes’s position, he argued in favor of legislation that structured employer/employee relations and was labeled a
Progressivist for having done so.
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question was one of several that presaged the major transformation in American
society during Wendell’s formative years. Immigration—nearly three million in
the 1850s, most of it from northern Europe, especially Ireland and
Germany—urbanization, and industrialization were changing the way America
voted and the way America lived. Jacksonian Democrats—Westerners with their
egalitarian and anti-intellectual inclinations, newly enfranchised property-less
voters, some of them poor tenement dwellers—were questioning the conventional
political wisdom and beginning to threaten the traditional leadership status of the
elite….Although the leading scientists of Wendell’s early youth were careful to
square their theories with basic Christian theology, it was becoming clear that
new developments and discoveries…would lead shortly to challenge revealed
truths. (67)
Adding to Baker’s statement, not only would revealed truths be challenged, but the way
truth was conceived and represented would also be challenged. Once again, as in the seventeenth
century, the socio-political, moral and ethical, religious and economic status quo was questioned.
With Darwin’s theory of evolution, the floodgates of theology burst open. Dewey (1909/1965)
explains the significance of Darwin’s concept of evolution:
Prior to Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, mind, and
politics, had been arrested, because between these ideal or moral interests and the
inorganic world intervened the kingdom of plants and animals. The gates of the
garden of life were barred to the new ideas; and only through this garden was
there access to mind and politics. The influence of Darwin upon philosophy
resides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of
transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and
life. (9)
The response of pragmatists to Darwinism was the feeling that a “general movement of
intellectual reconstruction” was underway (Dewey, 1965, iv). The new ethos was not one of re-
producing what was, but rather, finding ways to respond and move forward in ever new, and
hence changing situations. The importance of Darwin’s work for the pragmatists cannot be over-
emphasized. The idea of the world, cosmos, as an evolving one—a radical change from a closed
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and stable universe—made the idea of progress—and indeed, the idea of creativity— a very
different consideration.46 The past could no longer be the best determinant of the future. The end
of the nineteenth century in America, 1870–1900, a time of immense flux, signaled a new
enlightenment, and a new, enlightened sense of method.
A Developing Pragmatist Attitude
In Timothy Reiss’s sense of discourse being a tool that works for a purpose, pragmatists
were dissatisfied with discursive practices (reasoning) that were no longer working. They felt the
need for “open air and possibilities of nature against dogma, artificiality, and the pretense of
finality in truth” (James, 1907/1982, 213). Evasion is “the act of escaping confinement,” but it is
also to “side-step in avoiding a blow” (OED), or “swerving” (Cornel West, 1989, 9). As the word
evasion suggests, pragmatists do not reject either reason or method; rather, pragmatists intend to
improve upon old, ineffective tools.
In post-Civil War America, pragmatists responded to the times and the spirit of
emancipation and reconstruction arising from a uniquely American experience. In the
Emersonian47 manner that so affected American imagination and intellectual thought in the
                                                 
46 For Charles Darwin (himself not a “Darwinist”), change was slow and incremental, occurring perhaps in the
frame of the “Great Chain.” Darwin did not recognize the ramifications of his own work; and in fact, was
appreciative of the interest and support of Chauncey Wright (of the Metaphysical Club) who was very excited by
Darwin’s work. He came to Darwin’s defense by publishing articles critical of his (Darwin’s) detractors and
explanatory of this great theory. Wright’s work in this area is described by C. S. Peirce as brilliant.
47 Ralph Waldo Emerson, a friend of the Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes (Sr.) family, and advisor to “Wendell”
(son of the Dr., and later Supreme Court Justice), formed the Congregational Church in his rejection of religious
ideologies that he felt stood between man and God. His advice to Wendell in regard to reading Plato: “[You] must
hold him at arm’s length. You must say to yourself, “Plato, you have pleased the world for two thousand years: let
us see if you can please me” (Baker, 89). Such a direct relationship is picked up by Cornel West (1989), who begins
his history of pragmatist thought with Emerson, who “prefigures the dominant themes of pragmatism” (9). Emerson
was a cultural critic who “exerted leadership” (10), a phrase that infers the independent quality for which he was
known.
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nineteenth century, pragmatists were cultural critics who strategized moves to avoid the
constraints of ideologies and then (1) re-envision the relationship of science, religion and moral
purpose; (2) improve human capacity to solve problems and develop human potential (West,
1989, 43). In general, American pragmatists object to the general application of a universalized
method to one’s purpose.48 As Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote,
All the use of life is in specific solutions —which cannot be reached through
generalities any more than a picture can be painted by knowing some rules of
method. They are reached by insight, tact and specific knowledge. (in Menand,
2001, 342)49
“Specific solutions” entail the idea of particularity in a situation to which “methods” pay
little attention. Modern research methods, a product of the scientific revolution (Reiss, 1982;
Doll, 2005), reflect the epistemological foundations of a dominant, rationalist discourse (Reiss,
1982, 21–54). As such, methods are applied universally without regard to the specificity of a
situation. This, too, is characteristic of the rationalist discourse that is the methodological
foundation of methods.
When Richard Rorty comments that pragmatists are “notably free of ‘methodolatry’”
(1999, xxi), besides making a play on words by combining “method” and “idolatry,” he
comments on a pragmatist resistance to a naïve adherence to ideologies. Pragmatists are critical
                                                 
48 I refer to the American pragmatists because pragmatism developed out the American experience and culture
in the late nineteenth century. Pragmatism subsequently developed in England, primarily in the scholarship of F. C.
S. Schiller, and in Italy by Giovanni Papini. I use the terms “pragmatic,” “pragmatistic,” and pragmatist as general
terms as Peirce uses them to refer to “pragmatist thought.”
49 In his biography, Liva Baker (1991) states that Oliver Wendell Holmes defies categorization, not fitting easily
into any frame. However, as Louis Menand (2001) notes, Holmes was present as an early—and influential—
member of the Metaphysical Club, a selected men’s group for intellectual and philosophical discussion, that includes
the “classical pragmatists” (Morton White, 1972), Charles S. Peirce and William James. Other pragmatist thinkers of
the time include W. E. B. Du Bois, and Jane Addams, who both refused the label “pragmatist,” likely on the
(pragmatist) principle of objecting to categorization.
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of the underlying— perhaps obscured—elements of rationalism that configure and determine
modern methods.
William James (1907/1982), ever ready to condemn rationalism, frames it this way:
Reality stands complete and ready-made from all eternity, rationalism insists, and
the agreement of our ideas with it is that unique unanalyzable virtue in them of
which she has already told us. As that intrinsic excellence, their truth has nothing
to do with our experiences. It adds nothing to the content of experience. It makes
no difference to reality itself; it is subservient, inert, static, a reflection merely. It
doesn’t exist, it holds or obtains, it belongs to another dimension from that of
either facts or fact relations, belongs in short, to the epistemological dimension
—and with that big word rationalism closes the discussion….Rationalism [faces]
backward to a past eternity. True to her inveterate habit, rationalism reverts to
“principles,” and thinks that when an abstraction once is named, we own an
oracular solution. (240)
James writes passionately of the misconceptions of rationalism, and in the title and
substance of his essay, “The One and the Many,” he identifies one of the meanings of
“rationalism” in the word “ratio,” (one: many). He responds to a definition of philosophy as “the
quest or the vision of the world’s unity” by asking “But how about the variety in things?” (1995,
50). Using his famous phrase, he asks, “What is the practical value of the oneness for us? And he
answers, “Asking such questions, we pass from the vague to the definite, from the abstract to the
concrete” (51). Where rationalism tends to focus on universal principles (James refers to this
tendency as monism), pragmatists are interested in relations and diversities (pluralism). In this
essay, James identifies many of the issues that the first pragmatists were responding to: the
nature of truth, role of experience/nature, external reality, eternal universal laws/principles,
Hegelian worship of the Absolute (past cultures), transcendent truths, a view on the world, and
the privileging of a set method.
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In the remainder of this section, I bring forward selected pragmatist views to illustrate the
ways in which pragmatist thought reacted to Darwinism and the circumstances of history,
subsequently finding method out of date as the way.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, brings to pragmatist thought the idea of “fluidity”:
nothing should be “fixed” in universal principles. Logical reasoning from a priori truths is just
not the way people make practical choices most of the time: “general propositions do not decide
concrete cases” (O. W. Holmes, in Menand, 2001, 342). And, in the first paragraph of the first
lecture, in his important work in the field of American Law, The Common Law, he states,
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular
result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience. (O. W. Holmes, 1881/1923, 1; emphasis added)
By experience Holmes means “the name for everything that arises out of the interaction
of the human organism with its environment: beliefs, sentiments, customs, values, policies,
prejudices—what he called “the felt necessities of the time.” Another word for it is “culture”
(Holmes, in Menand, 2001, 341–42). Holmes questioned religious ideologies and legal traditions
derived from England; but other “classics,” including past forms of thought, were called to
question in light of changing times in America.
Nicholas St. John Green, a lawyer and contemporary of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
comments on the Great Chain metaphor, called to question with the publication of Darwin’s
work on evolution:
Causation is the law of cause in relation to effect. Nothing more imperils the
correctness of a train of reasoning than the use of metaphor. By its over free use
the subject of causation has been much obscured. [Bacon’s] phrase “chain of
causation,” which is a phrase in frequent use when this maxim is under
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discussion, embodies a dangerous metaphor. It raises in the mind an idea of one
determinate cause, followed by another determinate cause, created by the first,
and that followed by a third, created by the second, and so on, one succeeding
another till the effect is reached…There is nothing in nature which corresponds to
this. Such an idea is a pure fabrication. (St. John Green, 1933, 11)
Logician and historian of science, Charles Sanders Peirce (who went on to develop a
logic of semeiotics), considered “thought” to be interpretive, ongoing, inseparably intertwined
with language, observation, and experience. Peirce criticized and re-worked Hegel’s triadic
system of categories, to place stronger emphasis on the phenomenological category of “firstness”
and the role of abduction (based on experience) in thought. Peirce (1998) enjoys criticizing
Hegel, noting that what distinguishes his work from Hegel’s and gives pragmatism its
“pragmatoidal character” is his (Peirce’s) emphasis on phenomenology in reasoning. He
characterizes phenomenology as a “science that does not draw any distinction of good and bad in
any sense whatever, but just contemplates phenomena as they are, simply opens it eyes and
describes what it sees” (143). Peirce places great emphasis on the power of scientific
observation: “Not what it sees in the real as distinguished from figment,” and not restricted to
“the observation and analysis of experience,” but in extending the analysis to include
all the features that are common to whatever is experienced or might conceivably
be experienced or become an object of study in any way direct or indirect. (143)
Peirce’s strong emphasis here is that phenomenology is the ground of abduction, hypothesis
formation, and the beginning (and end) of sound reasoning.
Based on mathematical theory, also enlightened by Darwin’s theories, Peirce opened up
the concept of probability to “possibility.” The importance of this consideration is relevant to
complexity theory, because the cosmos can now be seen as creative and evolving, instead of
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fully determined and closed (as I will discuss in Chapter 4). For Peirce, pragmatism was always
more than an attitude; it is also sound logically and the basis of what good science is about.
Chauncey Wright, a brilliant philosopher, computer for the Geographical survey, and
climatologist, recognized the world in terms of change rather than constancy, thereby getting rid
of eternal truths. Wright was an atheist and his club discussions served to develop James’ ideas
about “beliefs” —and therefore, “truth.” In this time, ontology, as Morton White (1972) notes,
was “defined as the science of the supernatural or the non-phenomenal” (138). For James
(1902/1982a), the “ontological imagination” is:
Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your
divinations, have prepared the premises of which your consciousness now feels
the weight of result; and something in you absolutely knows that the result must
be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may
contradict it. (73)
How one recognizes truth then is that it feels right; we believe.
Jane Addams, with her strong sense of democratic values and an orientation to thought-
in-action, enacted pragmatism. For pragmatists, thought begins with doubt or perturbation.
Addam’s Hull-House neighborhood was an immigrant urban ward of poverty, disease, and
appalling living conditions. Her pragmatist thought was grounded in the activities of Hull-House,
a settlement house that she organized with Ellen Gates Starr. She and the core group of women
managing the residence, “gathered statistics, investigated factories and industries, conducted
health examinations, [and] examined sanitary conditions” (Deegan, 1988, 6). This information,
contributing to a deep understanding of a situation, in this case, the neighborhood, was mapped
and documented. “Addams translated the facts [data] into everyday language, articulating the
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problems and needs of the community” (6). With this information, she could propose
improvements and lobby for reforms to address specific problems. Addams saw—because it was
clearly evident, but also because she was intimately involved—that poor sanitation was
contributing to increase incidence of disease in residents. The Hull-House team presented
statistical information to city authorities and lobbied to have facilities improved. She wanted “to
combine scientific and objective observation with ethical and moral values to generate a just and
liberated society” (6). Addams realized that although the rhetoric of America is the land of
opportunity, freedom and equality, it was “classed” by color: those who were educated were
intellectual, white collars; those who were not educated were blue-collar laborers. Education was
the key to democracy, but this was another problem: children were laborers. Addams lobbied to
change labor laws.
Over the course of his long and productive career, John Dewey made many contributions
to a pragmatist attitude. One of Dewey’s foremost ideas originated in his discussions with Jane
Addams; he acknowledged the significant role of social interaction for democracy, the
immensely important interactive relationship of the individual and the community. Intellectual,
personal, and communal growth depends on interaction. A second contribution associated with
Dewey, especially in the field of education, is his concept of experience and with it, the idea of
reflection. Discursively, the subject/object split embedded in a rationalist episteme is problematic
for pragmatists. The effect of rationalist discourse is that it distances the subject from the object,
diminishing subjective influence in making observations. Dewey’s way of bridging the
subject/object bifurcation is, I suggest, in the act of reflecting on an experience (culture). In so
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doing, the subject is being (becomes) an object, and one’s self is seen differently —which is how
one grows or learns through experience. A pragmatist attitude, in countering rationalist tendency
to isolate and separate, begins with the assumption of interaction, relations, and recognizes that
learning involves the interaction of the subject with the “object” of inquiry via experience. This,
I suggest, is the wholeness of Rorty’s “organism/word/environment.” A pragmatist self is
inextricably tied to experience, and is understood as a discursive process, rather than a
dissociated object. For Peirce, as I suggest for Dewey, self is an inference, and not a concept
reified.
Pragmatism, pragmatist thought, positioned as it is on the cusp of epistemic change, has
often been read through a modernist lens, leading to misinterpretations. Dewey’s scientific
method is one example of an interpretation not in keeping with a pragmatist attitude of
orientation. As Cornel West (1993) points out, pragmatist thought is embedded in, arises from,
notions of “democracy as a way of life and mode of being in the world—not simply as a form of
governance…[but] the exciting yet frightening risk of living, thinking and feeling
democratically… [D]emocracy has deep ontological, existential and social implications” (167).
Democracy is the ideal.50 Pragmatism tends to question discursive practices that work to
challenge democracy’s principles, that we may move forward as individuals-in-communities in
an ever-changing culture.
                                                 
50 As rationalist discursive methods lead to and reinforce hierarchical, either/or forms of thought, the democratic
ideal of pragmatism moves beyond—not to consensus, not to compromise—to participatory problem solving
through conversations, in the spirit of, with a vision of, ultimate wholeness.
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A Pragmatist Approach to Inquiry—Four Considerations
A pragmatist approach to inquiry is guided by pragmatist attitudes formed in response to
rationalism and in light of Darwinism. Inquiry is the word Peirce uses consistently to describe an
open-ended process of investigation. Key elements of this new approach involve a new
appreciation for changes over time; the importance of seeing culture, thought, events in historical
context; an understanding of language as a negotiation and interpretive process; and the role of
experience—phenomenology—in thought.
For the pragmatists, the doing of science, or research, or inquiry, involves the experience
of trying, actually of doing, of experimenting. Peirce (1898/1998) suggests,
There is no positive sin against logic in trying any theory which may come into
our heads, so long as it is adopted in such a sense as to permit the investigation to
go on unimpeded and undiscouraged. (48)
Let nothing stand in the way of inquiry, challenges Peirce: do not impede, do not
discourage. His statement is further support, if one is needed, for the kind of broad-ranging,
synoptic approach that William Pinar calls for: an inter-disciplinary, historical panorama, seeing
the present historical moment in light of the past, for the purpose of reconfigur[ing] the
intellectual content of the curriculum. The investigation must keep in mind the present moment,
and guided by it, proceed to the settling of doubt.
The (prophetic) pragmatist approach to inquiry is demonstrated by Cornel West (1993),
in his exploration of terms “multiculturalism” and “Eurocentrism,” to indicate how matters of
race are concealed behind rhetoric. He identifies four constitutive elements: (1) discernment, (2)
connection, (3) tracking hypocrisy, and (4) hope.
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Discernment. A prophetic pragmatist approach to inquiry is specific and “it makes
democracy a basic focus” (20). Pragmatists attend to specific events or even words
(representations, signs) and their inextricable connection to humans and culture. For example,
Cornel West (1993, 3–7) asks, what do we mean by “freedom” or “democracy.” These are
conceptual, intellectual words that demand discernment, a broad and deep analytical grasp of the
present in light of the past, leading to a view of what is obscured or obfuscated. Discernment
involves collecting historical, specific information for an in-depth understanding. The inquirer
asks—Where does this concept come from? What does it mean now, here in this place. With this
understanding, how may one go forward?
Connection. On the basis of our common humanity, recognizing our differences, we need
to be empathetic toward others—“empathetic identification,” not as concepts, but as human
beings. Connection is a moral “moment”:
You’ve got to be rooted within…traditions, intellectual and political…and yet be
conversant with the best of what’s going on about the academy…to know more in
order to make your links better…you have the roots required for what you have to
say to bring some insight, and your insight can be informed by the very folk who
you’re talking to, because they have a wisdom to bring. (100)
This connectedness situates inquiry (and its representation) in relation to our human-ness
inseparable from cultural and historical influences. The connection is not only to the experience,
but is the ability to make connections between the local situation and the culture, involving
political, economic, and historical relations.
Tracking Hypocrisy. In tracking hypocrisy, West suggests, prophetic pragmatist inquirers
seek to address the gap between “rhetoric and reality,” the social terrain of rationality—the
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ironies, paradoxes and deceits. We need to understand this self-critically, to understand that we
are a part of that rationality, shaped by the technologies we criticize, and therefore complicit in
that rationality. West calls this “intellectual humility.” He asks, for example, looking at racism
and democracy in America, what does democracy mean to those on whose backs the functioning
of democracy sits? The answer is ugly: Democracy is intertwined with capitalism in a market
economy that depends on the black working poor, a continuation of slavery. “What are the
political consequences of one’s identity?” he asks, when that identity is determined by the market
economy. Difficult moral issues arise with this knowledge. With intellectual humility—and
honesty—the prophetic pragmatist takes responsibility for bringing forward even ugly truths that
they may be dealt with.
Hope. The final moment of prophetic pragmatist inquiry is hope:
To engage in an audacious attempt to galvanize and energize, to inspire and to
invigorate world-weary people…the future is open-ended and what we think, and
what we do, can make a difference. (6)
West continues, “What is distinctive about pragmatism is the premium on the future, the sense of
possibility, potentiality…” (46). I am struck by West’s phrase of “exerting leadership,” and find
that situations that require hope demand the ability to create—to work toward greater community
and the good for all. What needs to be done? How do we get there? In this phase, while West
turns to spirituality, I focus on the spirit of creating, poiesis in curriculum.
The Inquiry Represented
Pragmatists do not claim truth as the result of inquiry. As Peirce (1898/1998) says, “It
is… important that we should realize that the very best of what we humanly speaking, know, we
59
know only in an uncertain and inexact way.” (51). Dewey’s notion of warranted assertability is,
as Cornel West suggests, what one feels is assertable as truth at this time. The inquiry represents
an abstraction of an experience—where I am at this stage, enough to settle my doubts on an
issue, the basis on which I am willing to rest at the moment, and from which I will begin further
inquiries when this truth will no longer hold. It is recognized as the inquirer’s interpretation of
events (of interaction), a stage of an ongoing process, and therefore, for pragmatists, inquiry is
open-ended. “Process” brings with it, impermanence.
What one offers, in the representation of the inquiry, is not mimetic in its modernist,
rationalist sense of imitation, copy; it is not modeled on a way of thought, or a way of proceeding
toward a certain truth. A pragmatist understands discourse not as a medium conducting truth, but
rather, as a tool for description. The representation is a reconstruction of an experience, how one
currently makes sense of things and/or events, seen anew because in the inquiry one has created
a panorama, an expanded “view” of an event, a synoptic vision (Pinar, 2004). The narrative
describes what is revealed in the interaction of the inquirer with the subject. Since it is the
inquirer’s calling of these events into existence, it is a creating, a naming—as Foucault claims,
an enunciation. The inquirer names (describes) what is discovered, what s/he finds in her
exploration, investigation.
What is revealed in the process of engagement is seen in all of its aspects, imagined in
circumstances, seen in context. In this regard, Roger Ames and David Hall (2001) point to one of
the differences between Eastern philosophy and Western with respect to seeing; the difference,
they suggest is apparent in John Dewey’s writing following his stay in China. Dewey says,
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The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end the unseen decides what happens
in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped. (in
Ames and Hall, 2001, 118)51
This seeing involves the intense engagement in the investigation that leads, as James Garrison
points out, to developing a feeling for a situation—the poetic.52 Following a method does not
allow for the type of inquiry that “goes beyond” to involve itself in desires, feelings, and the
spirit of learning. My methodology in this dissertation is to conduct inquiry in such a way as to
go beyond the rationalist epistemology that has held us captive for so long. This “proffered
hypothesis” is the result of my intense engagement in an inquiry into the poetic, a description of
the connections I make in viewing a panorama of interconnections and co-constructions between
organism, word, and environment (or, self/ discourse/culture). This hypothesis is proffered in the
spirit of conversation, that is, as my contribution to the ongoing efforts of curriculum theorists to
re-conceive education, that is, to poietically imagine how educationists might proceed, rather
than to re-form education by merely rearranging, what already exists.
                                                 
51 In Experience and Nature (1958), pp. 43–44.
52 Jonas Soltis, editorial consultant to Teachers College Press, introduces James Garrison’s (1997) Dewey and
Eros by calling attention to two radically different versions of John Dewey’s “scientific method.” The first is: “the
cool, scientific, logical one: of five linear steps—from doubt, problem, data, hypothesis, test—to solution” (x). The
other version, that Garrison suggests is closer to the pragmatist approach of John Dewey, is quite different, notes
Soltis: “Garrison gives us a “warmer interpretation of feeling, desire, and the human need to deal with one’s
perceived disequilibrium by engaging imaginatively and creatively to resolve the situation, thereby restoring one’s
sense of equilibrium and finding satisfaction” (x). For Soltis, Garrison’s approach is poetic simply because it adds
feelings, desires and warmth.
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CHAPTER 3  SEARCHING FOR THE POETIC:
THE WELL-WORN GROUND
INTRODUCTION: TRACKING THE POETIC
My intent in this chapter, in keeping with discernment, described in the methodology of
this dissertation, is to track uses of poetic over time, to explore historical and cultural uses of the
word and to look at its entangled relationship to the “organism/ word/ environment” construal. 53
As a form of representation and as part of the construal of self and culture, the poetic is
historically situated in the realm of intellectual activity. The form, and the value attributed to it,
however, have changed over time. I note here that I have not found a concise, consistent,
baseline definition of poetic despite its common use, especially in relation to art or literature.
Writing about “The Poetics of Open Work,” Umberto Eco (2004) notes, “In every century the
way that artistic forms are structured reflects the way in which science or contemporary culture
views reality” (169). This is akin to Timothy Reiss’s (1982) point in The Discourse of
Modernity: that what we view as “reality”—and which is represented in our discourse—is a
culturally situated phenomenon. There is no particular internal validity to reality other than what
the culture ascribes to it. Notions about the poetic—since Aristotle— are as subject to change as
are the notions concerning rational thought, because these two, the artistic and the analytic
discourses have been shaped in relation to each other. How these concepts are used, what
                                                 
53 I draw on Martin Heidegger’s assertion that a culture is known through its practices. He claims that it is a
modern phenomenon, one of five characteristics of the modern world, that “‘human activity is conceived and
consummated as culture’ which means that culture is ‘the realization of the highest values’ and through such
nurturance ‘becomes the politics of culture’” (in Peters, 2002, 7). I take Heidegger’s point to be that in the modern
world, the cultural value placed on human productivity has determined the cultural “order,” or system of
relationships.
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purpose they serve, whose purpose they serve are questions of interest to educators and
curriculum scholars because what we teach and how we teach it hinges on modern constructions
of both the poetic and the rational.
Eco’s short article on “open work” is concerned with “a number of recent pieces of
instrumental music…linked by a common feature: the considerable autonomy left to the
individual performer in the way he chooses to play the work” (167). The point is not in regard to
interpretation of a complete musical piece, to be played, of course, as the musician feels the
piece may be played being true to the composer’s piece of work. Rather, Eco points to four
variations on a theme of incompleteness: the composer providing varying degrees of
completeness, but still leaving “spaces” for the musician to “finish” the work. Eco then clarifies
what is meant by the term “open work” in musical composition:
A work of art…is a complete and closed form in its uniqueness as a balanced
organic whole, while at the same time constituting an open product on account of
its susceptibility to countless different interpretations which do not impinge on its
unadulterable specificity. Hence every reception of a work of art is both an
interpretation and a performance of it, because in every reception the work takes
on a fresh perspective for itself. Nonetheless, it is obvious that works like those of
Berio and Stockhausen are “open” in a far more tangible sense…they are quite
literally “unfinished”: the author seems to hand them on to the performer…
seemingly unconcerned about the manner of their eventual deployment. (169)
Eco’s article concerns the relationship of art—aesthetic theory—to scientific, or
rationalist, thought. That relationship begins, I suggest, with Aristotle’s Poetics. Eco suggests
that a new trend to open work parallels an open-ness in contemporary scientific thought;
therefore the completion of the work will not be “a conglomeration of random components ready
to emerge from the chaos in which they previously stood and permitted to assume any form
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whatsoever, but rather, will have a “structural vitality…even though it admits of all kinds of
different conclusions and solutions for it.” His point being that the “macroscopic divergence”
between musicians in the performance of the open piece will be apparent, however, between the
“musical communication [in the score] and the time-honored tradition of the classics” the
performance well played will predictably have both coherence and variation (173).
In this chapter, I track the poetic, from the variety of meanings attributed to it in the
present back to its classical and medieval roots. Continuing in the mode established in the
Introduction, painting with broad brush strokes, I create an impression of the poetic, based on
discernment, Cornel West’s (1993) word for the historical work necessary to uncover obfuscated
details that over time have influenced how one might think about the poetic in the present. I am
keeping in mind ideas related to generativity and the emergence of the new. The panorama I
create in this exploration, from present to past, is to view the poetic as a form of representation in
the “organism/ word/ environment” construal.
The Poetic Present: A Modernist Approach
An accepted analytic way to find the meaning of a word today is to consult a dictionary
and/or thesaurus. In the Oxford English Dictionary, poetic refers to poetry. Roget’s Thesaurus is
more helpful in pinning down where the poetic fits in the modern scheme of meanings. It was
Peter Mark Roget’s (1852) plan in creating his thesaurus to “make a collection of words arranged
according to the ideas which they express” (vii). Current editors of Roget’s Thesaurus elaborate
on his schema:
Words express ideas—the ideas we have of tangible objects as well as
abstractions. Words expressing related ideas may be grouped under general heads;
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these general heads may be sorted into a system, so that we have a comprehensive
classification into which, theoretically, any word in the language may be fitted
and related to a context. (vii)
Roget’s conception was to contextualize words, finding other words through which the
idea might be most aptly expressed. Following Aristotle, he devised a “system of categories,
logically ordered” (viii), aligned with philosophical topics, to provide a reference that would
ultimately reduce questions of meaning—to “limit the fluctuations to which language has always
been subject,” and to serve as an “authoritative standard for [language] regulation” (xxxiv). He
states at the end of the introduction to the first edition:
Nothing would conduce more directly to bring about a golden age of union and
harmony among the several nations and races of mankind than the removal of that
barrier to the interchange of thought and mutual good understanding between man
and man, which is now interposed by the diversity of their respective languages.
(xxxvi)
I use Roget’s Thesaurus almost as often as I use the Oxford English Dictionary, both of
which tout themselves as authoritative references in the use of modern language—modern ideas.
Of concern, as I read Roget’s introduction,54 is his universalizing sense of ideas conveyed in
language; it is clear to him that ideas themselves are universal, his categories are universally
appropriate, and within modern English are contained all the necessary ideas that will lead to
“understanding between man and man.”
                                                 
54 A footnote in the original Introduction to Roget’s Thesaurus (1852) highlights the modernist Eurocentric
position in relation to other forms of knowledge: “The principle by which I have been guided in framing my verbal
classification is the same as that which is employed in the various departments of Natural History….[A]n attempt
has been made to construct a systematic arrangement of ideas with a view to their expression….[Earlier Sanskrit
systematic arrangements, 0–100 BCE] were, as might be expected, exceedingly imperfect and confused, especially in
all that relates to abstract ideas or mental operations” (xxxv).
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Aware of the ethnocentrism in this thought, I begin my search to understand the poetic. In
the Thesaurus, one is referred to “imagination.” Indeed, Under Class IV (Intellect), Division 1
(Formation of Ideas), Section VII, (Creative Thought), imagination is listed last, just below
supposition. Supposition is privileged in this schema by being synonymous, or associated, with
theoretical, hypothetical, philosophical, conjecture and surmise. The poetic is, it seems, low on
the intellectual scale and but a small aspect of imagination. To be imaginative is to be creative,
original, resourceful, fertile. When imagination is poetic, it is grouped with ecstacy55 and frenzy;
poetic imagination is fictional, rhapsodic. Rhapsodic in the dictionary means “relating to a
rhapsody, or with the emotional and improvisational qualities of a rhapsody; joyfully enthusiastic
or ecstatic about.”56 In Roget’s Thesaurus, Rhapsodical is grouped with rambling, desultory,
unsystematic —under the heading “Fitfulness.”57
I note specifically that, here in the thesaurus, under the heading of imagination to be
creative is “unimitative,” i.e., “not imitative.” The word that Aristotle uses in relation to the
poetic is imitation. For Aristotle, the poetic is imitative, which he considers to be creative and
imaginative. In the computer dictionary I used, and for Roget’s Thesaurus poetic is not imitative.
I wonder about this contradiction and of what Aristotle thought the poetic to be imitative. Indeed,
                                                 
55 The relationship between the poetic and ecstacy seems extreme, but Peter Kingsley (2003) notes, ecstacy was
related to the practices of certain healers, interpretations of dreams, and induced states of altered consciousness.
Poet, healer and logician, Parmenides “described how he had been given all the knowledge he taught by a goddess
after he traveled to meet her in another world. This is because he was a priest of Apollo who specialized in the
mastery of other states of consciousness: for him, our familiar world was an illusion that he could leave behind and
re-enter at will. And he was a healer—a healer who worked through ecstasy, through the inspired interpretation of
dreams, through immersing himself and others for extended periods of time in utter stillness” (web-page).
56 Encarta World English Dictionary, Microsoft Word X, 1999, s.v. “Rhapsodic”
57 It is interesting to note Section VI (Extension of Thought, to the past, to the future), includes words such as
oracle, prediction, foresight, or memory. In the temporal sense, for Roget, imagination exists only in the present.
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what does imitative mean for Aristotle? An inquiry into uses of poetic historically leads to
insights regarding conceptualizing practices, that is, discursive practices, and conceptions of self,
different in postmodern, modern and archaic times.58
POETICS IN LITERARY THEORY: MOVING TOWARD THE POSTMODERN
In the library of Louisiana State University, a keyword search of “poetic” reveals 1, 584
book titles, 561 written in the last ten years. Most of these books indicate by their descriptors that
they refer to literary criticism. The word “poetics” has a long history in literary theory, beginning
with Aristotle’s Poetics, claims literary theorist, Jonathan Culler (1997). He explains:
Poetics starts with attested meanings or effects and asks how they are achieved.
(What makes this passage in a novel seem ironic? What makes us sympathize
with this particular character? Why is the ending of this poem ambiguous?)…
Poetics [tries] to understand how literary works achieve the effects they do. (61)
Poetics, in literary theory, then, has to do with interpretation of the text in relation to
literary conventions. Among the books listed in this search, there is an obvious break with the
formalist and modernist tradition of “attested meanings,” assumptions of truth and the
presumption of a universal reader, a universal author, and the objectivity of language, as more
recent scholars contest this tradition and assert positions of difference in the reading and writing
of literature. Contestations, however, exceed purely literary conventions and take such forms as
Dalibor Vesely’s (2004) Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation: The Question of
                                                 
58 Timothy Reiss (1982) points out that although Aristotle and Plato are often considered to be the source of
rationalist—modern— thought, because “individuality” was not yet part of the conceptualizing practices, we were
not truly “modern” until after Galileo, when conceptualizing practices shifted to make an autonomous, “willful” self
part of the modern episteme. At the end of modernity, postmodernist Katherine Hayles’s (1999) inquires into what it
means to be human in a “post” liberal humanist society, that is, querying conceptions of self. This inquiry, explores
the relationship of the poetic to conceptions of self in three time periods to suggest that in postmodern times a
complex, poietic self might be part of conceptualizing practices of a postmodern episteme.
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Creativity in the Shadow of Production, which discusses the aesthetics of architecture in terms of
“rehabilitation of the fragment,” “the nature of communicative space,” and “the shadow of
modern technology.” Other examples are: Karen Jackson Ford’s (1997) Gender and the Poetics
of Excess: Moments of Brocade, in which “excess” is discussed contra containment, discipline,
sexuality and women’s literature; and Edmunds Bunkse’s (2004) Geography and the Art of Life,
which provides telling and insightful descriptors to illuminate a shift in “geographic sensibilities”
between “house and home,” “traveler to tourist,” “wonders of the world and knowing one’s self.”
Geographical perceptions are shaped by language. These books, by their descriptors, each infers
something more than an objective account— each entertains the idea of subjective difference.
Historically, the writing of difference stems from poststructural scholars such as Jacques
Derrida and his critique of the metaphysics of presence, underscoring the need to consider what
is not signified, that which is absent, excluded, or denied. His deconstruction of the text, in the
broadest sense of text being anything that is a “sign,” led the poststructuralist movement in
continental philosophy in the later 1960s. Richard Rorty (1985) notes that Martin Heidegger led
the Continental “break with scientism” (and its subject/object split), followed by Hans-Georg
Gadamer and Derrida, but only on the Continent “did this repudiation lead philosophers to align
themselves with the literary as opposed to the scientific [and analytic] culture.” Gadamer
repudiated “Kant’s spectatorial notion of the ‘aesthetic’” and Derrida approached “language as a
seamless intertextual web.” Together they “blur the distinction between philosophy and
literature, the serious and the playful, the cognitive and the non-cognitive, the aesthetic and the
moral” (751).
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The idea of “difference” is one of subject positions, that is, the subject in relation to the
object, no longer assumed to be both absent and universalized in whatever category he is
assumed to belong. This difference is manifested in the re-emergence of the subject, which
means that “objectivity” is denied. When the subject comes to presence, “experience” is re-
introduced. The shift in subject positions brings first person narrative, reintroduces narrative
voice into the text. First person is characteristic of both poetic and rhetorical writing.
Compatriots and colleagues of Derrida, French feminists of the 1970s, Julia Kristeva,
Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous, use the phrase “poetic writing,” also called l’écriture feminine
(women’s writing) or “writing the body,” to bring to public awareness women’s position of
differance in relation to the dominant discourse. The poetic here refers to the orality of poetics,
its existence prior to “masculine” discourse, its differences in regard to the political, moral,
ethical, and existential aspects of representation. The poetic language of l’écriture feminine
resists the structures of phallocentric discourse—the grammar, logic, and linearity—that
privileges representation from a male perspective; that is, language as tool of male domination,
language that is normative from a male perspective. From a feminist perspective, language is a
disciplinary device for shaping thought/representation to a hierarchically ordered, male
dominated world.59 Poetic writing here resists that act of violence. Kristeva, particularly, brings
to awareness the psychoanalytic influence in the semiotics of language.
                                                 
59 The orality of the poetic refers to the rhythmic, fluid form of language that is relatively unstructured,
compared with masculinist discourse which is logically structured. Such an orientation builds on the existential and
psychoanalytic relationship between the poet, language and world in a manner not unlike Rorty’s “organism / word /
environment.” Here poetic language reclaims jouissance, the sexual/ sensual pleasure of language in defiance of the
“objectivity” of masculinist discourse.
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Significantly, though poststructural and deconstructive thought brought the idea of
difference to recent recognition, authors have been writing difference for many years. In my
search of the literature to understand the poetic, I found Elizabeth Bishop: Her Poetics of Loss.
Susan McCabe (1994) helps me in the struggle to understand more about representation and its
entangled relationship to “organism/ word/ environment.” An American poet, Bishop
(1911–1979), writing in the mid-twentieth century, is neither poststructuralist nor feminist in the
usual sense, but does resist a “coherent system of beliefs that might provide ultimate meaning”
(McCabe, 1994, 243). These beliefs concern not only the assumptions embedded in the concept
of representation, that are taken for granted and “provide ultimate meaning,” but also the way
those assumptions affect a sense of self. Again, representation is, generally, in modernist terms,
one thing standing for another. In effect, one thing is in imitation of another. Imitation is from
the Greek word, mimesis, the concept underlying poetics as the knowledge of skills in writing
poetry, generalized later to forms of literature. Mimesis is a multifaceted concept; it is embedded
in the assumption that words stand for—represent— objects. In addition, however, mimesis
means, for Aristotle, that art is a skill, that properly developed provides forms that imitate nature.
Nature is, as Aristotle conceives it, man’s nature. Nature at the time, for the Greeks, was the
ideal form, proportions founded on the human body and projected anthropomorphically on the
world. Nature as a part of man is both universal and categorical. Ultimate meaning in
representation is found, for Aristotle, in this knowledge. In his time, poetry, properly written,
encourages both the writer and the reader to think in categorical—i.e., universal— terms.
70
One might say then, that modernist poetics, as a representational code, has embedded in it
universal and categorical values and forms that are the basis of ultimate meaning, as either truth
or reality. The universal is a conceptual word that becomes iconic, bearing the cultural ideal
form. For example, the word “woman” contains cultural values for an ideal woman of the right
size, type, gender. The statement, “Elizabeth is a woman” is a categorical statement representing
a universal truth; the assumption is, “this is that”—a mimesis—the particular is the universal. As
an equivalent, the word or symbol becomes “real”; such reification of representation is very
obvious in our consideration of the number three (3) being, not the abstraction it is, but the “real
thing.” The assumption that high scores represent real intelligence and understanding is another
expression of mimetic thinking. Representation of reality in these conceptual terms is the basis of
knowledge and judgments.
For Elizabeth Bishop, however, values and practices of the culture are called to question
by her sense of difference in regard to representation. Elizabeth Bishop is a lesbian, and therefore
her reality, her truth is not represented by “woman,” since woman is assumed to be the ideal
form (from a straight male perspective)—heterosexual. The poetics of representation is called to
question. As with other postmodernists (particularly in the arts and sciences) and
poststructuralists (in literary theory) who followed, recognition of difference brought about a
“crisis of representation” (Greene, 1994; Eldridge, 1996). The crisis led, as Maxine Greene
points out, to “rejection of universal constraints and standards, and of frameworks in which all
differences may be resolved (1994, 216).
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In Elizabeth Bishop’s case, it is perhaps too strongly stated to say “rejection” of
constraints and standards; troubling issues of identity, positioning, and the objectivizing of
representation is the challenge she presents.
Elizabeth Bishop and a Poetics of Loss
McCabe (1994) explains that from a literary perspective,
If modernism and postmodernism have shared a similar excitement in language
for itself… the former, even in its vibrant experimentalism, still possesses a faith
in the power and adequacy of words that the latter more insistently questions or
denies. (xiv)
Both the modern and postmodern share an excitement in the use of language, in the
capacity for artistry, but for the postmodernist, the power and adequacy of language is in
disrupting modernist ideas embedded in representation. The disruption of representation begins
in what McCabe sees as Bishop’s “poetics of loss”:
The art of losing isn’t hard to master;
so many things seem filled with the intent
to be lost that their loss is no disaster.
Elizabeth Bishop60
 McCabe explains,
Personal loss permeates Bishops’s perception of the world, of her role as artist,
lover, and “seer.” While bringing into view the unanswerable questions of
suffering and faith, [her poem] “Santarém” is a kind of conflux of poetic
impulses, with much of the innovations of the earlier career running beside those
breakthroughs of the later. There exist no seamless continuity and linear
development in Bishop’s work (there is always the flux of arrival and departure,
embarking and disembarking), but rather fundamental concerns—with loss, with
                                                 
60 “One Art,” in McCabe (1994).
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isolation and connection, with charting a feminist encounter with tradition—as
recurrent as the rhymes of her villanelle. Fort, da.61 We begin with loss. (250)
The “loss” might be seen simply as a counter position within a modern culture focused on
production, accumulation, and excess. Loss is perhaps even anticipated because, as McCabe
points out, if the descriptors of modernism are “purpose, design, hierarchy, mastery, presence,
center, hypotaxis, metaphor, depth, determinacy, phallocentrism, transcendence,” then they are
countered in Bishop through “play, chance, anarchy, silence, absence, dispersal, parataxis,
metonymy, surface, irony androgyny, indeterminacy, immanence” (xiv). All these (latter)
characteristics infer fragmentation, imperfection and disorder in juxtaposition to the existing
order. As McCabe points out though, Bishop’s poetics begins with loss in the sense apparent in
Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytic recognition of the loss of the maternal with the internalization of
symbolic language and subjection of the semiotic. Transgressing symbolic signification, the
feeling of loss is a perpetual reminder to create—poiesis—a self, a home.
I wish to focus on Bishop’s disruption of modernist notions of self because when
representation is called to question, so too is a modernist self. McCabe notes, that Bishop’s
poetics of loss,
allows us to see a topography of the self that cannot be limited to individual
existence. The personal becomes the communal, and our remembering, like our
poems, are moments of the homecoming: temporary alleviation of estrangement
but also heightened awareness of the ultimate strangeness of “being” and
“family”…The examination of personal history and self, then, does not implement
                                                 
61 Sigmund Freud (1962) describes the “fort, da” game of a child who repeatedly throws his toys away while
imitating the sound that indicates “gone” (fort, German) and gleefully exclaiming “there” (da) when the toy
reappears. Freud’s interpretation of the game is that “it was related to the child’s great cultural achievement of the
instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his
mother to go away without protesting” (In “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” Standard Edition, Vol. 18, 14–15).
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fixed identity; within Bishop’s poetics of loss, she can only acknowledge a fluid
sense of being in the world. (242)
The topography of the self—McCabe’s phrase—provides a metaphor for discussion of the
conceptual borders, boundaries, and geographies of self. The metaphor of topography suggests
the map/territory relationship, the tendency to conflate the map with the territory, to think of
them as one thing standing mimetically for another; but as many have pointed out, Gregory
Bateson (1979) among them, “the map is not the territory.”62 The metaphor is appropriate,
however, for pointing out several aspects of Bishop’s poetics. First, reading a map is an
impersonal experience, quite unrelated to the physical experience of “being there.” But even the
“being there” does not guarantee that one can represent. McCabe points out that in her poetry
Bishop reiterates, “I have seen it,” indicating her inability to record objectively immediate
experience; “words cannot transparently describe the world” (20). Mimetic representation
describes the world; Bishop describes her experience of the world in a bricolage, disintegrated,
inconclusive, irreducible and uncertain.
The map provides a perspective while the real-life experience has a view, a difference
related to objectivity and subjectivity. Bishop “disrupts an aesthetic of impersonality and
autonomy by interlacing her life with her art…revealing the difficulty of disentangling the two”
(2). The map provides a set of facts and geographical relations. The map seldom changes,
continually representing directions, elevations, rivers, mountains, locations. For Bishop there are
only relative and transitory borders, flux, uncertainty and instability and these ideas are seen by
                                                 
62 Bateson draws on Alfred Korzybski (1933/1958), a critic of Aristotelian logic who recognized the
relationship of that logic to language, and founded a general theory of semantics. It was Korzybski who popularized
this aphorism.
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the way she troubles self and identity. Beginning with incompleteness, Bishop writes her
subjectivity, a reorientation that questions the subject as object and that object as unitary, fully-
formed and able to be known. Bishop’s self is “homemade,” where “home” “is a living thing
within her imagination because never completed, arrived at, or substantiated”—any more than
self; self “thrives on the inconclusive and the impossible” (McCabe, 234, emphasis added), one
that eludes the trap of boundaries, impersonates, refuses categorization. Homemade draws on the
dimly mis-remembered and therefore is always re-creating. Here the position of the author in
relation to the text, and her/his presumed identity, become less a prescription from a modern
perspective, that an opportunity from a postmodern perspective—an opportunity to question and
“play” with what one has considered fixed, set, real.
The idea of a non-objectified self is one that I will return to in Chapter 4, but here it is
enough to say that Bishop’s poetry reveals a much more complicated—perhaps even, complex—
sense of self, one that, borrowing a phrase from Maxine Greene (1994) “re-describes and re-
creates the self as life proceeds” (216). Similar to Eco’s idea of “open work,” the “work” is open
ended, and creativity involves not only an aesthetic and artful interpretation of someone else’s
vision, but using that vision as a springboard for further re-composition. Creativity for Bishop
does not reside in comfortably certain places, but rather “from an exile’s imaginings and re-
creations” (199). Searching, questioning, refusing the categorical allows her to continually re-
make self and world as homes.
In his eulogy of W. V. Quine, Richard Rorty (2001) recalls the view expressed by Nelson
Goodman to Quine, that
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 There is no one way the world is, but merely various alternative descriptions of
it. Some descriptions are useful for certain purposes, others for other purposes,
but none of them is closer to or farther away from reality. (B8)
This is a view that Rorty posits for himself and for John Dewey. In the following section,
the structuring of this narrative ordering of the world is ironically also traced to Aristotle’s
Poetics. This is not such a big jump to make, however, as Jonathan Culler notes that the field of
literary criticism is indebted to Aristotle. Aristotle then becomes the foundation of both modern
and postmodern senses of the poetic (and its companion, mimesis).
ARISTOTLE’S POETICS: THE ROOT OF ALL
A. N. Whitehead makes the comment that all of Western philosophy is a footnote to
Plato. It is Plato’s student Aristotle, however, who puts a lasting twist on the concept of mimesis
(imitation) and who may be credited with creating poetics, providing a place for poetry, as an art
form in Western culture, and a philosophical grounding for poetic representation.63 The delayed
effect of this change, not really noticeable until late medieval times, is that the old poetic
becomes a specter. It follows from the death of the Muse, and hovers as the absent presence to
remind us that once there was something more—aliveness, spirit, and creativity of the poiesis of
the poetic—now a threat to the prospect of certainty. In the following sections, I present an
accepted interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of mimesis and its relationship to his ideas about
                                                 
63 Most scholars seem to agree that while Plato took a strong stand against the poets in The Republic, he still
used poetic devices. Plato saw mimesis as an “effective instrument of teaching,” “a methodology open to those who
cannot muster the rigor for a dialectical quest for ultimate truth” (Golden, 1992, 55). Plato claimed that since the
artist is under the influence of the Muse, he has no genuine knowledge himself, but is the deliverer of a “divine
message”; an artist is the “practitioner of non-rational cognition” and “the philosopher is the practitioner of rational
cognition” (55). Mimesis, as artful imitation, was removed from reality, which was itself once removed from ideal
forms. In addition, poetry exerted a “subversive [emotional] influence on the character of both individual and state”
(41). Aristotle takes a slightly different view, presented later in this chapter.
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poetry, art and intellectual thought. With the movement to literacy, that is, representation in
textual form, Aristotle keeps the same word, mimesis, but changes both the conceptual meaning
and practices associated with it. He makes over the old performative re-presentation of cultural
knowledge into a newer rational process. Mimesis as techné, picked up in late medieval times,
becomes foundational to schooling and teaching methods. The art of teaching is mimesis as
imitation— or worse, copying. Finally, I point to the poetic in current curriculum studies to
suggest that while invoking the poetic may be a call for change, it recalls ancient arguments,
replays age-old philosophical arguments, without moving beyond a modernist philosophical —or
conceptual—frame. 64
There is a story that Aristotle was commissioned by Philip (father of Alexander the
Great) to compile and organize the knowledge of the Greek world. Aristotle had an assistant,
Theophrastus, and many slaves to make this work possible. It was a phenomenal and a
complicated task, especially when the country had such a long and contentious history. The
culture was rich and varied, strongly oriented aesthetically to beauty and form.65 Mimesis, a
concept related to paideia, cultural knowledge, was in a period of revision. The historical
relationship of mimesis (re-presentation) and paideia (cultural knowledge) was in the
performance by poets of epics in which cultural myths and knowledge were re-presented. This
                                                 
64 Aristotle’s Poetics and other writings are still subject to much re-interpretation; for my purposes I draw on
Greek classicists Leon Golden (1992), Stephen Halliwell (2001) and related to Aristotle’s aesthetics, Wladyslaw
Tatarkiewicz (1970).
65 “Aesthetics” was not a word used by the Greeks. First use of the word to refer to field or discipline was in the
doctoral dissertation of Alexander Baumgarten, Aesthetics (1735), in which he “attempt[s] to articulate and defend a
new modality of experience” (Martin Jay, 2004, 133); that is, of things perceptible by the senses, things material (as
opposed to things thinkable or immaterial) (OED, s.v. “Aesthetic”). Kant, not acknowledging prior use of the term
aesthetics, but writing on the same topic, refers to it as “critique of judgment” (Tatarkiewicz, 1970, 4). Aesthetics
exists today as a discussion of “the beautiful,” often associated with “the good,” a reflection of cultural values.
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tradition, over hundreds of years, changed. Synchonically, literacy changed intellectual thought
and cultural practices; poetry was inscribed, theatrical performances were scripted.
In Plato’s time, Sophists were poets, rhetoricians, and itinerant teachers who attracted
paying students by reciting passages of popular epic poetry. Sophists gathered in the markets and
other public places, arguing among themselves concerning passages of poetry and the author’s
intentions, without a basis for coming to any sound conclusion. Plato held Sophists responsible
for inciting pubic feeling against Socrates, which led to his taking the hemlock. For Plato, these
poets were mere copies of the real thing. Hence, in his ideal Republic, Plato casts out the poets
and reduces mimesis (which was previously generally understood to be poetic re-presentation) to
“copying.” Plato even challenged the poetic tradition, questioning the wisdom of poets on the
basis that the Muse spoke through the ancient poets and therefore the poet had no knowledge of
his own. Although Plato often used myth allegorically in his own writings, he claimed that this
art arose from skill, while poetry derived from divine madness. Further, poets did not have true
knowledge since it was not reasoned knowledge. Plato’s views no doubt influenced Aristotle in
his considerations of poets, poetry, and knowledge.
In classical Greece, at that time of Plato, intellectuals were literate (Tatarkiewicz 1970;
Havelock, 1986) and as such, had lost touch with the performative aspects of the archaic
presentation of epics (Nagy, 1996; Martin, 1989; Gentili, 1988; Havelock, 1969). Aspects of the
“poetics” of the tradition— evocation, allusion, speaking indirectly, hinting, “the vague, implicit,
oracular use of language” (Kingsley, 2004) —were poorly understood; and mimesis, once
associated with poetic performance and re-presentation, was now associated with “seduction,”
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and “deception” (Tatarkiewicz, 111). Poetry was not considered an “art”: poets sang their epics,
performing the wisdom of Muses, and this wisdom was called sophia, the “cognition of the most
profound truth” (Tatarkiewicz, 33). As an oral performance, archaic poets produced no material
“product,” an important factor for following epistemological theorists such as Aristotle, who was
attempting to categorize such enigmatic “wisdom” as sophia. The word sophia also refers to
“art,” but true artists produced a material product and were considered to have objective
knowledge of their craft.66 To classical scholars, archaic poetry was, therefore, not an “art.”
“Wisdom” (sophia), associated with the sage poets of the past, was now an anachronism.
Archaic poets, once thought to be inspirited, and given much the same status as oracles, were
now disparagingly thought of as “soothsayers” (Tatarkiewicz, 28, 145).
The arts (techné) were practical skills for the classical Greeks, such as carpentry,
weaving, painting, sculpture, and architecture. Artists produced a product and had practical
knowledge of its production (Tatarkiewicz, 26). Aristotle, a realist, had no patience for
soothsaying, but he did believe in man’s nature, his inborn gifts. Thus, partly agreeing, partly
disagreeing with Plato, Aristotle, shifted the connotation of the word mimesis (re-presentation)
away from its archaic association with poetic performances, categorizing poetry as a form of
“art.” Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz (1970) explains that for Aristotle,
Good poetry comes about in the same way as any other good art, through talent,
skill and exercise, and is subject to rules no less than other arts. Because of this it
can be the subject of a scientific study: this study is called “poetics.” (145)
                                                 
66 The objective knowledge of artists has to do with discovering the kanon, the natural mathematical
proportions, in the art forms they produce: “The Greeks took it for granted that nature and the human body in
particular, displays mathematically defined proportions and inferred from this that representations of nature in art
must show similar proportions” (Tartarkiewicz, 57).
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Aristotle’s Poetics makes “poetics” the scientific study of poetry. It provides, probably
for his students, the guidelines and standards of a good poetic work of art; there was no general
conceptual category for literature at that time. He took “Greek epic and tragedy to be definitive
masterpieces and regarded the theories which he based upon them as universally and eternally
valid” (155). The emerging form for written work, the form of representation—was structured, as
Leon Golden (1992) points out, around Aristotle’s conceptions of reality, necessity, causation,
probability, plot, climax, possibility and appropriate end. A sense of beauty is then achieved
through form, order, proportion, harmony, rhythm and mimesis. The value of the work of art is
judged by its adherence to logical, ethical, and artistic canons—which Aristotle codifies.67 Artful
representations need to be of noble human actions and good poetry should guide students in
making sound moral judgments. Poetics is also concerned with the cognitive value of arts, and
the concept of mimesis (imitation of the “noble”) explains the way that art functions to develop
“good” thought. Mimesis, in Aristotle’s thought, is both process and product. It is an imitative
process; it is a product that represents nature. Appreciation of art, as a representation of nature,
plus ratio, leads to intellectuality. These progressive levels of intellectuality, hierarchically
ordered, are mimetically represented in social structures; as Tatarkiewicz notes, “In art, one man
is a craftsman, another an artist, and a third a connoisseur” in relation to expertise of judgment
                                                 
67 Greek kanon (canon) is a form by which the artist is bound, a law, and every art has its own canon;
architecture, based on mathematics (proportion), served as the master for other arts, although there was variation
among them. For example, in sculpture, the canon is based on the proportions of the human body, which was seen as
the canon of nature. The artist sought the canon in producing the work, as a guarantee of its perfection. Greek artists
“treated their art as a matter of skill and obedience to general rules rather than of inspiration and imagination”
(Tatarkiewicz, 24). Greeks, in the classical period of canonical art, had no theory of creation and were oblivious to
the idea of a creative individual (Tatarkiewicz, 29).
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(150). Aristotle’s resurrection of the poetic, after Plato’ disparaging treatment, transforms
mimesis of poetry to a more intellectually purposive art form—with its own canon—the mimesis
of human nature, and rationalization of social order.
Mimesis
According to Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz (1970), nowhere does Aristotle define his use of
the term mimesis (142), but it is generally acknowledged that it was important, not only for
Aristotle in his work, but historically and culturally. Stephen Halliwell (2001) maintains that for
Aristotle mimesis was about how humans “explore their own distinctively human world through
hypothetical simulation and enactment of some of its possibilities” (Halliwell, 2001, 88).
Mimesis is the human activity of imitation; it is in our human nature to imitate, as children play
games, for example, imitating adults, “miming,” pretending—imagining. Mimesis is associated
with the human desire to know, one of the principle ways of achieving genuine knowledge,
“deeply rooted in our very nature” (Golden, 19). In the production of art, mimesis is the name
given to the process of representing what is seen to be natural and it is a natural tendency to do
so. It is both a means (mode) and an intellectual end.
For Aristotle, intellectual thought is developed in two ways, through art and through
reason. Imitative art forms are an external realization of a true idea. For Aristotle, art is itself a
“body of knowledge capable of yielding universally applicable judgments and is thus
significantly superior to mere experience, which is concerned with particulars” (Golden, 1992,
63). Experience in itself is not sufficient for learning in Aristotle’s view. One must move from
this particularity to the universal.
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Golden (1992) explains that for Aristotle there is great pleasure in learning, the pleasure
of recognition, the a-ha experience of clarification. Golden explains katharsis as an act of
intellectual clarification, learning via mimesis: “central to all of our experiences…is an act of
intellectual insight” elicited by art, that of connecting to the universal (Golden, 39).68 The epic
poems of Homer and the tragedies are poetic art. If it is successful, the art form, representation,
advances thought to recognition of the universal. In this way, art generates the pleasure of
learning and inference69 (19; emphasis added). In the Poetics (1448 b 4–17), Aristotle writes:
Two causes appear to have brought poetry into existence and these are natural
causes. For the process of mimesis is natural to mankind from childhood on and it
is in this way that human beings differ from other animals, because they are the
most imitative of them and achieve their first learning experiences through
mimesis, and all human beings receive pleasure through mimesis. A proof of this
is what happens in reality; for there are some things which are painful to us when
we see them in reality, but we take pleasure in viewing the most precise
representations of them, for example, the forms of the most despised wild animals
and of corpses. The reason for this is that the act of learning is not only most
pleasant to philosophers but in a similar way, to everyone else, only others share
in this pleasure to a more limited degree. For it is on account of this that we take
pleasure when we see representations, because it turns out that in our viewing of
                                                 
68 As Golden (1992) explains, the single concept of katharsis, critically important to understanding the value of
tragedy (for Aristotle), has several aspects; drawing on a psychoanalytic perspective, he asserts that three senses of
katharsis are possible and found in Aristotle’s writings: emotional responses to tragedy, ethical lessons to be learned
in such dramatic presentations, and a medical-therapeutic curative effect in emotional release. Golden explains
katharsis in relation to the pleasure of learning inherent in mimesis: “the highest goal, the end in itself, of music, and
of art in general” is intellectual clarification (37).
69 Halliwell’s (2001) essay concerns the clarification of a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s use of “universals” in
connection with poetry and mimesis. As Halliwell (2001) explains, Aristotle is guarded in stating the relationship of
the poetic to universals, and there are differences between Poetics 4 and 9: in section 4 it is clear that “universals
must enter into poetry at the larger level of plot-structure and of the whole framework of relationships between the
agents, their actions and their characters….” (Halliwell, 98). In section 9, however, Halliwell explains that
“understanding poetic universals is a matter of implicit grasp, not of explicit articulation, and this points to an
important dimension of the model of human understanding that prevails in Aristotle’s thinking at large” (101). The
way I understand this subtlety is that in section 4 one is referring to the necessary qualities of good text; in section 9
one is referring to the cognitive aspect of inference related to interpretation.
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them we learn and infer what each thing is, for example that this is that.70 (in
Golden, 19; emphasis added)
The art form, the object itself, is of less importance than the value it has leading to
katharsis, the pleasure of recognition: “For it is not in the object itself that we take pleasure but
in the process of making inferences from “this to that” so that it turns out that we learn
something” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1371 b 4–10). The inference relates to the imitative nature of
art, and because it is an imitation, when we make the connection that “this is that,” there is the
pleasure of recognition, a moment of clarity in making the connection. The ultimate success of
mimesis is judged on its effectiveness in creating the learning experience, that is, on intellectual
and emotional pleasure, and in understanding the causes of events (Golden, 63–64).
Noting that “mimesis is a tightly structured process involving, in different arts, different
means of representation, different manners of communicating that representation to an audience,
and different moral and ethical states as the object of artistic representation” (63), there are still
qualities necessary for all art forms: the “roots, goal, and essential pleasure of all mimesis in the
act of learning and inference” (37). In regard to epic and tragic poetry, Aristotle’s
“uncompromising demands on art” (Golden 105) include:
psychological necessity and probability as it represents the beginning, middle, and
end of a significant human action that this structure serve the needs of the
essential telos of art in human experience [to move from the particular to the
universal]; and that this telos be clearly understood as the art of illumination
[katharsis, “intellectual clarity”] and universalization that naturally and
necessarily arises in the properly constructed work of art. (106)
                                                 
70 Aristotle determines an equivalency in “this is that”; however, as William Pinar (2005) notes, curriculum
scholar, Tetsuo Aoki (2005) finds a “generative, though ambiguous, ambivalent space” between this and that,
opening up “edgy spaces, located at margins and boundaries, space of doubling…spaces of generative possibilities”
(73). Aoki, and his relationship to the poetic, is discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
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Aristotle’s treatise is an elucidation of the canon of poetry; it identifies the nature of
poetry as mimesis; therefore, poetry, as a literary art, must meet the requirements laid out by
Aristotle, for poetic writing. Poetry must represent what is present in nature, must make the
connection of “this is that,” within the parameters of cause, effect, probability, possibility, and
telos (appropriate end). While Aristotle does not explicitly deny the significance of subjective
experience in his concept of mimesis, the idea of creativity, in the sense of inventio, (invention),
is confined to the realm of the logically possible for the universal self. In his cognitive schema,
imagination, the natural human tendency to create visual images, is psychologically subordinate
to ratio, rational judgment. The work of the poet is to represent those logically possible images
in text. Mimesis, no longer associated with poiesis (to create), is now a skill, techné. In his
schema, mimesis refers to an idealized, hierarchical, and linear set of relations among “organism/
word/ environment,” oriented to reproducing conformity to existing cultural values.71
There is no theory of creativity in classical Greek thought on art; since it is characterized
by its canons, the value of artistic representation is in its conformity to an external universal
standard. So, too, for the individual human being: the need to conform to an existing external,
universal standard. Individuality and subjective experience are not a part of this culture; there is
no creativity in the way that I might think of it from my contemporary perspective, as “newness,”
origination, or genesis. Inspiration, intuition, mysticism, and spiritual dimensions associated with
                                                 
71 In curriculum studies, Mary Aswell Doll (2000) provides a critique, based on the literature of Toni Morrison,
of the “color blindness” of Aristotelian mimesis, i.e., the ignorance of difference, pointing out the connection
between the liberal humanism of Eurocentric (White male) thought and the “knowledge enterprise” of education
(172–73).
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poiesis (to create) are simply spectral after Aristotle’s re-defining of the poetic arts. In his
worldview, in representation, and therefore in reasoned thought, there is only what is, “fixed,
certain and finished” (Dewey, 1958, 48). As John Dewey (1958) notes, Aristotle looks in the
direction of contingency, but does “not go far on [that] road” (48).
What are the implications of Aristotle’s poetics? As Øivind Andersen and Jon Haarberg
(2001) comment in their introduction to their recently published book, a collection of papers
from a conference dealing with Aristotle, the Poetics is the “only piece of technical writing from
Antiquity that still plays a role in scholarly discourse” (1). Similarly, Martin Jay (1998) suggests,
by including the essay “Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe” in his Cultural
Semantics: Keywords of Our Time, the enigmatic mimesis is well-worn intellectual ground. He
summarizes the views of several poststructuralists, commenting that for Roland Barthes, mimesis
is the “conservative reproduction of already existing signs” that produced, for him, feelings of
nausea (120); for Paul de Man, it is a trope that confuses “linguistic with natural reality” and
“reference with phenomenalism” (120); and for Deleuze and Guattari mimesis spurred a
“nomadic flight from paranoid despotism” (137). Aristotle’s concept of mimesis—“an
extraordinarily vexed term” (122)—is a central topic of poststructural debates about language,
representation, identity, and culture. Mimesis now manifests itself in “unexpected” and
“catachrestic” ways in postmodern/poststructural thought, Jay explains, because it carries with it
residues from various disciplinary fields. The first polysemic cluster revolves around a judgment,
questioning:
the value of the “original” model to be mimetically duplicated—variously
identified with nature as a nonsubjective other, the active producer of that nature,
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the cultural tradition of the ancients, or the reified relations of the modern world.
(135)
The second point Jay identifies concerns both rationality and the spectacle of performance, each
having complex relation to mimesis and to conceptualizing practices associated with a
“theoretical/theatrical logic based on visual reproduction.” In both, mimesis is “an infinite
oscillation between original and copy” that creates a “rhythmic repetition without closure,” a
rhythm which is an antidote to “the uncanny caesura in a speculative system that seeks to stifle
its playful uncertainties (136). A rhythm that resists arrhythmia, the unexpected, the uncanny, the
irregular, the rupture of time and motion in which to question, to think, to play.
Jay’s sophisticated philosophical, literary, and psychoanalytic analysis extends
problematics I have alluded to above, namely (1) the taken-for-granted idea in mimesis in regard
to the adequacy of language (symbolic representation) to express “reality”— without regard to
“the phenomenal” (Jay, 120)—the sensational and experiential aspects of life; and (2) a question
about theories of representation based on universals, ignoring difference, the improbable, and the
ineffable. Mimesis as a representation of knowledge is confined to the expression of a fixed,
external, universalized reality. In its process, mimesis is an ongoing back-and-forth between the
particular and the universal to identify this is that; it makes possible the statement of what is,
from a universal perspective. In its end, the statement is a fact; it has a truth value even if, as in
the case of poetry, it is allegorical. The two points regarding mimesis on which I will focus in the
remainder of this chapter concern teaching, specifically: (1) the cultural valuation of product/
production through skill development, and (2) the subordination of imagination to rational
thought, particularly in the form of text. Both points are relevant to mimesis, to “this is that” as a
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technology of representation, operating epistemically, validates reproduction of subjects—
students— as rational products, historically rooted in schooling practices. These methodized
practices, based on Aristotle’s poetics, remained relatively unquestioned from late medieval
times (Vico) until the end of the nineteenth century (Peirce).
Medieval Poetics in Curriculum
Amidst great social and cultural change and intellectual development in the middle ages,
from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, focusing on the poetic, important as it is, might obscure
the critically important interplay of discursive practices in this dynamic time of transition,
skewing one’s perspective. For example, Rita Copeland (2002) in her recent research on
epistemology and pedagogy tied to discursive practices, notes that Aristotle’s intellectual ideas
developed in relation to the prevailing mode of discourse of their time which was sophistry,
sometimes called sophistic. At this time, sophistry was not mere rhetorical word play. The
sophists were “the theorists of logos, and of knowledge, sense perception, and subjectivism, as
well as of ethics, justice and social relations” (113). Sophistry was foundational to ancient Greek
thought. 72
From our current perspective, where modernist rationalism—not sophistic rhetoric—is
the dominant discourse, rhetoric is seen as mere performance, the political whipping boy for the
                                                 
72 Copeland points to the persistence of dissent, also called heresy, which can be traced to rhetorical practices in
the late middle ages. She explains that sophistic is embedded in the curriculum throughout the classical and
medieval period, in the teaching of grammar, ars grammatical (1996, 6). Even in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, sophistry was taught, in universities of England, from Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations, written to
expose the fallacies and provide weapons against sophistical arguments. Copeland’s thesis is that “English dissident
identities of the fourteenth and fifteenth century were formed in the distant and refracted image of a class of
rhetorical practitioners who lived in the Athens of the fifth century BC, the immediate contemporaries of Socrates”
(113). Such “dissident” identities led to the rebellious uprisings of the Lollard laity against the intellectual clerics
over the issue of reading the Bible in the vernacular— a heresy at the time.
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rationalist episteme. Similarly, in presenting a reasonable view of rhetoric in the middle ages,
Marcia Colish (1983, 1997) quotes noted fifteenth century rhetorician Brunetto Latini, mentor to
Dante Allegheri, who claims that rhetoric is not merely the science of speaking but the art of
speaking well, “full of noble teaching; and teaching is nothing but wisdom; and wisdom is the
understanding of things as they are” (in Colish, 1983, 163).
As the history of Western intellectual thought is often (re-)told, modernity arises from the
victory of natural philosophy over groundless rhetoric. Rhetoric is then intellectually devalued;
poetry and poetics, embedded in formerly dominant rhetorical discursive practices of education
are similarly devalued.73 A reconstitution of the poetic, based on Aristotle’s poetics, but
transformed by Thomas Aquinas, gives greater scope to imagination, and makes possible the
emergence of the humanist individual —though not yet a liberal, humanist self. 74 In the pursuit
of truth and certainty, the creative spirit of the poetic shifts from nature to God. Mimesis persists,
playing a silent but powerful role in representation.
Poetic Practice in Schools
From the fourth century BCE, the grammarian was the “guardian of language” (Kaster,
1988; Minnis, 1984) who schooled students in grammar. Disciplining students to grammar and
the logic of rhetoric, to be the conservators of language, constituted schooling. If students did not
                                                 
73 Linear sequencing of this transition over-simplifies, and obscures the abundance of lyrical and poetic writing
produced throughout the middle ages. Troubadours and their ballads, (Nagy, 1996) and market square discourse in
Rabelais (Bakhtin) attest to the persistence of rhetoric and the poetic in public, everyday discourse, distinguished
from—and resistant to— intellectual discourse practices. Rationalism, that began with abstraction and
generalization of Plato and Aristotle, reached its apex with Rene Descartes.
74 Individuality was first constituted as a man-to-God relationship; the modern rational self emerges when
Descartes cuts the cord of dependence between the two. Reason alone will now do; albeit, Descartes does believe
the God he knows would not deceive him (Doll, 1993, 26–33)
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learn, knowledge was beaten into them (Kaster, 1988, 12–31). This tradition, learning grammar
and rhetoric, continued relatively unchanged until the later middle ages (Jardine, 1974, 1975;
Copeland, 1996, 2002).75 In the iconography of the time, symbolically, the grammarian often
carries a flagellum in his, or her (“Lady Grammar”) hand (Copeland, 1996, 6). The students, for
their part, read, memorized and copied the text of the ancient poets, considered the authorities of
good speech and writing. Poetry was the “medium of education” in the early middle ages
(Colish, 1983, 159). This form of schooling reflects a simplistic sense of mimesis as copying or
imitation that continued until the late middle ages. Students were drilled, exercised and
disciplined—sometimes violently—to create habits that were second nature, and in this sense,
Aristotelian mimesis is apparent, as the “product” re-presents the ideal nature; the student
re-presents the canon: Aristotle’s poetic canon. Here I am reminded of the continued presence of
re-presentation of the canon (mimesis) in the government’s call for national testing.
The exercises were so tedious and mind-numbing that teachers sought teaching materials
to captivate student interest. Marjorie Woods (1996) notes that the basic readers for teaching
literacy to medieval boys contain passages of sexual imagery and rape from Ovid (Ars
amatoria), Statius (Achilleid), and the anonymous Pamphilus. She explains that the content was
not only exciting, it was also instructive. Younger schoolboys learned grammar, vocabulary, and
sexual “facts.” Older boys, in addition to sexual violence, learned declamation, a function of
rhetoric, to see things from various perspectives, to learn about power and powerlessness, to deal
                                                 
75 Even in the sixteenth century, Gabriel Harvey, in his 1577 address to Cantabridgians, entitled Rhetor, a two
day speech on Nature, Art, and Practice in the study of rhetoric, outlines the expectations of students in their study
of rhetoric, noting the tripartite components: natural gifts, practice for the development of skills, and imitation.
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with anxieties of adolescence and young manhood (69). As Woods points out, predicated on
maleness, in an “absolutely patriarchal tradition,” these texts shaped gender identities and
victimized women, but were neither simplistic nor psychologically crude (74). They were
effective strategies of mimesis in reproducing a patriarchal world. Notes Copeland:
The medieval classroom is the historical site where the ars grammatica is
produced and reproduced as the fundamental program of textuality. Grammar
shapes students and their environment, and it is continually shaped in and by
student culture. Grammar as a discipline comes into being as it is materially
enacted in the classroom. As the most physically embodied of the trivium arts
(with its emphasis on tongue and mouth for pronouncing words, and the
formation of letters inscribed on parchment or wax by fingers correctly holding
pens), it is also enacted on and through the bodies of the students learning its
rules. (2001, 6)
The totality of discipline in education, shaping thought and body, is a point that Michel
Foucault (1995) makes in Discipline and Punish, one I would not have associated with poetry
per se; however, slavish adherence to the authority of authors is behind the idea of education in
the language arts until the twelfth century (Minnis, 1984), and continues today in adherence to
the authority of textbooks. In education, the curriculum for teaching grammar was the study of
Latin authors (auctores); medieval teachers wrote commentaries (auctoritas), or glosses, on the
auctores. Alastair Minnis’s (1981, 1984) research on these commentaries indicates a singularly
consistent theory of literary analysis. A teacher’s first lecture provides a prologue to the
commentaries, at the beginning of a course, studied along with segments of the literature itself.
The great poets were the authorities that were studied and imitated.
Education in grammar, according to Priene (84 BCE), is founded on literary culture
“through which souls progress toward excellence and the condition proper to humanity” (in
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Kaster, 1988). The cultural value placed on education was a commonplace, reflecting the belief
that excellence and humanity are achieved through education, and “one not so educated was less
than human” (15). Education in the literary tradition provided access to the sacred and therefore
set one apart, reinscribing a hierarchical social order. Robert Kaster (1988) further describes the
value of education using two “common but antithetical” metaphors:
In one [metaphor] the literary culture was a mystery, of the Muses or the ancients;
its acquisition was an initiation, by which “the things not to be spoken” were
revealed…convey[ing] the sense of distinction shared by an elect. But insofar as
initiation in a mystery implies a transfiguring revelation, a passive experience, an
irreversible change, the recurrent cast of thought does little to convey the reality
of the literary education; its true character is more accurately capture by the
second metaphor, at once more common and more consequential. The school of
literature is “the gymnasium of wisdom, where is shown the path to the blessed
life.” The literary education is the “gymnastic of the soul”; the literary culture, a
matter of training achieved through “the sweat of the Muses.” The process was
gradual, painstaking—and painful. Like the athlete trained in the old gymnasium,
the student of literature slowly acquired his knowledge and skills by replacing
unrefined habits with good habits until these (ideally) became second nature.
(quoting Pirene,16–17)
Education was hard achieved, set one apart, in a class unto themselves, and won a place
for the victor with a select few whose souls who were prepared for “excellence and humanity.”
The literary tradition that Kaster refers to is the teaching of Latin, the language of education,
through the ancient poems. Poetry and poetics are the material and the method of curriculum
used to teach stylistics of oral speech, such as rhythm, rhyme, grammar and vocabulary. Until
approximately the twelfth century, moral lessons, too, were learned directly through poetry and
poetics. As such, this classical curriculum is a methodological technology, a teaching tool,
effectively influencing the body as well as the mind.
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RECASTING THE POETIC
In their respective research on medieval scholastics, Alastair Minnis (1981, 1984),
Donnalee Dox (2003), Marcia Colish (1983, 1997), Rita Copeland (1996, 2001, 2002) and Colin
Morris (1972) detail confluences and controversies in this period of time: a re-discovery of
Aristotle’s writings, a movement away from the old poetic method of analyzing text, and a
reconfiguring of literary analysis to coincide with theological perspectives on Biblical exegesis.
In this transformational late medieval period, 1100–1300, the mimetic study of classics is
reconsidered, leading to an acceptance of writing in the vernacular, and a greater role for
imagination in reason. This time period is often referred to as the first humanist revolution.
Colish (1983, 1997) and Copeland (2001, 2002) both emphasize that in this later
medieval period scholastics and other intellectuals began to write in the vernacular. Colish and
Copeland explore the significance of the common language on development of thought, but also
the controversies caused by “popularizing” intellectual thought in the vernacular. Colish points
out that twelfth century scholastic Bernard of Chartres “was alert to the dangers of passive
imitation and even the plagiarism that might result from the mere veneration of past models”; he
sought to teach techniques that would make the canons merely a touchstone for students, and
encouraged the vernacular “to give them their personal voices, so that students can develop
styles that are correct, elegant, and their own” (1997, 178). Curriculum under Bernard, as with
other scholastics, began to change, to encourage the voicing of individual thoughts, often about
the relationship between the individual and God, about which one could only speculate.
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Rhetoric and poetic literary methods did not simply and easily give way to logic and
metaphysics, nor did a classical arts curriculum (trivium plus quadrivium) die out. Rather, the
study of grammar and the explication of classical auctores (authors) led to “speculative analysis
of the theoretical structures of language,” and “theologians and Bible-scholars elaborat[ed] a
comprehensive and flexible interpretative model for the diverse literary styles and structures
supposed to be present in sacred Scripture.” Differences among the books of the Bible were
difficult to explain using old methods; a better mode of analysis was necessary to account for
“the diverse roles or functions—both literary and moral—believed to be performed by the human
auctores of the Bible” (Minnis, 1984, 3).76
While poetry was previously acknowledged as fiction, it was the kind of fiction that
imitates truth, which may contain natural or moral truths. Truths could be gleaned from poetic
texts by allegorical reasoning. Dox explains that while poetry was thought of as “linguistic
artifice” (46) and “decorative fiction,” truths were “obliquely expressed.” Poetic methods could
be used, it was thought, “to discern truth from falsehood even when language was acknowledged
to represent things existing only in imagination” (Dox, 46).77 For Aquinas, as for some other
                                                 
76 From medieval scholastic glosses, Minnis determines a progression among scholastics toward speculative
philosophy. Knowledge, once sought through contemplative practices by “following a path inward through the soul
to the imprinted universal” (Timothy Reiss, 1982, 59), was now associated with speculative process, increasingly
involving imagination. Knowledge is derived from rational reasoning, but imagination —speculation— is the
handmaiden to reason in medieval scholastic thought. Thomas Aquinas, among others, drew upon Aristotle,
combining theology and philosophical reasoning, suggesting that the capacity to form concepts and abstract ideas is
intrinsic to human nature (Colish, 1997, 297). In Aquinas’s natural philosophy, nature is explained, one way or
another, as attributable to the influence of God, also, supernature.
77 Hermannus Alemmanus’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s writings surfaced and were of great interest to
the scholastics. In these documents, Poetics was included along with the Organon, and was therefore thought to be a
work on logic (Dox, 46). Alemmanus makes poetry to be “the art of making statements in imitation of ideas, images
and aspects of human conduct” and poetics is “the study of the composition of imitative statements and their
relationship to truth, [that is]… the art of logic.” Poetics becomes, for Alemmanus, “the method for discerning truth
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scholastics, however, since (classical and epic) poems deal with fables and illusions, they cannot
express the truths grasped by discursive reasoning. Poets use allegorical or symbolic method
falsely because poetry has no claims to truth. On the other hand, allegorical or symbolic methods
are used rightly by theologians and exegetes because God himself placed several levels of
meaning in the Bible, and allegory is simply the way in which exegetes discover what is already
present in the inspired text. “Speculative theology may use a symbolic method because its object
[God’s meaning] transcends discursive reason” (Colish, 1983, 160).
Classical poetry and its poetics were devalued because answers to problems confronting
scholastics concerning the nature of man and his relationship to God were not to be found in the
tradition. Therefore, analysis shifted from the rhetorical/poetic tradition where meaning was
found by analogy, to metaphysical/logical analysis (under the influence of Aristotle’s Poetics),
that was directed toward finding God’s influence in the text.78 As Michel Serres has commented,
it is always important to have God on one’s side in any discursive analysis—rational or
speculative (1983, Chapter 2).
Imagination and Individuality
In Aquinas’s metaphysical approach, Aristotle’s nature is transformed: nature is God’s
creation. Creating is, then, for Aquinas, associated with the supernatural—God or his Holy
Spirit. Man creates through God’s grace, and man’s creating is only a pale imitation of God’s
                                                                                                                                                              
in language” (in Dox, 47), a form of non-demonstrative logic (51), the aim of which is to move the soul to produce
judgment (49). Alemannus’s commentary on Aristotle introduces a new logic and vocabulary to literary analysis,
one that Thomas Aquinas takes to, even though Aristotle is “pagan.”
78 Hermannus Alemannus included Aristotle’s Poetics with the Organon, making it a work of logic. Thomas
Aquinas, drawing on Aristotlian (Alemannus’s) commentaries, pronounces poetry “subrational,” and “incapable of
signifying truth” and therefore previous poetical methods of analysis are discredited. In biblical exegesis, analogy
was still used, however, it was now to discover truth, that is, God’s meaning in the text.
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creating. Aquinas’s rational theology combines faith and reason. Mimesis becomes the process of
looking to God (not Aristotle’s universal), and directing one’s thoughts and actions in imitation
of His ways.
Imagination takes a significantly expanded role in Thomas Aquinas’s natural philosophy.
Imagination, related to the passions, stimulated by the physical senses, is interpreted as God’s
grace and a natural form of intelligence. In medieval scholastic thought, imagination is “thinking
which produced not certainties but possibilities, often in areas where certainty could not be
reached” (Minnis, 1981, 79). Logically, it was considered that, “Something can be known of
incorporeal realities, which themselves have no phantasms or images, by comparison with
sensible things of which there are phantasms” (81); the Holy Spirit may reveal itself as a sensory
experience, a revelation, often associated “a far-sighted grasp of a situation” and with speculative
problem-solving (78). Where one could not be certain, one needed to speculate. Characteristics
of imagination such as speculation and initiative to solve problems led to new ways of thinking
about practical situations.
While the value of the poetic tradition depreciated, the poem, itself, in the form of hymns,
developed as an expression (representation) of the poet’s theological, communal thoughts and
feelings (Colish, 162) and as an expression of shared feeling, bringing people together in sensis
communis, recognizing the humanity of mankind, God’s creation and spirit in each man’s nature.
In Aquinas’ metaphysics, the individual, via imagination, a manifestation of God’s spirit, had a
personal “lord-man” bond with God. In addition, a man was united with natural men who
believed in the Holy Spirit.
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Colin Morris (1972) claims that two significant factors that allow for individuality as a
concept to come into being are the rediscovery of Aristotle’s writings and the theological
intellectual work of the scholastics, particularly St. Thomas Aquinas. Significantly, for Morris,
The revolution of thought in the thirteenth century created the possibility of a
natural and secular outlook, by distinguishing between the realms of nature and
supernature, of nature and grace, of reason and revelation. Thanks to the union of
Aristotle and Christianity in the works of Aquinas, it was henceforth possible to
look at man either as a natural being or as a being designed for fellowship with
God, whereas before the former could not be conceived separately from the latter.
From this time onwards, the objective study of the natural order was possible.
(161)
Recognizing differences between men, between “natural” and “secular” men, led to the
recognition of individuals as either like or different. Individuality is an achievement of the late
middle ages. This individual is not yet autonomous, for he is dependent on God, a subject of
God.
For Morris, the “objective study of the natural order,” as Galileo did so brilliantly, is the
final step necessary for the conceptualizing practices of modernity: the individual, viewing the
world as object, analyzing it in reference to his (her) perspective and pronouncing upon it (Reiss,
1982). Knowledge, no longer associated with inward contemplation and the realization of the
universal present in the soul, is apprehended in relation to a world seen outside of oneself, but
reflexively having an impact on an objectified self.
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CHAPTER 4  POIESIS:
TO CREATE AS BEING IN THE WORLD
INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history, from Aristotle on, poetic thought, as imagination, has increasingly
been categorized as auxiliary to rationality. G. E. R. Lloyd (1999) explains that in the
development of scientific thought—that is, organized, methodized reason—Greek scholars
eliminated factors of contingency, those dealing with the vicissitudes of life and nature, to focus
on increasing the probability of certainty, a criteria of sound thought. Reasoned certainty came to
define intellectual thought (Dewey, 1929). The rational field of reason, over time, narrowed
intellectual thought to such an extent that other discursive possibilities become not only
improbable, but virtually impossible to ponder. In creating a bifurcation between the rational and
the poetic, a hierarchical relationship was established. Thus, the “poetic” is now associated
negatively, as it is in Roget’s Thesaurus, with rambling, desultory, unsystematic. The poetic is
not, in the “modern” world, rational, scientific, logical thought; at best, in its creative and
imaginative aspects, it is an auxiliary to such “real” thought.
Tracing the poetic to Aristotle’s interpretation of the concept of mimesis leads to a fuller
understanding of his ideas—and subsequent modern rationalist ideas— about education, and the
inter-connectedness of education with moral and political values. In a modern rationalist
episteme, poetics is associated with “representation”; representations are also “operative
metaphors for cultural production.” Aristotle’s Poetics is, for example, not simply a treatise on
art; as a metaphor for cultural production it also “generates and structures a differential set of
power relations” (Dougherty and Kurke, 1993, 6–7). Hierarchical relations are reproduced
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through education founded on simple Latin translations of mimesis as “copy” and on Plato’s, and
more importantly, Aristotle’s, revision of the concept of mimesis, which led to an
institutionalized understanding of education as imitation. As Jeffrey Walker (2000) notes,
mimesis as “this is that” “allegorically figures forth” or “represents general truths and aligns
those truths with an appropriate emotion, mood or attitude that the well-bred observer may
properly entertain” (286; emphasis added). Education sets students apart as the learned,
elevating their status. At the same time, students are in production, preparing—being
disciplined—to mimetically reproduce a hierarchical society.
Widening the panorama in search of a broader understanding of the poetic, that is,
understanding the poetic from the perspective of a culture organized around the wisdom of poets,
I explore literature on mytho-poetic cultures. I search, as did Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin
Heidegger, to understand the poetic from the perspective of those archaic cultures, prior to the
Greek rationalists, Plato and Aristotle. Inquiring into a different episteme, with different
conceptualizing practices, I draw on studies in cultural anthropology, particularly those using
critical theoretical research approaches developed in Renaissance studies, that view all texts and
other forms of representation —ritual, art, performance— as “sites for the circulation of cultural
energy and for the ongoing negotiation of power relations within society” (Dougherty and Kurke,
7). This approach, called cultural poetics,79 lends itself well to an inquiry into discursive relations
implied by the organism/word/environment construal, especially in a primarily oral society,
historically located prior to textualization. As Dougherty and Kurke (1993) explain, “later texts
                                                 
79 Dougherty and Kurke attribute the term “cultural poetics” to Stephen Greenblatt, an early “new historicist.”
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record, though they do not seem to understand, earlier “systems of signification.” Therefore, in
this research into archaic, pre-literate cultural practices, texts from later periods may be “mined”
for metaphorical evidence (6). In the previous chapter, I drew on Alastair Minnis (1981, 1984)
and Rita Copeland (1996, 2001), both of whom use a cultural poetics approach in analyzing
Renaissance texts. In this chapter, I refer to Gregory Nagy (1996) who “mines” literature
concerning medieval French troubadours to find metaphors of signification to illustrate both the
poiesis and mimesis of archaic poets.
The challenge for such an inquiry is in trying not to read the past in terms of the present.
The pre-Socratic poetic is a conceptualizing practice, with its own set of pre-literate relations,
that, as Timothy Reiss (1982) and Stanley Tambiah, (1990) remark, we of the modern—or
postmodern—Western world, can hardly imagine.80 From the descriptions I put forward, related
to aspects of a mytho-poetic culture oriented by poiesis (to create, to make, to do), an impression
of the construal of relations will hopefully emerge.
In this chapter, in Part One, I look at the poetic in pre-Platonic and archaic Greece;
drawing on these descriptions I develop the idea of poiesis as a mode of thought integrally
related to being in the world—therefore, thought plus action— that leads to creativity, looking at,
first, the environment; second, the word; third, the organism. In Part Two, I “point in the
direction” (Aoki, 2005,190), toward the incredible dynamics of this construal considered as play:
                                                 
80 Even greater than the challenge of not reading the past in terms of the present, is trying to “represent” poiesis,
not in terms of a modern rational poetics. What does representation mean in primarily oral cultures? How does one
“logically” represent dynamical processes? As Brent Davis (2004) points out, “explanation” is a word that derives
from Euclidian geometry, that it flattens out—planes—the object that it may be symbolically logical. Just as
Aristotle’s poetics rationally ignored what could not be explained through causal relationships, explanations suffer
from simple, linear, literary expression.
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“a disclosure that allows us a glimmer of the essence of [poiesis]. In proceeding, I want not to
create a strong binary between conceptualizing practices, poietic versus rationalist, choosing one
over the other; but rather, suggest that modern poetics is an artifact, one that could even be
graphed as a seriation of mimesis. The exploration here is an archeology to understand a set of
relations: “organism/ word/environment” in a past poietic culture.81 Understanding these
relations may provide insights for existing educational practices based on mimesis that are
interested in reform.
PART 1 POIESIS PAST
Etymologically, the word poetic is traced to poiesis, the archaic word for the action of
creating, an infinitive verb, “to create.” Martin Heidegger more eloquently states—“to call into
being” is a poiesis. In this section, I look at poiesis in relation: “environment,” referring to
culture, “word” referring to representation, and “organism” referring to an individual in this
culture where mimesis is an altogether different—and yet remotely similar—concept.
Environment
In a poietic environment, the universe is full of signs; its reading and interpretation is
organized by resemblance in patterns. This is why Timothy Reiss (1982) uses the phrase
“discourse of patterning” to refer to the discourse of mythopoetic cultures. The culture I refer to
specifically, one whose dominant discourse is a “discourse of patterning,” is the culture in
                                                 
81 N. Katherine Hayles (1993) uses the archeological terms seriation and artifact heuristically to explain change
that occurs not as pardigm shift (Kuhn) and not as a new episteme (Foucault) “suddenly springing into being across
a wide range of cultural sites” but rather, “through overlapping patterns of innovation and replication” (443). The
idea of “patterns of innovation and replication” is remarkably similar to a pre-Socratic mimesis. For Foucault,
archaeology “reconstructs systems of practices” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 256).
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archaic Greece, that was organized, I suggest, around the poetic tradition and its myths.
Therefore, I call it a mythopoetic culture, and to distinguish this poetic from the Aristotelian
poetic, I refer to it as poiesis or poietic.
In a mythopoetic culture, which is primarily oral, there is, to begin, an assumption of
“sympathy between all things as a sign of a universal vitalism” (Reiss, 49). This vitalism is an
energy that flows through all things, bringing continguity (Tambiah, 1990), a flowing together
that forms an unbroken sequence in time and uninterrupted expanse in space. There is a systemic
wholeness to this world. A discourse of patterning functions “to make the world say what it has
to say, both through its motions and its proportions” (Reiss, 49); it is a dynamic system of
patterns and transformation that “makes it possible to deal with unresolveable differences and
contradictions” (49) in a relational manner.
An encompassing one-ness characterizes a mythopoetic culture. It is an inter-subjectivity
that Stanley Tambiah (1990) calls simply “participation,” referring to (1) sociocentrism, being a
person in the world and a product of the world; (2) a continuity of time and space through the
process of recollection, variation and looking to the future; and, (3) understanding developed in
and through negotiation and a relational logic developed through interaction (109).82 This
cosmological wholeness in archaic and primarily oral cultures, or even yet, in present-day
hunter-gatherer cultures, challenges modern day concepts of time and spirituality (Hugh Brody,
2001). The past is in the present; the spirits, the divine, gods, goddesses and the fates are real and
                                                 
82 The selections in this list are excerpted from a chart comparing concepts and characteristics associated with
Tambiah’s two orderings of reality, causality and participation. “Causality” is a strong factor in Aristotle’s
philosophical thought. Tambiah places these “orderings” on a theoretical continuum.
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present. In the Homeric “atmosphere “everything is at once persuasive and mysterious, natural
and marvelous, human and divine” (Paulo Vivante, 1970, 32).
Stability and meaning in such a culture are achieved by recognizing patterns and rhythms
in traditions and in speech. Recognition by “pattern” means that bundles of relations must be
seen (Reiss, 1982), rather than one set of relations, or isolated events. All situations are
contextual; looking at the “bigger picture” takes on new meaning. One is not considering the
present ramifications of a single event; one is in the poietic culture, looking at this event as a
bundle of relations over time.
As Jeffrey Walker (2000) notes, meaning is also felt. Explaining the power of ancient
rhetoric, Walker discusses the “suasive”-ness of epideictic (poetic speech), that draws on the
authority of timelessness, equivalence in the rhythms and patterns of phrasing, and cultural
permanence achieved through memorability of archival knowledge. While epideictic “with its
archival rhythmic psychogogy of oral/archival discourse can be deeply conservative—even
oppressive” (10), poets exhibit a great degree of creative freedom. Poets are “not constrained to
be the mouthpiece of traditional knowledge” (12). Revision and revival function as a medium for
both the exercise and contestation of authority and social power (12). A cultural value is placed
on fluidity and flexibility within a set of relations.
Word
From his research on Homeric epics, linguist and cultural anthropologist Gregory Nagy
(1996) points out, mimesis, as it was pre-Socratically associated with poetic performance, means
“re-presentation,” with the connotation of “re-enactment.” To understand the archaic Greek
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poiesis as “to create” in a mythic, oral society, says Nagy, one must understand it as
performance; to understand the value and purpose of performance, one must understand mimesis
as re-enactment; and embedded in this understanding of mimesis is the concept of paideia. The
paideia (education, particularly, cultural education) of the community—its values, beliefs and
attitudes—was influenced by the community’s participation in the poetic performance. Nagy
explains that a “definite goal,” a telos, is a part of mimetic (re-enacted) performance. Nested in
the semantics of the word mimesis is deuk-/duk, the Greek root word for education (educere in
Latin), which means draw continuously forward—not pulling or pushing—toward a definite
goal, in a future direction, toward maturity or, perhaps, to a stage of initiation, which marks
achievement.
The inter-connectedness of these words and concepts—poiesis, paideia, mimesis—in
light of cultural values placed on interrelations is perhaps to be expected; but additionally it is a
function of orality, the fact that the culture is organized without an orientation to literacy.
Eloquence and ability with language carries with it authority (Walker, 2000, 10). Language is
highly contextual and interpretive. There is a surplus of meaning (Ong, 1982) and meaning can
be played with. Later in this section, I will focus on “play” and use the concept to discuss the
dynamics of poiesis in relation to self.
“Word” is oral in archaic Greece, and representation is organized relationally around
rhetoric— speeches, poetic performances, and rituals play a large role. There are two main kinds
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of rhetorical discourse, the poetic and the pragmatic. It is on poetic performance that I focus
because of its connection to education and mimesis.83
The poets were the sages, the wisemen, and at first, the performers of their poems. They
were the first eloquent speakers and the history of rhetoric begins with the poets. They trained
others to compose and perform, the rhapsodes. The great poets created poems that were re-
created in performance and honored for centuries. The composing of a poem, although formulaic
in many ways, was also improvisational in its re-enactment, in accordance with the dramatized
myths and the memory of the community. The poet’s ability to “read” and respond to his
audience was crucial. From the audience’s point of view, the poet’s words, deeds, and portrayal
of characters needed to ring true; he needed to meet their expectations—and he had to provide
entertainment; therefore some element of novelty was needed in the telling (singing). The
audience was active, not passive, in their viewing of the performance. The performance was
always in the context of a contest, either with the audience or other poets. The livelihood and
reputation of the poet depended on the performance.
Each performance in an oral culture is a poietic re-enactment that involves pulling the
past into the present, recollection, and re-presenting with variation, since each performance was
intended to improve upon the past, to have a sense of novelty. James Olney (1984), drawing on
hermeneuticist Paul Ricouer, provides another perspective on recollection and poiesis:
Memory creates the significance of events in discovering the pattern into which
those events fall. And such a pattern…will be a teleological one bringing us, in
                                                 
83 Jeffrey Walker (2000) outlines the history of rhetoric in antiquity; the practical business of law and civics
derive from pragmatic rhetoric, basileus.
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and through narration, and by an inevitable process, to the end of all past
moments which is the present. (47)
Poiesis, in the recollection, plays with time in that it “characterizes the story as made out
of events”; and it “construes significant wholes out of scattered events” (Ricouer, in Olney,
1984, 47). The story pulls the past into the present, and in poiesis, the variation stands in relation
to the future, for the future will draw on this variation. Gregory Nagy (1996) explains this
variation as the “same thing but…a new instance of the same old thing” (52); seeing in different
ways, as in seeing a sunset, different each evening. Poiesis entails a fundamental instability of
form, but continuities evolve from “patterns of many kinds” (51–54), rhythms, rhyme-schemes,
and patterns of events. Nagy’s description of a “fundamental instability” might be likened to the
“fluidity” of orally patterned thought developed by Walter Ong (1982). Ong discusses
“continuity with change” in oral cultures as a “continuing present” (49). Since history is only as
long as memory, the distant past must slip away, to be re-created in the present.
Nagy (1990, 1996a, 1996b)84 “mines” the medieval songs of Jaufré Rudel, prince of
Blaye, in Provençe, which were collected, transcribed and published by Rupert T. Pickens in
1978. In mining these texts, Nagy searches for metaphorical evidence of systems of signification
relevant to the oral performance of epics.85  He develops the idea of poiesis in relation to mimêsis
                                                 
84 Gregory Nagy, classicist, linguist, and anthropologist, explains in Homeric Questions (1996b) that studying
questions related to Hellenic times demands a multi-disciplinary approach. His own work follows the work of
Milman Parry and Albert Lord, who pioneered the anthropological study of epic poetry and the notion of orality in
cultures. Common questions, such as, How were the epic poems composed, remembered, spread throughout Greece,
without being written, are a reflection of our present dependence upon text.
85 Rupert Pickens’s inquiry concerns authorship of traditional songs; similarly Nagy is interested in authorship
in epic traditions (Nagy, Homeric Questions, 1996b). Nagy inquires into medieval Provençal oral performance
traditions, Celtic traditions and Homeric epic poetry, to provide a stronger basis for theorizing the poietic process of
composition in Homeric times.
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in primarily oral traditions. In the 8th century, he notes, the composer/performer created the
poem, and this creating, poiesis, although formulaic, in accordance with myths and the cultural
history of the community, was improvisational.
In Poetry as Performance (1996), Nagy identifies the image of the nightingale, common
to medieval Provençal, to Celtic, and to Homeric poems, as the metaphorical signifier of the
poiesis–mimesis relationship. The nightingale sings his song, never finalizing—each a re-
composition, and re-presentation of the same, but varied, song—as does the oral performer.
Nagy suggests that where the nightingale is brought forward, the performer is actually talking
about the poet’s method of re-creation and re-presentation—mimêsis —which is not a replication
and not an imitation—but is varied with each performance.86
The performance of Homeric epics, which served as a paideia (cultural education) for
centuries, led to the development of a highly skilled, creative culture. Poiesis, as the translation
“to create” implies, is a dynamic process, in which a number of variables contribute to its energy,
involving a plexus of actions and interactions: of the players, the poet, the chorus, and the
audience; time: the mythic past, the present, and the future; the senses: speaking, hearing, seeing,
and feeling; and inter-subjectivities: gods, goddesses, heroes, and mortals.
                                                 
86 In oral traditions, the song varies in its composition, varies as it passes from one performer to another, and
again for each local audience. Variations in the song (poem), termed mouvance, a word predicated on oral tradition,
differ by degree and kind, and are inconsistent—perhaps, at times, even unpredictable. Mouvance is a condition of
poiesis. The fluid nature of songs (poems) and their singing (performance) persists until the orality of the tradition
becomes obsolete, and songs are fixed in written text. Nagy illustrates the fluidity with the example of the French
troubadours’ songs and the jongleurs who popularized—and changed—them. By comparing versions of Rudel’s
songs, Nagy is able bring forward the (probable) origins of an authorization process, one which depended upon both
the authenticity of the composer and the approval of the audience (1996a: 19).
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The flow of this energy is circular, not uni-directional, for example, does not flow from
the poet as an authority, down to the audience. The agonistic nature of orality is a competitive
tension that fires up performance and its creativity requires feedback and reflexivity. In this
sense, poiesis has a “double nature”: for example, first the audience is moved between
enchantment (captivated, under a spell) and “synthesizing,” meaning, two different “states of
mind” (George Walshe, 1984), but which contribute to their reflexivity. The second example of
the double nature of poiesis is related to the flow of energy achieved by the production itself, the
staging of the epic performance, highlighting the contrast between near and far, foregrounding
and backgrounding characters against a sociohistorical context (Richard Martin, 1989);
simultaneously, the chorus and audience, the “present” respondents/interlocuters, interact with
the mythic past. The audience member is drawn out of themselves, their energy flowing outward,
toward the events enacted on stage, reacting to the performance; and energy from the performer
is absorbed, drawn into, as the viewer receives this variation of the tale. This active engagement
and participation, giving and receiving, attention and reflection, is a part of a poietic mimesis that
is paideia, being drawn out of oneself, drawn continuously forward toward a definite goal. There
is no sense of being trapped by the rhythmic back-and-forth copying process of mimesis that
Martin Jay talks about (see chapter 3). The poet-performer, the viewer, each allows oneself to be
drawn in to the movement, to find the play, the slip, in a situation, to be in the movement, and to
work with the movement, to find—to create—variations. How the individual self (organism) is
conceived in this culture, is key to understanding the circulation of energy in this culture.
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Organism: A Poietic Self
Foucault’s concept of “care of the self” is based on his research of a classical Greek
phrase epimeleia heautou, a powerful idea that means “working on or being concerned with
something.” Implied in this two-word phrase, is “management,” “responsibility,” and “caring”;
the phrase “describes a sort of work, an activity; it implies attention, knowledge, technique” (in
Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, 243). For Foucault, care of the self reflects the attitude of classical
Greeks toward the role and responsibility of the individual; he discusses this notion in terms of
technique, ontology, ethics.87
In [pagan] Greek ethics people were concerned with their moral conduct, their
ethics, their relations to themselves and to others…ethics was not related to any
social—or at least to any legal—institutional system. (231)
Care of the self “is not imposed on the individual by means of civil law or religious
obligation, but is a choice about existence made by the individual. People decide for themselves
whether or not to care for themselves” (244).88 Ethics is related to aesthetics in this pagan
culture; Foucault asks, why couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? (236). By connecting
ethics and aesthetics with being, one’s self becomes a creating, a poiesis.
                                                 
87 As Foucault points out, there is no “normalization” of this ethics, for two reasons: first, it was a personal
choice; second, it was reserved “for a few people in the population; it was not a question of giving a pattern of
behavior for everybody” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 230). Foucault develops care of the self drawing on a wide range of
Greek literature, carrying forward themes of austerity and mastery that were picked up by Christianity. In the
following paragraphs I have put together extracted references concerning the care of the self from an interview with
Paul Rabinow.
88 Gregory Bateson (1958), in Naven, is clearly struck by the fact that the Iatmul people have no formal system
of laws; coming from a still Victorian England as a young man, it was a shock to find that the society still had an
organization—a complicated, if not “complex,” one. Many of the concepts that Bateson subsequently develops
concerning how systems work—learning systems, social systems—germinated from this period. David Bogen
(1999) brings forward similar views to Bateson’s, regarding self-organizing systems, although from a different
theoretical perspective.
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The performance provides an opportunity, a venue for seeing, for hearing the traditional
words, and for developing skills in the art of living, “a training of oneself by oneself…a
traditional principle to which [is] attributed great importance” (246), and the aim of which is to
“establish as adequate and as perfect a relationship of oneself to oneself as possible” (247). “The
one who cares for himself has to choose among all the things that you can know…only those
kinds of things which were relative to him and important to life” (243)—a two-fold recognition.
What knowledge is necessary? —“knowledge of the world, of what is the necessity of the world,
the relation between world, necessity, and the gods” (244). “There [is] a kind of adequation
between all possible knowledge and care of the self” (244; emphasis added).
One technique for “the art of living,” that is, for “the care of the self,” involves, a
“retiring into oneself, reaching oneself, living with oneself, being sufficient to oneself” —a
reflection, contemplation. This is a practice of being based on the “recognized value of the
already-said… [in] the recurrence of discourse” (247). This contemplation leads to an
ontological knowledge, being a “contemplation of the soul.” Foucault, in an example of
“mining” later texts, draws on an example from Plato:
Plato asks, “How can the eye see itself?” The answer is apparently very simple,
but in fact it is very complicated. For Plato, one cannot simply look at oneself in a
mirror. One has to look into another eye, that is, one in oneself, however in
oneself in the shape of the eye of the other. And there, in the other’s pupil, one
will see oneself: the pupil serves as a mirror. And, in the same manner, the soul
contemplating itself in another soul (or in the divine element of the other soul)
which is like its pupil, will recognize its divine element. (249)
Foucault continues, explaining how the contemplative aspect of the care of the self leads
beyond the self:
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This idea that one must know oneself, i.e. gain ontological knowledge of the
soul’s mode of being, is independent of what one could call an exercise of the self
upon the self…. This technique of contemplation uses as [one’s] object the soul of
an other. (249)
The self creates reflexively, therefore, by looking both inward and outward, seeing
oneself in the other. Self in this sense is not an object, but rather a site of reflexivity and
connection— with the other and with tradition—and a site of transformation as one moves
toward as “adequate and perfect” a self as possible. To create, poiesis, is a cultural value.89
The Poietic as a Dynamic Construal
Although I have described the environment, word, and organism elements that comprise
the construal of poiesis as a mode of thought, the “more-ness” that has been implied, but not yet
described, is the dynamism of the interaction. The interaction is what adds the life or “spirit”
(Doll, 1993, 2003, 2005). For Heidegger, that dynamism is poiesis, a source of power, related to
playing with words and ideas: but play goes further. It is interaction that provides the circum-
stances for the emergence of the new and for the transformation of self. Hans-Georg Gadamer
(1986/1998), in an intricate series of steps, relates performance to play, and this description is
most appropriate to the dynamism and creativity achieved through play. As he says:90
                                                 
89 When Katherine Hayles (1994) develops the notion of reflexivity in relation to cybernetics and the Macy
Conferences, she begins by describing it as “precisely what enables information and meaning to be connected”
(450); but this “man-in-the-middle” position leads to input/output “black box functioning” psychological and
psychoanalytic discussions. In the context of the Macy conference discussions, reflexivity is divorced from the
homeostatic feedback loop concept and, drawing on Humberto Maturana’s work, it is associated with autopoiesis,
thereby providing a conceptual space for creativity through self-organization. About this Hayles says: “Maturana
defined a self-organizing system as a composite unity: it is a unity because it has a coherent organization, and it is
composite because it consists of components whose relations with each other and with other systems constitute the
organization that defines the system as such. The circularity of the reasoning foregrounds reflexivity while also
transforming it. Whereas, in the Macy conferences reflexivity was associated with psychological complexity, in
Maturana’s world it is constituted through the interplay between a system and its components. They mutually define
each other in the bootstrap operation characteristic of reflexive self-constitution” (462).
90 I emphasize certain aspects of play as outlined by Gadamer, but deliberately do not include emphasis on the
notion of playing games which leads rather quickly to the idea of professional sports as “play.” The justification for
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[T]he movement of playing has no goal that brings it to an end; rather, it renews
itself in constant repetition. The movement backward and forward is obviously so
central to the definition of play that it makes no difference who or what performs
this movement. (103)
The player is subsumed by the play, playing without purpose or effort, absorbed into the
structure of play, and relaxed by it (104–05). Gadamer then moves to the child with a playful
task, playing with a ball: “such tasks are playful ones because the purpose of the game is not
really solving the task, but ordering and shaping the movement of the game itself” (107), which
becomes the performance of a task. When the performance is before an audience it is a
presentation—of the self. Performing the task presents it. “First and foremost play is self-
presentation….All presentation is potentially a representation for someone” (108). Play before an
audience becomes “the play” and “openness toward the spectator is part of the closedness of the
play. The audience only completes what the play as such is.” (109). He continues,
This point shows the importance of defining play as a process that takes place “in
between”…Play does not have its being in the player’s consciousness or attitude,
but on the contrary play draws him into its dominion and fills him with its spirit.
The player experiences the game as a reality that surpasses him…all the more the
case where the game is itself “intended” as such a reality—for instance, the play
which appears as presentation for an audience. (109)
For Gadamer, the “in between” is the creative space of being, of self-creating. The poiesis
of performance is a confluence of forces in effect on that occasion and mimesis is (re-)enactment
for the purpose of (re-)creating the past and oneself, drawing from the past and looking to the
future. Each performative occasion is an opportunity to create, to reinterpret and to grow through
                                                                                                                                                              
not considering organized sport or professional sports “play” is that, as Gadamer says, play is without goals or
purpose, and open to anyone. Professional sports, although based on the idea of playing games, do not fall in this
category; rather, professional sport has commodified the idea of contest which is a part of some game-playing.
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the experience. So too with teaching, filled with spirit, it is a live performance, and in the
performance—with all of its interactions—knowledge is not so much given, as it is created.
Grace Ledbetter (2003), in explaining Socrates and his poetic (poietic) “method of
interpretation,” says:
what audiences earn when they interpret divinely inspired poetry is not any share
of divine knowledge, but rather improved human wisdom. Like the Delphic
oracle’s pronouncement, poetry can have a divine source, but the wisdom that its
Socratic interpretation can advance must be human wisdom. (118; emphasis
added) 91
What “audiences” engaged in the poietic performance earn “are new truths generated by
the interpretation itself” (117; emphasis added). Analogously, in an educative poietic
performance, knowledge is not given, but self-developed, self-created. Knowledge, as we think of
it in the modern world, is not the object of the performance. Rather, the performance is an event
for the development of being by doing—inquiry, study, listening, observing, reflecting—all
directed at creating relations to oneself and to others as paideia. In archaic Greece, the focus is
on the performing—the doing—of learning that leads to the creating of thought and self.
I make connection to Charles Sanders Peirce (1998) and Gregory Bateson (1979) and
their revolutionary ideas concerning the interaction of self-in-relation and play.92 Both conceive
                                                 
91 H. D. Kitto, addresses this point of poietic performance is a slightly different way. Homer does not speak
directly in his own voice. He paints (creates) a picture through the portrayal of characters; the audience must then do
its own interpretive work (Kitto, 1966, 25).
92 These two, disparate scholars, share certain characteristics: both were non-conforming, multi-disciplinary
scientists, intellectually marginalized, regarded as odd by their colleagues; both, according to their biographies, were
somewhat reclusive and anti-social. These two, similarly, paid strong attention to patterns, relations of things, and
cosmological “order” in the development of thought. Peirce did not know A. N. Whitehead, but both Peirce and
Bateson had much in common with him intellectually.
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of self not as an object, but as a reference point, an inferred self. For both, growth related to
development of creative thought and being, is associated with the play of thought.
For Peirce, the connection between discourse and thought is “as intimate as that between
body and mind” (1998, 474). Thought is nothing until it is brought to action, to a change of belief
(habit of thought), and into words. In speaking our truths, bringing them into “the public” (says
Peirce), thought contributes to the growth of knowledge. In this way, we develop social
networks. As others hear, and we hear others, the possibilities for further creativity increase. An
idea becomes part of a set, then a family, etc. As others make observations —absolutely critical
for Peirce—we see differently, imaging, visualizing, with a new perspective, an activity Peirce
calls “Musement,” governed only by the “law of liberty,” making connections, free association,
looking for differences and “homogeneities of connectedness…that every small part of space,
however remote, is bounded by just such neighboring parts as every other, without a single
exception throughout immensity” (438). For him, the inter-connectedness of all living things,
which he says “abound in all immensity,” form a pattern of connection, one that suggests to me
“patterns of self-similarity” of a poietic form of thought. Experiences, those that surprise us,
draw us out of ourselves, allow us to create knowledge of self and in this way—as with
Bateson—we are self-creating.
Working in a different tradition than Peirce, Bateson explores not the particular, atomistic
activities of play, but rather asks, “how does play function in society?” When he asks the
question in this way, he exemplifies the approach he recommends, that is, to see the particular in
relation to the whole. He asks the question as he develops the idea of self from his multiple—
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evolutionary, biological, communications, and systems theories—perspectives. For Bateson
(1979), it is a mistake to try to understand any biological phenomenon as an object: self—really,
there is no such “object” —cannot be isolated from a historical/cultural environment. Rather, one
must view the organism as part of a functioning system. This view allows Bateson to develop a
theory of creativity. Probing the notion of self he asks: Where does self begin and end? For
Bateson, as for Peirce, self is a collection of impressions gathered, in part, through play,
exploration or other such contexts for “double description” (Mind and Nature, 140–55). As
Stephen Toulmin (1981) puts it,
no event or process has any single unambiguous description: we [need to]
describe any event in different terms, and view it as an element in a different
network of relations, depending on the standpoint from which—and the purpose
for which—we are considering it.” (in Wilder-Mott, 1981, 363)
For Bateson, play—or exploration, or crime93 (or other activities of the same logical
type)—is an organization of activities through which organisms develop a concept of “self”
within systems (self-in-relation, part-whole) that have boundaries, which may be conceived as
flexible, and crossed depending on the circumstances of frame and context. Bateson says play is
self-validating; that is, a characterological awareness or development. One accumulates
characteristics that comprise a notion of self through interactions and relationships. The feedback
                                                 
93 I think Bateson’s (1979) use of “crime” as an activity of the same logical type as exploration—i.e., as “self-
validating”—relates to the example of the rat, searching for food (132, 150). It makes no difference whether the rat
finds food or gets a shock. It is successful in finding out where food is located, i.e., in learning the context for food.
As Bateson points out, it is the difference— “contrast between learning about the particular and learning about the
general.” Crime is like the “dark side” of exploration; it is a category, or organization, of activities that lead to the
“incorporation or marriage of ideas about the world with ideas about self” (Mind and Nature, 150). In the interaction
between the organism and the environment there is positive and negative feedback—both of which lead to a sense of
relationship (self + world). Crime is an activity that provides to the participant feedback in the form of
characterological validation of “self.”
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from the interaction provides information to the organism about the boundaries or limits—i.e.
about the organization and flexibility of systems. Through play, in this sense, one develops
double description, seeing from a different standpoint. Play leads to abstraction, a way to
envision new boundaries, and to play with “the structures or rules [of communication] and
thereby move forward to new rules, new philosophies” (Bateson, 1956, 216).94 This is
comparable to Peirce’s “Musement,” which is the play of thought.
These factors—the play of thought, appreciation of patterns, recognition of the interplay
and interconnectedness of humans, in the cosmos and to the cosmos—justify my suggestion that
pragmatist thought recuperates the poietic to rehabilitate rationalism. Peirce and Bateson, each in
their own way, bring to reasoned thought the importance of experience, and thus contingency;
engagement and the need for the play of thought in reflection; and a sense of wholeness
comprised of inter-connected patterns.
In her work, Katherine Hayles (1994, 1999) suggests that organisms respond to their
environment in ways determined by their internal self-organization. Hence, they are not only
self-organizing, they are also autopoietic, or self-making. This is a post-humanist self, one that is
constituted not as an autonomous, individual independent of the cosmos, as is the modern
human; rather, the post-human self continually evolves, emerging from the poietic interaction
among organism, word and environment, which is the bridge, I believe, between complexity
theory and a postmodern theory of representation. What becomes critically important for
                                                 
94 Double description or binocular vision is important to Bateson because it creates a sense of difference, which
is generative; conversation, “talking about” is a discursive practice that leads to binocular vision, as opposed to the
discursive practices that lead to monocular vision.
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education then is to provide a rich environment and opportunity for playful engagement with
ideas and interaction to promote creativity and growth.
PART 2 PROFFERED HYPOTHESES OF A PRAGMATIST INQUIRY
In proferring the results of my pragmatist inquiry into the poetic, reconnecting with, and
focusing on, the intent of this inquiry, I have traced the word “poetic” over time, to understand
its meaning in use, related to thought and education. In this process of discernment, I have
emphasized the relations between the poetic as a form of representation and a concept of self
historically. In doing so, I found a postmodern shift in conceptions of self related to its modernist
discursive position. I make connections between modernist discursive practices and Aristotle’s
Poetics, where he redefines the powerful archaic Greek concept of mimesis as representation.
Here lies, I believe, one root of the rationality so dominant in modernism. Representation, taught
in schools, beginning as grammar, is not a neutral medium, but metaphorically, a form of
thought, that operates culturally as “re-presentation,” that is, to reproduce a rationalist mode
based on Aristotelian abstraction and generalization. Prior to Aristotle and his teacher, Plato, the
poetic—still related to mimesis—describes a different episteme, a culture oriented around
discursive speech practices that reflect values of poiesis (to create, to make, to do).
A poietic mimesis relates to “representation” as recollection and re-presenting with
variation. “Representation” is fluid, not fixed, reflecting a cultural value of innovation and
transformation, within a relational context. The mode of thought is interpretation; one interprets
through recognition of patterns. Knowledge concerns relations, an awareness of being in the
world. There are no equivalencies between this and that; there is, however, adequation in the
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recognition of similarity in patterns. As with the aesthetic of Eco’s openwork, the interpretation
builds on the past and provides variation through interaction, with oneself and others.
With these two forms of mimesis, two very different perspectives related to the poetic, I
am reminded of Heidegger, his poetic turn, and his inquiry into modes of thought while trying to
understand what it means to educate. 95 For him, education, traced to the Greek concept of
paideia, sees “each succeeding generation bring[ing] its own fund of experience to bear on
interpreting such notions of fundamental import to the leading of a life” (in Peters, 2002, 30).
Idealizing that goal, Heidegger states, the role of the university, the “pinnacle of our educational
system,” should not be utility and expediency, or conformity to convention and custom; certainly
it should not be “an instrument of social engineering or, more generally, simply a means to an
end” (30–31). He maintains, however, that education is reduced by rational reason—
institutionalized in the university— “to the instrumental, by analogy with techné,” and rational
reason “is the source of everything awry with the university today.” As he does so often and so
well, Heidegger suggestively illustrates the relation between rationalism—referring to the
subject-object split— and education etymologically:
In the Aristotelian use of the term subjectum, subject constitutes the very center of
one’s identity; sub-stantiality is essential, coterminous with and forever present
unto the self…The original sense of Latin subicere, “to place beneath,” was
applied in the most basic of senses, as in placing a mare beneath a stallion, while
adicere meant “to insert,” “to hurl (oneself) on top of.” In a curious reversal of
fortune from inferior to superior position, the theoretical subject, now sovereign,
seizes upon the object, thrown before the mind, to re-present it in the abstraction
of thought. Likewise in the university, the pedagogical relation between teacher
and student is understood in homologous terms as a practical instance of the more
                                                 
95 He draws on that inquiry in explaining his views on education to the post World War II committee that
questioned him in connection to his Nazism.
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general relation of subject to object. The teacher gives eidos, form and finality, to
the student as spiritual material presented for shaping and forming, in accordance
with an abstract model. The Greek metaphors of formation that provide the basis
for our concept of education bear out this connection. In the word morphe, there is
still to be found the potter’s poietical hand at work on malleable clay. The teacher
stands as typos, the mold, from which students will emerge as exemplars. As a
verb, typto, reminds us of the violence of education in subject-object terms, for it
has the meaning “to beat” or “to pound,” as when combating an adversary or,
more to the point, pressing a coin. The student is to be beaten into an image,
fashioned as if he were a drachma coin to be put into circulation. (34–35)
What Heidegger also presents here is the relationship of the one who teaches to the
abstraction and generalization of “teacher,” subjected, “thrown under” the category of “teacher.”
The teacher is a mold for the production of students (also subjected by this production process).
This is what he refers to as the “reduction of education to the instrumental” (36). Pedagogy, since
Aristotle, has been based on his rationalization of nature (physis), the nature to abstract and to
generalize and to make “equivalencies”—this is that—in mimesis. Heidegger says, “I came to
see that the idea of truth as adequation of exchange between two things, representation and what
is represented, was itself but an instance of figurative disclosure that had become fixed in our
imagination” (36). This notion of equivalence implies a general idea about value, a “common
denominator by which the equality of the exchange is to be measured” (36). The assumed
relationship between teaching and learning can be seen in Heidegger’s comment of equality of
exchange; the material taught will be “exchanged” with the student, who will give back, on
examination, an equivalent “value.” An economy of exchange, a “poetics” (sans “poietics”)
based on the idea of mimesis, still sits behind—really, underneath, as foundational to—the idea
of a modernist education.
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In contrast, a poietic mimesis brings forward a self-creating and self-emerging nature.
This sense of the poetic, which I call poietic to distinguish it, is less well recognized in
curriculum studies. In the final chapter I will relate these two concepts of mimesis to the present
moment, in the work of two fine scholars of curriculum studies, David Hansen and Tetsuo Aoki,
as an indication of the influence of this split. In developing hope, the final moment of a
pragmatist inquiry, I will focus on the discursive practice of Aoki, embodying the spirit of
poiesis in education.
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CHAPTER 5  TOWARD A POIESIS OF CURRICULUM
In the following chapter I will make connections between (1) the intent of my inquiry to
understand what Richard Rorty means by “poetic,” detailed in Chapter 2, and to suggest
implications for the way one might (re)conceive curriculum.
RORTY AND THE POETIC
What does Richard Rorty mean when he advocates for the poet rather than the
metaphysician? When he refers to “poetic imagination” is he simply referring to figurative use of
language? To answer these questions, in light of my inquiry, I refer to Rorty’s (1967)
Introduction to The Linguistic Turn; there he states that “epistemological difficulties which have
troubled philosophers since Plato and Aristotle” are related to what he calls, drawing on John
Dewey, a “spectatorial account of knowledge.” The difficulties concern
the acquisition of knowledge [as] the presentation of something ‘immediately
given’ to the mind, where the mind is conceived of as a sort of ‘immaterial eye,’
and where immediately means… ‘without the mediation of language.’ (39)
The “presentation of something immediately given” is its “representation” in language, a
representation of knowledge so separated “from doing and making that we fail to recognize how
it controls our conceptions of mind, of consciousness and of reflective inquiry” (Dewey, 1929,
22).96 Dewey’s characterization of spectatorial knowledge closely resembles Timothy Reiss’s
                                                 
96 John Dewey’s (1929) Experience and Nature contains, I think, six references to other scholars. Five of these
are: Basil Gildersleeve, Gilbert Murray, Otto Jesperson, Alexander Goldenweiser, and Herbert Spencer.
Gildersleeve was an exemplary scholar of Greek at Johns Hopkins. Gilbert Murray a scholar of Greek literature at
Oxford (and later president of the League of Nations). Jesperson was a Danish linguist, inventor of the international
language of Esperanto, and later, Ido; he lectured in the US and studied the American educational system.
Goldenweiser, a graduate of Columbia University, studied anthropology with Frank Boaz; his interests were race,
sex, cultural diffusion and psychoanalysis. Herbert Spencer was a social Darwinist, interested in the development of
symbolic relations. Symbolic interactionism, one of four theoretical approaches to analysis in sociology, derived
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(1982) “objectivity” in the rationalist discourse of modernity. Indeed, Dewey takes apart
“objectivity” in his criticism of philosophy in the Introduction to (and throughout) Experience
and Nature (1929).97 For Dewey, the spectatorial theory of knowledge is problematic in three
ways: first, the assumption of “knowledge” as a result of (only) observing; second, its denial of
the other, bodily or organic ways of knowing; and third, refusal to acknowledge the choices of
selection (viewer discretion) in the representation of knowledge. These problems stem from the
“separation between theory and practice, knowledge and action” (24) which Dewey attributes to
“the Greeks” (Plato and Aristotle).
 “Spectatorial” knowledge is widely accepted in educational practices, implemented, as
William Doll (1993) explains, in relation to a concept of curriculum
that sets out the a priori in clear and concise terms, and to a concept of instruction
whereby the teacher (as knower) shows and transmits the a priori to the student.
The teacher’s success (as well as the student’s) depends on the size of the deficit
between the ideal reality “out there” and the existential reality that the student
possesses. It is feasible to call this curriculum a “measured deficit curriculum,”
                                                                                                                                                              
from the influence of Herbert Spencer. An interactionist approach views communication by means of symbols as the
key to social organization; humans act toward people, objects, and events on the basis of the meanings they impart
to them. For Dewey those meanings are, in part, derived from culture and systems of relations in which the human is
participant. Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy, an anti-positivist one, informs his views on the interactions among
language, culture, and human activities; his historical study of the development of philosophy, and what preceded it,
draws on the scholarly work of the six scholars mentioned.
97 Philip Jackson (2002), in John Dewey and the Philosopher’s Task, undertakes an inquiry into the multiple
revisions Dewey made to the Introduction to Experience and Nature. While he honestly admits his own hopes and
desires for the inquiry in the Afterward, admitting that he arrives at no substantive conclusions, Jackson provides
intriguing insights and discussion of differences among the versions.
In a personal conversation (2001), Jackson stated that he could not see that Dewey’s two years in China had any
influence in the writing of the book, or in his thinking, written on his return from that trip. On my part, subsequent to
my exploration of differences in interpretation of mimesis, before and after the rational Greeks (Plato and Aristotle),
I find in this work references that I attribute directly to Dewey’s encounter with a culture so completely different
from his own. For example, his acceptance of the existence of the mythical and magical alongside—integrally a part
of— the “objective,” is not a “rational” view, nor a typical Euro-American one, but it was a part of the pre-
revolutionary Chinese culture he visited.
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with grades designed to measure the size of the deficit: the higher the grade the
lower the deficit. (139)98
The a priori concept of teaching and learning that Doll describes as a “measured deficit
curriculum” is based on two mimetic fallacies. The first is that representations in textbooks are
equivalent to experience (this is that). The second fallacy is to assume that learning is the same
in both situations, i.e. that the stripped-down, objective version of some universal reality is the
same as life in all its untidy, disorderly complexity. The third fallacy, Doll describes elsewhere,
pointing to the authority of the text which presents a God’s eye view, without acknowledging
other perspectives or the “selective choices” (Dewey, 1929) made in the determination of the
knowledge presented.
Continuing in Experience and Nature, in determination of what Rorty might mean by
poetic, I focus on the contrast to a spectatorial view that Dewey presents. He refers to the
spectatorial observation as the “blankest of stares”; the difference he develops, however, refers to
more than a degree of involvement. Observation is supremely important to the pragmatist
thought of Dewey (and Peirce). Observation on observations (12) is reflection that leads to
intellectual growth. Observation on observation99 has to do with the subject interacting with itself
as the object. “In this sense,” says Dewey,
The recognition of “subject” as centres (sic) of experience… marks a great
advance. It is equivalent to the emergence of agencies equipped with special
powers of observation and experiment, and with emotions and desires that are
efficacious for production of chosen modifications of nature. For otherwise the
                                                 
98 Doll (1993) draws on Stephen Toulmin’s history of the “spectator” in ancient Greece and its relation to
theoretical knowledge and philosophy, pg. 140.
99 The sense of “observation on observations”—key to any reflection in depth—is akin to Gregory Bateson’s
(1979) “pattern of patterns” (meta- patterns) with which he begins Mind and Nature.
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agencies are submerged in nature and produce qualities of things which must be
accepted and submitted to. (13)
Agency submerged in things which must be submitted to corresponds to the subjectivism
that William Pinar (2005) describes as the “gracious submission” of some educators to the
politicization of the reform of public education by special interest groups—“a national fantasy
fabricated and articulated by politicians” (69; also Huebner, 1999, 231–40).100
When Dewey refers to “modifications of nature,” presaging Gregory Bateson, he refers
also to mind, for mind is formed through the interaction of nature and culture:101
The mind that appears in individuals is not as such individual mind. The former is
in itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and
rejection, of expectancies and appraisals of meanings which have been instituted
under the influence of custom and tradition. (219)
Dewey develops, by bridging the (artificial) separation of nature and experience (20–21),
a theory of “emergent” mind (271), on which he bases the interaction and influence of subject
and object to create “newness.” Newness is growth, transformation and learning involving self
which is for Dewey, never “owned,” finished or closed (245). Growth requires:
Surrender of what is possessed, disowning of what supports one in secure
ease…in all inquiry and discovery; the later implicate an individual still to make,
with all the risks implied therein. For to arrive at new truth and vision is to alter.
The old self is put off and the new self is only forming, and the form it finally
takes will depend upon the unforeseeable result of an adventure. No one discovers
a new world without forsaking an old one; and no one discovers a new world who
exacts guarantee in advance for what it shall be, or who puts the act of discovery
                                                 
100 In regard to this position of submission, Dewey refers to an individual who is “broken off, discrete, because
it is at odds with its surrounding. It either surrenders, conforms, and for the sake of peace becomes a parasitical
subordinate…(245).
101 Jackson notes that Dewey’s later comment that were he to write his book again he would substitute the word
“culture” for “experience.” Most of Dewey’s book titles are, for example, Democracy and Education, a combination
of two contrasting words, joined by “and.” Experience and nature are two too-similar words.
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under bonds with respect to what the new world shall do to him when it comes
into vision. This is the truth in the exaggeration of subjectivism. Only by
identification with remaking the objects that now obtain are we saved from
complacent objectivism. (245; emphasis added).
The remaking of objects, as Dewey explains, and as Maxine Greene (1988) later explores, is the
role of imagination:
Imagination as mere reverie is one thing, a natural and additive event, complete in
itself, a terminal object rich and consoling, or trivial and silly, as may be.
Imagination which terminates in a modification of the objective order, in the
institution of a new object is other than a merely added occurrence. It involves a
dissolution of old objects and a forming of new ones in a medium which, since it
is beyond the old object and not yet in a new one, can properly be termed
subjective. (220)
Through imagination the subject-object chasm is bridged; but it is more, too, because it
leads to a re-forming of “old objects.” How does this relate to the poetic, for Dewey and hence,
for Rorty? The remaking of objects through imagination relates strongly to the pre-Socratic idea
of poiesis in my inquiry; but what does it mean, if anything, to Dewey? Art, as he explains, for
the earliest “Greek thinkers” was born of experience—“of need, lack, deprivation,
incompleteness” — that “inferior portion of nature…infected with chance and change, the less
Being part of the cosmos” (355). Out of the struggle of human experience, attacked by the fates,
comes imagination, visioning of a different sort; “the more unrestrained the play of fancy, the
greater the contrast” (80) between labor and leisure, work and pleasure. A sense of living is
generated in “those periods of relief when activity was dramatic”; dramatic here probably refers
to “the kind of intense and gripping excitement, startling suddenness, or larger-than-life
impressiveness associated with drama. First, imagination provides relief and release; “objects of
imagination are consummatory in the degree in which they exuberantly escape from the pressure
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of natural surrounding, even when they re-enact its crises” (81). But then also, “consummations
have first to be hit upon spontaneously and accidentally…before they can be objects of foresight,
invention and industry” (81). The “creation” which is the product of imagination may be asserted
“vaguely and mystically” (360), however,
The “magic” of poetry—and pregnant experience as poetical quality—is precisely
the revelation of meaning in the old effected by its presentation through the new.
(360)
This is poiesis in the archaic sense of to make, to create, to do. To create, using
imagination, is Being, in the fullest sense of participating in the cosmos—not simply spectating.
As a result of this inquiry, I feel confident in suggesting that Rorty’s reference to poetic
imagination draws heavily on concepts put forward in Dewey’s Experience and Nature. Here the
poetic is associated with agency, imagination, creativity, all emerging from the interactions
between and among, “organism” “word” and “environment.” A question that has concerned me
since the beginning of the project concerns Rorty’s idea of “conversation.” He cites Michael
Oakeshott’s (1959) essay, of course, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, but the idea of
conversation as “edifying” discourse, and the poetic seems to lie deeper in his thinking. What do
poetic and conversation have to do with each other? Dewey makes a distinction between fine art
and ordinary art. Fine art is an end in itself, as is “knowledge as the fruit of intellectual
discourse”; but such an art is an art as yet open to comparatively few” (203). In contrast,
Letters, poetry, song, the drama, fiction, history, biography, engaging rites and
ceremonies hallowed by time and rich with the sense of the countless multitudes
that share in them, are also modes of discourse that…are ends for most persons.102
                                                 
102 Basil Gildersleeve, Greek scholar at Johns Hopkins until the age of 84, editor of the Journal of Philology
until 89, also wrote poetry. Just before his death at the age of 90, he wrote this sonnet which expresses sentiment
125
From Dewey’s perspective, the art forms he lists here are the arts of the people, who
effectively communicate, through language and performance, their joys and experiences.
Communication is consummatory (final, an “end,” and “objective”) as well as instrumental (a
“means”). It is a means of shared experience, “the greatest of human goods.” Communication is
uniquely instrumental and uniquely final. It is instrumental as liberating us from
the otherwise overwhelming pressure of events and enabling us to live in a world
of things that have meaning. It is final as a sharing in the objects and arts precious
to a community, a sharing whereby meanings are enhanced, deepened and
solidified in the sense of communion. (204–05; emphasis added)103
“Poetry” as an art (not a fine art) and “conversation” (as discourse, but not intellectual
discourse) are both consummatory (ends) and instrumental (means), and both are subjective,
(“private” [103], not objective) expressions that reach out to a community bridging private and
public.
Further, for Dewey, an “objective” self, defined “within closed limits” inevitably faces
the “dialectic [problem] of the universal and individual” (244). This strongly autonomous
individual, finding security in clear-cut boundaries and demarcations, “hugs himself in his
isolation and fights against disclosure, the give and take of communication…[and] the very
integrity of existence” (242–43). A permeable self (242), on the other hand, one that has
                                                                                                                                                              
similar to the point Dewey makes: “I know this sonnet-writing is inanity./ It is not art. 'Tis nothing but a knack/ With
which I while away the darksome hours./ I'll keep it up, though critics doubt my sanity/ Till the pale postman comes
whose knocks attack/ Alike the poor men's cots and princes' towers.'' (http://etc.princeton.edu/Campus
WWW/Companion/gildersleeve_basil_lanneau.html). For Dewey, poetry was not “fine art”; it was the art of “the
poor” and “the princes.” Art “yields direct enjoyment,” and derives from festivity “in revery (sic), ceremonies, and
conversation” (1958, 79).
103 I speculate that by “communication” Dewey may refer to conversation, in Rorty’s terms, In the OED,
conversation is associated with “having dealings with others; living together; commerce, intercourse, society,
intimacy. Communion is “fellowship; intimate personal converse; sharing or holding in common with others.
126
“qualitative and intrinsic boundaries” and “affinities and active outreachings for connection and
intimate union,” is one that is open to growth and renewal (242–45).
No one discovers a new world without forsaking an old one; and no one discovers
a new world who exacts guarantee in advance for what it shall be, or who puts the
act of discovery under bonds with respect to what the new world shall do to him
when it comes into vision. (246)104
For the permeable self, conversation/communication bridges subjectivity and objectivity,
allowing the “old self [to be] put off and the new self [to] form” (245), a poiesis, in the
reforming.105
In Dewey’s Experience and Nature, I find the basis for Rorty’s use of the poetic and
imagination, and I understand better pragmatist thought and its relation to the linguistic turn in
philosophy. In fact, much of the theoretical frame that Rorty brings forward and has developed
over the last forty years is in this Dewey book. Having explored the poetic to create a wider
panorama, seeing the poetic in relation to two modes of representation—poiesis and poetic—I
now read Dewey differently. Dewey—and Nietzsche and Heidegger—did similar research,
recognizing a particular habit of thought, the modernist habit of objectivism. As Timothy Reiss
                                                 
104 Dennis Carlson (2004) in his Leaving Safe Harbors, alludes beautifully to this Deweyan point of forsaking
an old world to discover a new one; one does not discover with the vision already in sight. The idea of being “clear,”
but especially about the future, is not one often associated with Dewey. Indeed, as Philip Jackson (2002) notes, a
criticism aimed at Dewey’s writing is that “it’s an unstructured world in which you sort of move through a fog”
(Jackson, 98–99). Jackson makes much of this point; he says Dewey headed “straight into the fog”; he continues,
“What we still want to know is what lay beyond the fog for Dewey” (101). For Dewey, however, as the quotation
(above) indicates, one cannot predict the future until it comes into vision; discovery is of the unknown. As a good
pragmatist, Dewey was content to be guided in practice by his “vision”—not of a clear path—but of recognizing and
encouraging relationships.
105 Dewey’s views on communication are criticized by feminist, poststructuralist, and critical theorist critiques
concerning “power and subjectivity” in relations. A major thrust of Dewey’s pragmatist view is, however, that
rationalism and positivist philosophies of modernity condition the habits of thought (and practices) which form
these subjectivities. Attending closely to practices of communication, one recognizes the obfuscated presence of
modernist habits. Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997), in Teaching Positions, brilliantly exposes the power dynamics in
dialogical communication in her discussion of modes of address.
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(1982) points out, modernist thought is characterized, in part, by a cognitive separation of subject
and object, focusing on the object, seeing it external to the enunciating subject, and representing,
in language, that object as though the subject is both unaffected by the object, and indeed, absent.
This modernist habit tends to reinforce itself, and Rorty says that to be able to move beyond
modernity, to envision a new future, one needs poetic imagination. Modernist habits are hard to
dismiss, actually, hard to recognize. The poetic is slippery and hard to get hold of. In the
following section, I draw on the work of two curriculum scholars to illustrate, in their discursive
practices, selected differences between (1) a continuing, but obfuscated, presence of Aristotelian
mimesis in David Hansen’s (2004) “A Poetics of Teaching”; and (2) a less recognized poietic
presence in Tetsuo Aoki’s (2004) scholarly playing with curriculum.
THE POETIC IN CURRICULUM STUDIES
In his article “A Poetics of Teaching,” David Hansen (2004), comments that no
comprehensive study of the poetic has been done in curriculum studies; he provides such,
drawing from a wide selection of authors: Aristotle, Friedrich Schiller, John Dewey, George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Martin Heidegger, and Friedrich Nietzsche. From these works he
pulls forward various aspects of his sense of the poetic to create a “holistic” impression of
teaching as a process that “can rekindle, or reignite, a love of learning, of development, of new
insight and knowledge, that might otherwise never have come into being” (137). Hansen’s
worry, one shared by many educators, is that teaching is today looked upon “as merely an
engineering problem of how to transfer a preset body of knowledge and skills efficiently to
students.” In this frame, the “teacher becomes a paid functionary…while the student becomes the
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passive recipient” (123). Hansen’s remedy for this situation is to focus—as the title of the article
states—on teaching and the teacher’s art. In this Hansen does not neglect the student—believing
the student will benefit from a “dynamics of teaching”—but his focus is on a new approach to
teaching, a poetic approach. As I have said, and I believe Hansen would agree, poetics is a
“slippery term.” Hansen describes many meanings for the term, but argues that all of them
coalesce around a “heightened sense of meaning, artfulness, and delight that various events,
scenes, and situations can spontaneously evoke” (122). He encourages teachers to look upon
their acts in this poetic way, fusing together “aesthetic, moral, and intellectual” aspects of their
work. To look upon teaching in this way, Hansen argues, heightens the “relation between world
and person” as “reason and emotion [or inquiry and art] act in concert” (122). This vision draws
heavily, not exclusively, on Aristotle and his poetics. For his vision (appealingly romantic and
ideal), Hansen draws on the power of metaphor, referring to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s
(1980) seminal work (Metaphors We Live By). Hansen believes that metaphor “unites reason and
imagination” (125); “that languages of inquiry and of understanding are enriched…by the
ubiquitous place of metaphor in them” (126). In short, metaphors constitute “a mode of
understanding” (127), an understanding that opens us up to the aesthetic, moral and intellectual
conditions of the world we inhabit. Hansen asks teachers to look at the world in a poetic manner
and to act upon this vision in their teaching.
In his essay, Hansen holds out an impressionistic image of an experienced ideal teacher.
His model is a representational image of what a teacher (or Teacher) could be. As he says,
speaking directly to the nation’s teachers, “Here is a portrait of what teaching can mean, of how
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it can fuse the aesthetic, the moral, and the intellectual features of your work into a worthy
undertaking” (141–42).
I applaud Hansen in his efforts, the intent of the article, and the sentiment expressed. But
as Richard Rorty says, to move beyond modernity, to move beyond modern discursive practices
that hold us captive in hierarchal thinking, we need imagination to envision a new future.
Timothy Reiss (in Chapter 2) describes, somewhat obscurely, the evolution and characteristics of
modernist discourse practices which hold us captive: (1) objectivity, the separation of the
viewing subject from the object being viewed; (2) the introduction of thought ordered by a
metaphor, in the case of science, a telescopic image; (3) perspective, the view from above, or
from “everywhere”, the all-seeing; (4) a drive to certainty; and (5) the linear narration of
causation. In its modernist (non-poietic) sense, the poetic is traced to Aristotle’s treatment of
mimesis, a rational process of abstraction and generalization of thought, likening this to that, and
reasoning as though this is that (Chapter 3). In agreement with Rorty, recognizing a postmodern
tendency to proliferate endlessly the types of criticism of modernity and the dominant discourse
of rationalism, I want to understand how to “move beyond.” What form of representation might
follow modernity? Practically speaking, that work has already been done by Charles Sanders
Peirce and John Dewey. Pragmatist thought intended to address the inadequacies and errors that
they attributed to positivist philosophies, the effect of which was apparent in modern discursive
practices. My argument is that we too rarely understand the ways in which we continue to be
modern, but those ways are present in our discourse. I use David Hansen’s essay to illustrate the
insidious persistence of such modernist discursive practices —despite our best intentions. I
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suggest that underneath its romantic idealism, his poetics of teaching is a continuation of
Aristotelian mimesis in representation.
I find three points to bring forward from Hansen’s essay indicating an Aristotelian poetic
of mimesis. I begin with the association of the poetic with metaphor. As a figure of speech, a
metaphor “associates two unlike things; the representation of one thing by another.”106 An image
is used to represent or “figure” something else. As Reiss points out, modernist rational thought is
ordered by metaphor. Metaphorical order leads one to look from the particular to the abstraction;
the abstraction is an image or concept which is a universal. In Aristotelian terms, the universal is
a representation of traits of nature in all humans. Thus, rational thought moves logically from the
particular to the representation of the universal, and reasoning occurs at the level of
generalization. The particular is subjected—subordinate— to the universal.
Dewey (1958) criticized this mode of thought as “spectatorial”; it calls us to look at the
image. The image is, however, not a real thing, but “non-temporal,” (an eternal), “out of time in
the sense that a particular temporal quality is irrelevant to [it].” “These non-temporal,
mathematical or logical qualities are capable of abstraction, and of conversion into relations, into
temporal, numerical and spatial order. As such they are dialectical, non-existential” (148;
original emphasis). Dewey continues, elaborating the types of knowledge obtained by modern
epistemologies, which are “bound to regard things which are causally explanatory as superior to
results and outcomes; for the temporal dependence of the latter cannot be disguised, while
‘causes’ can be plausibly converted into independent beings, or laws, or other non-temporal
                                                 
106 Bedford Glossary of Critical and Literary Terms (1997), s. v. “Metaphor.”
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forms” (149). I take Dewey’s point to be that “eternals” (non-temporals) create a hierarchical
ordering of thought. The particular is subjected to the abstract image or concept. These eternals
are manipulated rationally—at a distance— to create logical solutions, to find causes, to lead to
certain knowledge.
With these Deweyan thoughts in mind, I reconsider Hansen’s phrase about the poetic as a
dynamic that can inspire and lead us to new ways of seeing the “relation between world and
person” (122). In this statement, I recognize “organism” (person) and “environment” (world); but
notice that the “word” (representation) is absent—a characteristic of modern discourse practices,
where “word” (representation) is assumed, mistakenly thought to be equivalent (in mimesis) to
the object represented. The absence of “word” is essential to understanding the obfuscated
presence of Aristotelian mimesis in Hansen’s use of the word “poetic.” The portrait, the image,
set before the teacher, suggests that this is a Teacher. It is a model, an abstract representation, to
which the teacher is subjected. The word “subjected” here has great importance, because the
subject is now really becoming an object, a thing. The teacher is now objectified as “Teacher.”
This is a point that much distressed Dewey.
Beholding the vision, inspired by it, working toward the idealized “teacher” becomes, in
the Aristotelian sense, the artistry of teaching. Here, artistry is conceived, in the classical
manner, as the refinement of skills that leads eventually to connoisseurship (Tatarkiewicz, 1970;
Eisner, 1979).107 The product that this mimetic “artistry” aims toward is a more skilled teacher,
                                                 
107 Eisner’s notion of connoisseurship is “spectatorial” (Dewey’s term) in the sense that it emphasizes knowing
through seeing; however, he states: “My emphasis on seeing should be regarded as a shorthand way of referring to
all of the senses and the qualities to which they are sensitive” (in Pinar et al., 1995, 582).
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one who is able to control, him- herself and others, and to be responsible for a better learning
situation. I recall the adjectives “captivating and mesmerizing” from Martin Jay’s (1998) chapter
on mimesis, in regard to the rhythm in the back and forth of mimesis; I envision the teacher
gazing first at the portrait, and then to him- herself, and back again, repeatedly. For the teacher,
the idea of controlling a situation through cause and effect thinking (if I can be a better teacher I
can get the students to learn more), no matter how poetic, is self-defeating. Hansen’s poetics
provides an example of the dynamics of “gracious submission” (Pinar, 2004, 46) that leads to the
subjectivization of teachers.
Embedded in the Aristotelian poetic dynamic of equivalency, this is that, is Martin
Heidegger’s concern about an economy of exchange, where teacher “input” is equated with
student “output,” as in test scores. Since neither particular teachers nor particular students are
ever equal to the image, there is always a gap. Disguised is the direct relationship implied by
cause and effect thinking, that if the teacher just improves his or her skills, the student will learn
better. This places the teacher’s actions always within a deficit relationship; Hansen tacitly
admits such when he presents his model of an idealized, abstracted, generalized teacher.
 The poetic dynamic that is at work here also leads to the objectification of the student;
Hansen states:
A teacher moved by gesture and voice, and drawn to the grace and the good often
expressed in them, gains access to the functioning of the mind that all such acts
reveal. (135; emphasis added)
Here Hansen is expressing, I feel certain, the common notion that in knowing the student
better, the teacher can teach better. (Literally, gaining access to the actual functioning of a
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student’s mind is, I expect, not a reading Hansen intends). While Dewey, as I, might well
applaud the existent quality of grace and good, there is still the idea, implied if not expressed,
that teacher and student are separate, gazing at each other, seeing each other’s gestures. The
exchange of looks is only a sign however: “Gestures…are not primarily expressive and
communicative”; “The story of language is the story of the use made of these occurrences; a use
that is eventual, as well as eventful” (175). What either the teacher or the student sees in the
exchange is a “signaling act” (177). Hansen states, “the teacher seeks to build upon [the
signals]…urging students to deepen and extend their insights” (135); but the teacher’s
exhortations indicate, unfortunately, a blindness to the function of “word” in representation. It is
not words that carry meaning, Dewey (1958) explains. A signal is primal “organic behavior,” it
has implications, and can lead to language. Important as this early awareness (of signals) is, it
must not be confused with the use of language, which is more than merely a means of
“economizing energy in the interaction” of individuals; language accrues meaning as the
“consequences that flow from the distinctive patterns of human association” (175). Relationship
is established in this patterning that arises from participation.108 Participation, active
engagement, so important to Dewey, is lacking in Aristotelian mimesis (as I have been indicating
for several chapters), missing in modernist either/or thought, and unfortunately not evident in
Hansens’s teacher gaining access to the student’s thoughts, actions, behaviors.
Participation, teacher and student together, begins movement toward a participatory act
of shared partnership, “in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by the
                                                 
108 The discourse of patterning is the name that Reiss gives to the discourse of mythopoetic cultures, a discourse
that was effectively lost in the domination of rationalism.
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partnership” (179). Entering into this communicative relationship, each of these formerly
objectified persons, comes to share with the other. They are in communion. For Dewey,
communication ends the objectification of both teacher and student, each becoming permeable to
the other, entering a partnership born of shared activity. Explaining the difference between mere
language use and communication, he says,
The heart of language is not “expression” of something antecedent, much less
expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of
cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of
each is modified and regulated by the partnership. To fail to understand is to fail
to come into agreement in action; to misunderstand is to set up action at cross-
purposes. (179)
The consummatory act of communication for Dewey is about creating meaning, about which he
states,
It constitutes the intelligibility of acts and things. Possession of the capacity to
engage in such activity is intelligence. Intelligence and meaning are natural
consequences of the peculiar form which interaction sometimes assumes in the
case of human beings. (180).
The peculiar form of interaction Dewey refers to is, I suggest, what Rorty calls conversation. In
this act of communication, uncommon in schools, meaning is made and communities develop, as
well as permeable, non-objectified, selves.
My final point concerning a poetics of teaching as an aesthetic, moral, intellectual art
concerns a conceptual difference between Aristotelian “fine art” as a representation of nature (a
universal), and Dewey’s poetic art which coincides with my version of poietic mimesis. Teaching
as an art conceived through Aristotelian poetics will always be a labor; this is a fundamental shift
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away from Dewey’s emphasis on the poetic and art as a pleasure and a qualitative expression of
release from the toils of labor. Dewey notes,
A passion of anger, a dream, relaxation of the limbs after effort, swapping of
jokes, horse-playing, beating of drums, blowing of tin whistles, explosion of
firecrackers and walking on stilts, have the same quality of immediate and
absorbing finality that is possessed by things and acts dignified by the title of
esthetic. For man is more preoccupied with enhancing life than with bare living;
so that a sense of living when it attends labor and utility is borrowed not intrinsic,
having been generated in those periods of relief when activity was dramatic. (80)
Dramatic, in this sense, refers to intense, gripping excitement and surprise. According to Dewey,
it is not laboring at one’s craft that leads to consummatory experiences: “labor manifests things
in their connections of things with one another, in efficiency, productivity, furthering, hindering,
generating, destroying” (84). “Direct appreciative enjoyment exhibits things in the
consummatory phase” (84), such as drama, poetry, art, celebration. Imagination is
consummatory, in the degree to which it provides exuberant “escape from the pressure of natural
surroundings” (81). And it is imagination that leads to growth.
Traditional teaching is founded on poetic practices which conceive of learning as some
form of mimesis, either direct imitation and copying, or aimed at abstraction and generalization,
the metaphorical this is that. The reform that Dewey brought to education subsequent to a
reconsideration of the poetic, much as I have done here, is to see the necessity—and the
liberty—of imagination in intelligent thought. In the following section I use the writing of Tetsuo
Aoki to illustrate discursive practices that I think demonstrate a “poiesis of curriculum.” Using
this phrase, as I have done in the title of this dissertation, my aim is to call attention to the
possibilities of generative creativity in reconceiving discursive practices. To create, to make, to
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do—these were, for Dewey, the ultimate experiences of learners. The free and liberating
experiences Dewey had in mind were not poetry and art classes where students copied the
methods of others; nor were these opportunities to learn how to judge fine art. In drawing on the
discursive practices of Aoki, I hope to bring forward an awareness of the type of
creating/generativity that Dewey had in mind for curriculum.
TED AOKI AND A POIESIS OF CURRICULUM
Tetsuo Aoki (2005) provides a contrasting sense of the poetic in curriculum studies, one
that works to counter the hegemony of Eurocentric Western thought in education. Therefore, as
one might expect at this point in this dissertation, Aoki’s discursive practices provide an
illustration of his conscious effort to decenter representation and, I suggest, Aristotelian mimesis.
His interest in curriculum studies and in teaching, lies in his exploration of the being of teaching,
its “is-ness” (191).
In his writing (and performance of teaching), calling attention to representation (word),
his sense of being in the world (organism), and Western cultural values (environment), Aoki
creates, by calling into play, the unseen, unrepresented, and lived phenomena of being-in-the-
world when freed from a taken-for-granted, Eurocentric orientation. In Aoki’s work, I focus, as I
think he does, on the centrality of the relationship of organism/ word/environment in educational
inquiry.
 In this final section of the dissertation, I draw on Aoki’s texts to illustrate a poiesis of
curriculum emerging when one moves away from the tradition; that is, Aoki plays with the
dominant discourse, creating “cracks,” to access spaces rich with generative possibilities. His
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discursive practice is an “evocation,” meaning “a re-creation of something not present, especially
an event or feeling from the [lived] past.”109 In these “breaks,” he calls others into engagement
through surprise and wonder. Teaching is an opportunity to create—a poiesis—twining into the
curriculum, perhaps even foregrounding, one’s lived experience.
Environment
As “environment” relates to culture, Canadian-born, Japanese-Canadian, Aoki
experienced the marginalization of racism around WWII. He has the sensibilities of his parents
Japanese-ness, the language, the appearance, but is not at home in Japan. Aoki plays off Eastern
culture against a dominant Western culture, creating a “tensionality” that he has felt much of his
life, thereby decentering characteristics of Western knowledge such as rationality with its
emphasis on vision (seeing).
Word
As “word” relates to representation and to thought, Aoki beautifully works in a different
frame, calling the Western canon into question. He says that “by questioning…by contrasting
one thing with another, the resultant dialectic allows possibilities of a deeper awareness of who
one is and of a fuller understanding of the conditions shaping one’s being” (2005, 35). Here I
refer to one particular essay, “Language, Culture and Curriculum…”; 110  it is representative of
his later essays, I believe, and it illustrates his mode of analysis. The essay deals directly with the
relationship of language to culture and curriculum, exposing the oppressive, but opaque, effects
                                                 
109 Encarta World English Dictionary, Microsoft Word X, 1999, s.v. “Evocation.”
110 This chapter was a presentation to the Canadian Association of Curriculum Studies, President’s Symposium,
with a colleague from the University of Alberta, Ken Jacknicke, May, 2000.
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of language. The essay is a performance of insights gained through questioning from a position
of marginality, a demonstration of consummate skill with language, awareness of (two) cultures
and a belief in the importance of the meaningfulness of curriculum. His exploration illuminates
how others might also find deeper awareness of “the conditions shaping one’s being.”
Aoki identifies his style (I would say discursive practice) as “metonymic writing.”
Metonymy is the “substitution of an attribute for the name of the [objectified] thing meant.”111 As
such metonymy is a trope, a figure of speech, in which one thing is represented by another that is
commonly and often physically associated with it.”112 For example, “to refer to a writer’s
handwriting as his or her “hand” is to use a metonymic figure.” Deconstructivists insist that
undue privilege is “granted to metaphor in the metaphor/metonymy distinction or ‘opposition,’”
and suggest, instead, “that all metaphors are really metonyms” (214).
Aoki’s metonymic writing uses the word/idea “fragment” to explore the physical
relationship of the part to a more complex whole; the fragment does not in itself represent the
whole, nor is it necessarily considered a self-similar element. To “fragment” is “to cause
something to lose sense of unity or cohesion, with the result that it splits into isolated and often
conflicting elements.”113 A fragment is sometimes caused by a “break”; fragmenting leaves small
gaps or chinks, “cracks.” Focusing on the fragment (the particular) is an inversion of the
abstraction (universalization) of rationalism; in so doing, Aoki calls to question the coherence
valued in rationalist discourse.114
                                                 
111 Modern English Usage, H. G. Fowler, s.v. “Technical Terms,” “metonymy”.
112 Bedford Glossary of Critical and Literary Terms, s.v. “Metonymy”
113 Encarta World English Dictionary, Microsoft Word X, 1999, s.v. “Fragment.”
114 Coherence in rationalist discourse is achieved, in part, through the “absent presence” of metaphor—this is
that— and through the linear narration of causation.
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Aoki calls attention to the obfuscated role of metaphor (this is that) by creating what he
calls the “conjunctive space” between, this and that, substituting “and” for the copula “is,” which
is a variation to the verb “to be.” In so doing, Aoki suggests that there are other ways “to be.”
Since there is now no direct relationship (this/that) that precludes variations and interpretations,
there is a “space” to consider other possibilities, including those of lived experience. Between
representational and non-representational discourses “is the site of living pedagogy” (429); for
Aoki, this site is a creative space for his metonymic writing, it becomes a geographical terrain in
some of his writing, and he explores its topography.115 He refers to the “space” metonymically,
as a “moment,” perhaps, the momentary fragment of lived life. In this essay (“Language,
Culture, and Curriculum…”) he includes five moments in which to consider lived experience:
“Midst Curriculum-as-Plan/Curriculum-as-Lived; “Midst Presence/Absence; “Opening Up to the
Third Space Midst Representational/ Nonrepresentational Discourses”; “Midst Western
Knowledge/Aboriginal Knowledge”; and “Translation/ Transformation.”116
In the conjunctive “and” space that is “opened up,” spaces that he calls “cracks,” where
light comes in, he wonders what it may be like to be “enlightened,” “living in the spaces
between, marked by cracks in the words” (2005, 54, 321). This is Aoki’s invitation to the
                                                 
115 Aoki develops this notion of “space” drawing on cultural theorist, Homi Bhabha’s “third space of ambivalent
construction,” similarly developed by: Trinh Minh-ha (hybridity); William Doll (“chaos in which dwell
transformative possibilities”); Gloria Anzaldúa (Borderlands/la Frontera); and most notably, and complexly, by
Deleuze and Guattari (nomadic spaces and rhizomatic connections/accesses). I speculate that this literary
“space”—described now by many in various ways—is in some way comparable to the ineffable space of possibility
that figured the work of both C. S. Peirce and Gregory Bateson, who came not from a literary frame, but from a
mathematical and logical one: the logic of relatives, “the relation of the one and the many.” Michel Serres’s (1997)
third space of knowing and Gregory Bateson’s levels of learning have close similarities.
116 Antoinette Oberg (2005), a former student of Ted Aoki, notes that for him, midst is being in the middle; like
the word “interest,” which derives, literally, from “inter” (between) and “esse” (Latin form of the verb “to be”). In
the OED, to interest is to invest in, “share in” a spiritual privilege, “to engage in” (OED, s.v. “Interest,” v.)
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audience. The hook he uses is absurdly simple: he pays intensely close attention to language, to
words, and what they may—or may not—signify. He comments on the title, “Language, Culture,
and Curriculum…(referring to himself and his co-presenter)
We are drawn into spaces: first, the space between “language” and “culture”
where a graphic mark we call “comma” urges us to pause a moment, the space
between “culture” and “curriculum” where we locate the word “and” claiming a
conjoining, and then the space marked “…” suggesting “more to come” and
“incompleteness.” (321)
Aoki proceeds from these deceptively easy observations, to create “cracks” in the three
words which become the metonymic moments; for example, curriculum, becomes
“curric/ulum…,” then “curriculum-as-plan/curriculum-as-lived” (322). The distinction he creates
refers to the “plan” which is the “conventionalized,” “mandated,” “prescripted for implement-
ation” curriculum which contrasts with “lived,” the “unplanned and unplannable,” a “site of both
difficulty and ambiguity and also a site of generative possibilities and hope” (322). Aoki notes
that “thoughtful teachers” remark that “pedagogy is located in the vibrant space in the fold
between” “plan” and “lived.”117 “Pedagogy” is one of his favorite words; he draws upon its
etymological roots, to find that a pedagogue is one who leads, with care, by both listening and
following; “what authorizes him [her] to be a leader is not so much the title or position, but
rather his attunement to the care that silently dwells” (192). Aoki explains that he offers “short
narratives— stories—that point to more than they tell,” fragmentary tales, that help us to “break
                                                 
117 It would be interesting to compare Aoki’s use of “fold,” a common term for him, with Michel Serres’s use of
the term, from a chaos theory perspective. For Serres, see Troubadour of Knowledge (“Folds and Knots”), and
Conversations on Science, Culture and Time (“Method”). For “folding” in chaos theory (Baker transformations), see
Edward Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos. Serres is a self-proclaimed “chaotician” (in Conversations on Science,
Culture, and Time: Michel Serres with Bruno Latour).
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away from the orientation that may blind us” (190). His effort is to disrupt. The “break” signifies
a “fragment” which fits with W. J. T. Mitchell’s (1994) reconceiving of representation as
a multi-dimensional and heterogenous terrain, a collage or patchwork quilt
assembled over time out of fragments. Suppose further that this quilt was torn,
folded, wrinkled, covered with accidental stains, traces of bodies it has enfolded.
This model might help us understand a number of things about representation. I
would make materially visible the structure of representation as a trace of
temporality and exchange, the fragments as mementos, as “presents” re-presented
in the ongoing process of assemblage, of stitching in and tearing out. (419)
In his metonymic moments, Aoki offers the reader/listener a gift, a “present” of re-
presentation comprised of his attunement, his sensitivity to the “difficulty and ambiguity” that he
knows exists in the space that we are numb to; indeed, the space that Aristotle excluded in his
either/or logic.
In the end, there is a short “lingering” moment, to note the transformation that the play of
language has wrought: In re-working the title of the presentation, he changes the relationship of
three separate “master signifier” words, “Language, Culture, and Curriculum…” separated by
commas and spaces, to indicate their connections and relationship to the “living moments of
life.” He says, “We leave you with a new title: “The Interplay of Languages and Cultures Midst
Curricular Spaces: Five Metonymic Moments” (328). Where the previous title was three
separated and singular nouns and an ellipsis, now the title is transformed, ironically, to a
sentence fragment, but a fragment that even so, implies their interrelatedness.
Organism
The disruption of Western representational discourse leads inevitably to a questioning of
the idea/l of an individual, autonomous “self unto itself with its own identity” (page; emphasis
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added). For Aoki, a unified sense of self is alien; for the Japanese a person is twofold of self and
other” (327). In traditional Japanese language, there is not even a graphic for individualism. As a
“Japanese-Canadian” he identifies with hybridity, and in its being, he “sinks into the lived space
of between—in the midst of many cultures, into the inter of interculturalism,” reminding us that
we all live in this space. He continues,
Indwelling here is a dwelling in the midst of difference, often trying and difficult.
It is a place alive with tension. In dwelling here, the quest is not so much to rid
ourselves of tension, for to be tensionless is to be dead like a limp violin string,
but more so to seek appropriately tuned tension, such that the sound of the
tensioned string resounds well. (382)
We all dwell amidst difference in this hybrid interspace. The idea of identity is limiting
for Aoki, and for Heidegger, on whom he draws:
The traditional notion of “identity” tends to truncate the situational context of our
lives, leaving the possible danger of reducing our life reality to an abstracted
totality of its own, pretending to wholeness…such a reduction seduces us to
forgetfulness of the possibilities for a fuller life, of our living in differences. He
advises us not to limit ourselves, not to submit ourselves to mere identity, but to
enlarge and deepen our place of dwelling so that both identity and difference can
dwell complimentarily. There, he says, would be a human place of openness
wherein humans may struggle in their dwelling aright. And it is the quality of this
struggle that really matters. (354)
As Aoki refers to “a human place of openness” and a capacity to dwell with the tensions
of identity and difference, I find lessons worth living. As this war-torn time demonstrates,
tensionalities are disproportionate in relation to the dominance of “modernist,” “rationalist,”
“Western” representation, and its failure to recognize the generative value of difference. Aoki’s
approach to teaching, like that of archaic Greeks pedagogues, “leads” through listening and
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attunement, to help identify “cracks” through which the light might penetrate. In this regard, I
recall again John Dewey’s (1958) remarks:
The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is unseen decides what
happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and
ungrasped. (43–44)
Aoki’s pedagogical attunement to the untouched and ungrasped is full of the more-ness
he brings to teaching, the more-ness that he knows exists in all lived experience, the more-ness
that leads to generative creativity. His performative pedagogy, that dwells in the folds between
curriculum-as-plan and curriculum-as-lived, opens to students the opportunity “to create, to
make, to do”—to create meanings of lived experiences, to understand the culture around them, to
make sense of the human struggle of being self-and-other, leads toward a poiesis of curriculum.
REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this dissertation, I have criticized a rationalist discursive practice, a habit of thought,
which has dominated intellectual and educational discourse for centuries. As a conceptualizing
practice it is one that excludes the role and/or influence of the observer. In its form, this practice
aims to reason equivalencies, this is that (mimesis). Reasoning that proceeds from a mimetic
form of logic is dyadic (Peirce, in Eisele, 1985, 843), which is defined as “pertaining to or
designating a relation between exactly two entities” (OED). The forms are universals or
categories; the formal relations between the forms is one of equivalency.118 Peirce called this type
of reasoning corollarial, because it is a form of reasoning, based on Euclidean geometrical
forms, that given a particular set of circumstances proceeds to certain conclusions; it also entails
                                                 
118 A syllogism is an example of simple logical relations. Peirce complicates logical relations by introducing a
triadic logic of relations (see below).
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the obvious corollary this is not that. Dyadic reasoning is a simple, logical form fit for a world
observed as whole, complete, fixed and certain, one that creates a bifurcated either/or world of
knowledge.119 In this static view, the regularities of the world can lead to immutable laws and
knowledge as fact. Practices of schooling derived from this form are also simple, based upon the
assumption that memorizing facts and reasoning from them is educative.120
An alternative to such rationalist logic is the pragmatist one developed by Charles
Sanders Peirce, advanced and explicated by John Dewey. Pragmatist thought acknowledges the
contribution of Euclidean forms of deductive reasoning, views it as a necessary but simple form
of reasoning. However, in their world, just then being recognized as evolving, open-ended, and
expanding, a new form of logic was necessary, a logic that assumed transformation, change, and
process as fundamental to existence. Moving beyond modernity and its form of reasoning,
pragmatist logic is triadic involving relations (interactions) between and among the three
categories that I label organism/ word/ environment. Triadic reasoning involves a set of formal
relations that Peirce calls the “logic of relations” (and variously, logic of relatives), where
                                                 
119 Often one recognizes the attempt to reconcile bifurcations, as in the case of “reason and imagination,” or
“reason and art” (Hansen, 122); however, John Dewey advocates moving beyond bifurcated “either-or” ways of
thinking altogether. He does not intend, as some have suggested, reconciliation of the bifurcation by adding this
(reason) plus this (imagination) to get that (artfulness), which is basically the same logical form. Dewey’s approach
as a pragmatist is to use an alternative form of logic, a logic of relations, one that sees thought as a process of
reasoning within a situation, beginning with the interaction of the organism and its environment.
120 Peirce provides an example of the formal logic that underlies traditional pedagogical practices where
learning is conceived as a direct result of teaching. To “teach” in this frame is to show or demonstrate, derived from
rhetorical discursive practices. To “learn” is related etymologically to “lore”; the teacher gives the lesson—“lore” is
a body of knowledge— to the student who learns by receiving it. The simple logical relations of schooling, the
relations between teaching and learning, are dyadic. The relation is perceived as a direct one between the teacher
and the learner. The mediating role of the “lore” itself, its evolution over time, relations to both teacher and learner
are unconsidered. As I discussed in Chapter 2, drawing on Timothy Reiss’s (1982) analysis, rationalist
conceptualizing practices overlook the discourse itself, which in Peirce’s example, is the lore. As Peirce explains,
the art of teaching is a branch of rhetoric; learning is a fruit of logic. These two practices, teaching and learning, are
brought together as the student learns reasoning for himself—what to think—not how to think.
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reasoning proceeds from categories that are at best “approximal” and transforming. In its triadic
form, reasoning begins with the observer (organism), whose view is always only partial, who
exists in an environment that is always evolving.121
The influence of the observer greatly complicates the formal relations of reasoning,
because the effect of unique individual experience (interaction with environment) is brought into
logical relations. Peirce’s logic of relations is greater in difference than merely a move away
from “purely mathematical” reasoning.122 About this Peirce admits,
It is my fate to be supposed an extreme partisan of formal logic, and so I began.
But the study of the logic of relations has converted me from that error. Formal
logic centers its whole attention on the least important part of reasoning, a part so
mechanical that it may be performed by a machine, and fancies that that is all
there is in the mental process. For my part, I hold that reasoning is the observation
of relations, mainly by means of diagrams and the like. It is a living process…
Reasoning is a kind of experimentation, in which, instead of relying on the
intelligible laws of outward nature to bring out the result, we depend upon the
equally hidden laws of inward association. (Peirce, in Ketner, 2000, 45)
                                                 
121 Peirce developed his triadic form of reasoning and the logic of relations at the roughly the same Henri
Poincaré became aware that Newton’s dyadic equations would not work on the relations among three celestial
bodies. Poincaré’s mathematical struggles led eventually to the birth of chaos and complexity theories. Peirce
disagreed with Poincaré’s insistence upon the “nonexistence of any absolute truth for all questions” (Peirce, 1998a,
419). For the pragmatist Peirce, for all practical purposes, there is a satisfactory truth. A separate underlying
difference between Peirce and Poincaré is related to “metaphysical assumptions” that may be drawn from theories in
favor of bare equations” (Peirce, 1998a, 524, fn. 16). “Poincare thought that all physical theories, besides having a
mathematical, experimental, and hypothetical dimension, were also partly conventional, since any number of
hypotheses can be selected, and their selection often rests on economical conventions” (Peirce, 1998a, 529, fn.10).
For Peirce, Poincaré’s position was “contrary to demonstrated principles of logic…an error analogous to that of
agnosticism” (Peirce, 1998a, 187). The relevance, or perhaps, satisfactory truth, of Poincaré’s mathematical
theorizing (which eventually led to the development of complexity theory), was only realized when computers
where available to generate and display fractals, non-regular geometric shapes that have the same degree of non-
regularity on all scales. The patterns represented by fractals would have perhaps have satisfied Peirce about the
relationship between their mathematics and a complex logic of relations.
122 Peirce, a geographer, among his many other occupations, was “greatly influenced” by German
mathematicians Georg Friedrich Riemann and Johann Listing. Riemann “initiated a general non-Euclidean system
of geometry and contributed to the theory of functions” (Peirce, 1998a, 507, fn. 41). Peirce invented existential
graphs as a way to diagram a pragmatist logic of relations.
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The complication of “mental process” and “hidden laws of inward association” to reason
further complicates, and I suggest, opens the door to complexity theory, by considering the effect
of time. Here I begin to speculate on grounds for further research, a path I intend to follow. A
question that Peirce was dealing with, one that plagued others at that time and since, concerned
the order of an evolving world, with questions of its increasing life and growth (diversity) or
tendency to uniformity and entropy. Peirce favored a view that
allows for diversity and specificity as part of the original character or endowment
of things, which in the course of time may increase in some respects and diminish
in others.” (Ketner, in Peirce, 1998b, xxvi)
In the world of ideas, where does “the new” come from? Peirce comments, (in
autobiographical notes), that originality is “the ideal part of the mind’s work in investigation”
and that in science, “scientific minds breathed an atmosphere of ideas which were so incessantly
present that they were unconscious of them” (Peirce in Ketner, 1998, 261).123 The unconscious
plays a large role in Peirce’s pragmatist thought, figuring strongly in abduction, the first phase of
pragmatist logical thought, which involves creative imagination. It is not added to reason; it
begins the process of reasoning, and creativity, or as Peirce says, “genesis” begins in the
abductive phase. Unlike those for whom imagination seems to represents the uncanny in the
sense of the mystical, for Peirce, imagination springs from percepts based on experience. He
means experience in its broadest sense, meaning interaction between the “organism” and its
                                                 
123 Peirce laments in his autobiographical account, that his scientific approach has been misconstrued by his
critics. Not only does he attack all problems by inquiring into their history and the methods through which the
problem is resolved, “but the elementary ideas which are to enter into those methods, should be subjected to careful
preliminary examination” (Peirce, in Ketner, 1998, 262).
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“environment.” 124 In the scenario above, the scientist breathing the atmosphere of science is an
organism in an environment, perhaps unaware of the influence of the environment and of what is
germinating out of this interaction. It is a poiesis, in this phenomenological phase of thought that
Peirce emphasizes, a creating based on experience and interaction. The logical difference that
phenomenology makes is this: (1) percepts, pre-conscious sensory awareness based on
experience (interactions), lead us to anticipate or envision, to have an idea; an “imaginary object”
is expected; (2) but then, something quite different (from our idea) appears. Peirce calls this “the
Strange Intruder in his abrupt entrance” (Peirce, 1998a, 154). Surprise (or doubt) occurs as the
expectation is disrupted. In this moment, says Peirce, there is a double consciousness, between
the anticipated and the actual occurrence. In this space of double consciousness, two
opportunities arise. The first opportunity is to question the observation, to wonder and
hypothesize about one’s observation.125 The second opportunity arising from one’s double
consciousness is reflective, to raise questions about one’s expectations, the surprise itself, the
“Strange Intruder.”
Not only is experience important, but its effects are cumulative, as the Strange Intruder in
its abrupt entrance might be likened to the effect of time, as a recursive effect of the past in the
                                                 
124 The history of the word “uncanny” relates to supernatural influence. In the OED, “being associated with
supernatural arts or powers” or “partaking of a supernatural character; mysterious, weird, uncomfortably strange or
unfamiliar”. French feminist and poststructuralist Julia Kristeva (1991, 169–92) appropriates the idea of the
uncanny, referring to the uncanny stranger, drawing on Melanie Klein’s approach to psychoanalytic theory, seeing
the uncanny as that which is abjected, something which was a part of, but is no longer, something that remains oddly
familiar, taking one back to primal experiences in the development of one’s subjectivities/identity. In curriculum
theory Hongyu Wang (2004, 2005) draws on Kristeva’s uncanny stranger to develop her approach to identity in a
multicultural world and intercultural dialogue.
125 Abduction leads quickly, but secondarily to induction and deduction, and summarily, as retroduction, which
is a judgment made of the conclusions of deduction in Peirce’s triadic schema.
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present, a recollection, to be re-viewed in light of the present, and to inform the future. Small
changes, over time, may make a significant difference.
The creativity of this triadic form of logic has greater import, I think, than being merely
the roots of a vocabulary of complexity theory: emergence, the effect of small changes over time,
reflexivity, iteration, and open dynamical systems. Here is a paradigmatic shift from reason
based on pure mathematics—uniplanar, linear, Euclidean— to a triadic set of relations that
begins with the interaction of the observer in its environment, i.e., the phenomenological poiesis
of interaction. This shift points to a reconsideration of the type of interactions that can be
generative in classrooms. Further, the fundamentally wrong-headed view that curriculum be pre-
set, organized according to an external authority, as opposed to situated in the context of a
specific community of learners, needs to be re-thought in light of pragmatist (Peirce and Dewey)
recommendations of inquiry and interaction. Finally, re-reading progressive educationist John
Dewey, in light of poiesis as an act of creating that emerges in and through interaction (rather
than modernist or Aristotelian views of the poetic), may provide a deeper understanding of
pragmatist principles and views on both education and democracy.
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